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CROZER QUARTERLY

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DANGER AND OPPORTUNITY

HENRY WILDER FOOTE

Belmont, Massachusetts

I HAVE BEEN TOLD that an American missionary in China, studying the Chinese language, observed that the Chinese word into which our word *crisis* was translated is composed of two ideographs, one signifying *danger,* the other *opportunity.* That is very suggestive for the highly critical era in the world's history which confronts us—it is threatened with great dangers, but it also offers great opportunities. Arnold Toynbee in his book, *A Study of History,* has pointed out how such eras of danger balanced by opportunity have recurred again and again in the past. Periods, in which a long-established and apparently stable social order has maintained a relative degree of peace and prosperity, have been overtaken by what he calls "a time of troubles," when nations or whole civilizations have been suddenly confronted with some great crisis which has either destroyed them or compelled them, if they could muster sufficient strength, courage, and wisdom, to remake themselves in a measure sufficient to overcome the threatening dangers.

Today[1] we are living in such "a time of troubles," which burst upon an unsuspecting Europe with the opening of World War I, thirty-six years ago. It followed a century which, though not without localized warfare, was in general one of peace, prosperity, and progress. A high degree of stability had apparently been achieved, and, until the war came, most well-informed persons assumed that we should continue the great advances which civilization was making. When, after my graduation from college a little more than a half-century ago, my sisters and I went abroad for a European tour of fifteen months' duration, we didn't trouble to get passports; none were required until we went to Egypt, then nominally a part of the Turkish empire. Travel was easy; the level of living in Europe was high; a general friendliness prevailed. At that time no one would have believed that in our lifetime we should see the disasters which have since come about, "a time of troubles" the like of which the world has

[1] This essay was written last winter. Its thesis, that modern democracy, and not Russian totalitarianism, represents the true revolutionary movement of our times has since been pointed out by Edwin Canham of the *Christian Science Monitor* and hinted at by President Truman, and the war in Korea has given added force to the author's claims for the United Nations; but none of these developments has invalidated his thesis.—ED.

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never seen on so vast a scale and which has well-nigh destroyed the Europe we knew in our youth.

This miscalculation as to the future of civilization lay in the common failure to realize that the period of almost 140 years which began with the American Declaration of Independence and ended with the opening of World War I had been a revolutionary epoch of profound significance, and to recognize that such a revolutionary epoch piles up explosives which at last detonate with devastating effect.

As we look back upon it with lengthening perspective we can see how revolutionary that period of 140 years was. The Declaration of Independence, and the Federal Constitution which followed it, although the fruit of the long slow growth of self-government in England from the time of Magna Charta and, more immediately, of the political philosophy of John Locke, nevertheless set up principles and methods of government which the world had never seen before and which the rulers of every European country profoundly distrusted as unworkable and dangerous. And flying sparks from the American Revolution did set fire to the vast accumulation of bitter grievances which caused the French Revolution, and the example of American democracy was a stimulating cause of the various revolts against other autocratic European governments in the course of the nineteenth century.

In the present century the ferment has spread throughout the world, the greater part of whose population has until recently remained under native autocracies, or under some form of colonial exploitation. Every native autocrat, such as the feudal Arab rulers, instinctively recognizes that democratic ideals threaten his prerogatives, and is in a quandary as to how to face them. It is, however, the revolt against every form of colonialism which most vividly reveals how widespread and potent are the forces now working for freedom in the Near and Far East. Witness the transition from dependent to independent status which has gone forward like a chain reaction in the successive liberation, within a period of a little more than five years, of the Philippines, Ceylon, Burma, India, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, and Indonesia. In all these lands the people have been stirring in dreams of some form of freedom, and the dream is spreading to Africa as well. We may say that they are ill-prepared to make good use of freedom. That is just what some Europeans said about us, after we had gained our independence. It is true, of course, that all of these newly established governments are faced with problems which will require many decades to solve, and it would be foolish, and worse than foolish, for us to try to impose upon them our particular pattern of democracy, but at least they have the opportunity, never before known to them, to fashion their lives after such pattern as

they desire, free from external coercion. Few, if any of them, are likely willingly to yield their hard-won freedom to Soviet domination, or, on the other hand, to allow themselves to be drawn into the Anglo-American orbit, and as they grow in strength and regional cohesiveness they may well form a third grouping of powers which will act as a stabilizing balance wheel between the now divided East and West.

But this political ferment, of which the Declaration of Independence was the first fruit and has since been the shining example, was only one aspect of the revolution which has gone forward since about 1800. It was closely followed by a development of scientific research and discovery such as the world had never seen before, and which continues with ever-increasing speed and momentum, until it has put into human hands a measure of power inconceivable to earlier generations. Compare, by way of illustration, Benjamin Franklin's kite and key demonstration that lightning was an electrical phenomenon with what we know about electricity today. This vast development of science is the result of freeing the human mind from controls which hitherto had restricted the fields of inquiry and prescribed the results to be found. The treatment of Galileo is the classic example of such restrictions. It was because intellectual freedom had been won in Western Europe and America that science has made its stupendous advance in the last century and a half, and this intellectual freedom has revolutionized our ideas about the universe in which we live and of which we are a part.

A third aspect of the profound change which has taken place in men's thoughts and ways of living was what is known as "the industrial revolution" of the nineteenth century, brought about by the application to industry of these scientific discoveries, especially of new sources of power, first steam and then electricity, to supersede the only forms of power, beyond their own muscles, that men had previously known, namely, the strength of beasts of burden, of falling water to turn small mills, or of wind to move windmills or sailing vessels. Down to about 1800 people all over the world had worked and lived pretty much as their ancestors had done from time immemorial. There had been, of course, superficial changes of fashion, chiefly in clothing. There were also improvements, as in transportation when roads were built to allow the passage of the stagecoach, and especially when the art of navigation in the fifteenth century brought the development of seagoing ships and so transformed the oceans from barriers into pathways. There were enlargements of knowledge, such as the discovery of America. Broadly speaking, however, Europeans previous to 1800 still lived pretty much as they had done since the days of Julius Cæsar, and in other parts of the world as they had done since far earlier times. But with the industrial and technological revolution came machines

which enormously increased productivity and which profoundly altered many forms of human activity and standards of living.

Two very simple illustrations from my own family will illustrate the change in living conditions brought about by this revolution. My maternal grandfather, who lived on Beacon Hill, is credited with having the first icebox in Boston, because he employed a carpenter to make a chest lined with tin, or perhaps it was zinc, into which he could put a block of ice, believing that milk and other foods could thus be kept better and in a cooler temperature than in the cellar, or when lowered into the well in the backyard. The results were so satisfactory that the carpenter made other iceboxes for the neighbors, and soon set up as the first manufacturer of such articles in the country. The contrast between that first icebox and the deep-freeze automatic electrical refrigerator in my own cellar is one yardstick of technological progress in a little more than a century.

My paternal grandfather was born in Salem in 1803 and lived to nearly ninety-one years of age. I well recall his telling me that he was past thirty before it was possible to travel from Salem to Boston in any other way than on foot, on horseback, by carriage or stagecoach, or by sailing vessel. The coming of the Eastern Railroad from Boston to Salem in 1833 marked the beginning of a new epoch, but my grandfather never imagined traveling in an automobile which might go sixty miles an hour on paved highways, much less traveling by airplane. If he had been told that only a little more than half a century after his death his great-grandson would leave an airfield outside of Glasgow after luncheon, would stop briefly in Iceland late that afternoon and in Newfoundland at dawn the next day, would look down on his summer home on Mt. Desert Island in midmorning, and would dine in Washington that night, the prediction would have sounded to him as fantastically impossible as the wildest fictions in the *Arabian Nights*.

Now it is these three factors—the political and social ideals of democracy, the liberation of the human mind in the pursuit of truth, and the new-found ability to create forms of power which can be applied to productive industry—which have, within a period of no more than three or four generations, revolutionized both the thoughts and the ways of living of men in all those parts of the world which have been affected by them, and which have created the ferment spreading to the uttermost parts of the earth. It is no accident that the attainment of freedom, whether political or intellectual, was speedily followed by a rapid development of science which, in turn, brought about the industrial revolution. The sequence was a logical one; the threefold strands are inseparable and, taken together, have created a revolutionary epoch the like of which the world has never before seen for its swiftness and its widespread effect.

I began with the thesis that every revolution sooner or later develops a counterrevolution, that is, an endeavor to return to the tried and trusted ways of old, or at least to stay the rate of change. Such a resistance to change is a normal human reaction, especially for the older members of a generation who have been comfortable in a well-stabilized order of society, the good old times to which they look back with nostalgic longing. When such a reaction takes on the character of a widespread intellectual counterrevolution, we see a movement such as occurred in the Roman Catholic Church following the Protestant Reformation—what is commonly called the Counter Reformation but which modern Catholic writers like to call the Catholic Reformation—consummated in the Council of Trent near the end of the sixteenth century. In that movement the Catholic Church did purify itself of degrading practices and administrative abuses which had caused the Protestant Reformation, and sought in various ways to modernize itself, but the outstanding purpose was not to seek a broadened base of understanding and comprehensiveness which should bring the Protestants back to the fold. The aim and the result were rather to make the papacy even more completely autocratic than it had been before and to require of both priests and laity a rigid and disciplined adherence to dogma and practice, a purpose of which it has never since lost sight. In our own "time of troubles" the religious counterrevolution is seen in the revival of neo-Calvinism or neoörthodoxy in Protestantism, and of neo-Thomism in Catholic circles, with its thesis that our present ills are due to the false standards which arose in the Renaissance or the Reformation, or in the more recent revolutionary period. These religious movements represent a reaction which seeks to recover the faith and wisdom of men of old and to force the new wine into the ancient bottles.

When the counterrevolution takes on a political aspect, it is liable to go far beyond this. It usually takes on gigantic proportions and, in the hands of a dictator or of a small militaristic oligarchy, it invokes traditional patterns of authoritarian despotism to delay or to turn into other channels the course which events are taking. Such counterrevolutionary movements always retain such gains which the revolution has made as can be turned into useful tools for their own ends, but their aim is to revert to an earlier type of social order. That is a familiar phenomenon in history; for example, the French Revolution was quickly followed by the rise of Napoleon, who had all the characteristics of a despotic aggressor shown by his predecessor Louis XIV.

Our own country may seem to offer an exception to the rule that revolution is followed by counterrevolution. Yet Alexander Hamilton, though he had fought bravely in the Revolutionary army for political independence, and skillfully administered the finances of the new govern-

ment, had a very low opinion of the Federal Constitution, which he called a "frail and worthless fabric," and he urged a social order modeled on that of Great Britain, with a titled aristocracy and perhaps a king. It was the leadership of Jefferson, with his advocacy of social reforms such as he had secured in the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom and in the abolition of laws of entail and primogeniture, which overcame what might have developed into a powerful reactionary movement. And our Civil War is, perhaps correctly, interpreted as a belated counterrevolution by Southern slaveholders to make secure an ancient system of privileged property which was threatened by the progress of human thought.

In our present "time of troubles" we have seen several forms of political counterrevolutionary movements. The fascism of Mussolini, with his contempt for "the putrifying corpse of democracy," and the naziism of Hitler with his tricky use of legal forms to set up an aggressive antidemocratic police state, are typical examples. Today two counterrevolutionary movements are conspicuous, one in the continuing fascism of Franco's Spain and Peron's Argentina; the other in Soviet Russia, where what began as a revolt of the people against the agelong tyranny of the czars has been transformed into a magnified and more powerful image of the very despotism which it set out to destroy. Russia is the spiritual heir of the Eastern Roman Empire which had its seat at Byzantium for 1,000 years, when it was an aggressive power exercising an oppressive tyranny on the minds and bodies of its subjects. The czars closely followed that traditional model, and the Soviet government has reverted to the ancient pattern, although using greatly improved techniques to stay the spread of the revolutionary ideas which have remoulded western civilization along democratic lines.

It may seem odd thus to bracket together Soviet Russia and countries dominated by the Roman Catholic Church, for Catholicism and Soviet ideology are bitterly opposed to each other. Their opposition, however, springs not so much from their differences as from their likeness, inasmuch as both are autocratic totalitarian systems claiming dominion over the lives and souls of men, and each knows full well that there is no room for two competing authoritarian systems. In any given region or period one or the other must succumb, or at least must yield for the time being most of the prerogatives it claims. Witness the seesaw conflict which went on for centuries between the papacy and the so-called Holy Roman Empire in the Middle Ages, which at one time brought Henry IV to submission at Canossa, and at another saw the papacy driven from Rome into the so-called "Babylonian exile" in Avignon; or the struggle going on at this moment between the Vatican and the Soviet-sponsored régime in Czechoslovakia. At the moment the Roman Church in Czechoslovakia claims that

it is fighting for religious freedom, a phrase calculated to rally the support of the Western world. It is fighting for religious freedom for itself, but not for other forms of faith, for it does not grant religious freedom, as we understand it, in Spain or anywhere else where it is in control.

The plain fact is that any authoritarian system, whether of church or state, must by its very nature oppose those ideals of political and intellectual freedom which have been the driving force of what I have described as the revolutionary progress of the Western world in the nineteenth century. No autocratic ruler can tolerate any free discussion which tends to undermine his rule. All thinking, speech, and action must, sooner or later, be forced to conform to the pattern which he sets. Witness the methods employed today in Russia to force scientific and economic thinking, music, and literature into a fixed pattern. The Roman Church followed similar methods in the Middle Ages, and its ideology would inevitably lead it to do the same today whenever and wherever it had the power, though it has always displayed great skill in adapting itself to situations in which it lacked that power.

My theisis is that the underlying cause of the "time of troubles" through which we are passing is this gigantic conflict for the minds and hearts of men between the modern ideal of human freedom in a democracy, developed by the threefold complex of causes at work since about 1800, and the age-old tradition of autocratic rule over submissive masses, ostensibly for their own good but in practice mostly for the benefit of the few who have seized power. Autocratic rule, whether in church or state, always moves in the same direction, however much its ideology and its methods may vary, and while it arms itself with tools or weapons which it takes from the arsenal of its opponents, it uses every artifice to pervert or exclude or destroy any influence in conflict with its aims. Russia today is the outstanding illustration. Lenin borrowed Marxism from the West as a tool to overthrow the czars, and Stalin has borrowed all the weapons he could lay hands on to pervert the so-called rule of the proletariat into an ironclad despotism on the Byzantine model of a hermit nation secluded from the revolutionary ideas of the West.

This gigantic conflict takes on various aspects in different parts of the earth, but everywhere the ultimate issue is whether the revolutionary political and social ideas of the nineteenth century or the maintenance of, or reversion to, traditional autocracies shall prevail. The situation is similar, on a world-wide scale, to that which Lincoln described in his famous "House Divided" speech of 1858, when he saw this country as a house divided against itself, half slave and half free. So today what has become "one world," so far as human welfare is concerned, is a house divided between two opposing and apparently irreconcilable forces. This

conflict, of which the "cold war" is the immediate manifestation, will not be soon or easily terminated. Another world war would not settle it, for, though nations may be overwhelmed by force, men's minds are not conquered by force but by persuasion. The wars of religion in Europe following the Reformation illustrate how two bitterly opposed systems of thought, after fighting to exhaustion, finally learn that they can, because they must, live in peace side by side. The problem before us is to find a way by which the two halves of the divided house can live together without recourse to warfare until, perhaps in the course of centuries though probably much sooner, a measure of common understanding and coöperation is achieved.

This country, as the leading exponent of the way of life achieved by the revolution of the past 150 years, has the heaviest responsibility for finding that way. American civilization is frequently criticized as being materialistic, but in reality it is the Soviet philosophy whch is avowedly materialistic, whereas our philosophy has profound spiritual foundations, based on the conception of the dignity and inherent rights of the individual soul, and on the individual's responsibility to the community. Thence spring all our theories about the equality of human souls in the sight of God; of the brotherhood of mankind; of the rights of men to freedom in thought, speech, and action, and in the choice of the form of government under which they live.

Our first line of defense against the counterrevolutionary forces which deny those ideals and would set up a universal auotcracy is to wipe out as rapidly as possible the glaring discrepancies between our faith and our practice—of which lynching and race discrimination are the most flagrant example—and to demonstrate to the world that our ideals are not only workable but that they open the surest and most effective path to peace and widespread human welfare. Beyond that we must use every available agency to promote international coöperation. The most conspicuous is the organization of the United Nations. We are primarily responsible for its existence. The preliminary plans were drafted at Dumbarton Oaks; Secretary of State Stettinius presided at the opening meeting in San Francisco where the Charter was drawn up; and that Charter bears the strong impress of its inheritance from our Declaration of Independence and our Federal Constitution.

It is easy to criticize the United Nations on two grounds: first, that its Charter does not go far enough and should have provided for an effective system of world government; second, that it has not accomplished that which it was set up to do in securing the peace of the world.

As to the first, the answer is that few, save the most optimistic, would have believed that the peoples of the world were prepared to accept

so far-reaching a document as the Charter, and that it came in the nick of time, before the split between East and West became as wide as it now is. A high authority in the United Nations recently remarked that if the meeting in San Francisco had been postponed for six months there would have been no Charter. It is idle to talk of superseding it by some form of federated world government. If the United Nations cannot secure a reasonably effective coöperation between nations, no more highly centralized plan of world government would stand a chance of adoption. The Charter contains provisions for amèndment, and let us improve its methods and strengthen it as opportunity offers; but if the United Nations organization is allowed to go the way of the League of Nations, we shall relapse into a system of alliances which will be almost certain to end in another world war.

As to the second charge, that the United Nations has failed to accomplish what it set out to do, the answer is that it has been confronted with far more difficult problems than men foresaw, chiefly because of the counterrevolutionary policies of Russia, and that, as a matter of fact, it has accomplished a great deal and has proved an effective instrument for voicing world opinion. For example, the Dutch-Indonesian settlement could not have been attained without the quiet, persistent work of the United Nations representatives.

The United Nations Charter is a potent instrument for the protection and advancement of the revolutionary ideals of human freedom. If we analyze the votes taken at the recent meeting of the United Nations Assembly, we observe that, while the "Little Powers" on many occasions showed a commendable independence of any control exercised by the United States or Great Britain, whenever it was a question of human rights as against tyranny, or of national freedom against aggression, they always, with the exception of the Soviet satellites, lined up on the side of freedom and democracy. That is why Soviet Russia is so generally in opposition to United Nations procedures. Russia cannot afford to withdraw from the United Nations; for its own prestige it must retain its place therein, and can only resort to the policy of blocking operations when possible. If the United Nations is upheld and strengthened as the world's best instrument for promoting human freedom and human welfare, it will be our safeguard against the counterrevolutionary movements which, if triumphant, would block human progress for a thousand years to come.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations on December 10, 1948, is an amazing expression of the ultimate aims of the political, social, and intellectual revolution of the last 150 years. It is amazing that persons with such diverse backgrounds as those of the committee which drafted it should have been able to reach agreement

on the wording of its revolutionary statements; amazing that it should have been accepted by an overwhelming majority of the United Nations Assembly.

The Declaration obviously owes much to the achievements of American democracy and it sets up standards which are similar to those which we, in theory, have sought in this country but which look far beyond our accomplishment. It is easy to criticize the Declaration for setting up standards which no country on earth now meets and which no legislation could enforce. But the Declaration is not a code of laws; it is an announcement of principles, explicitly set forth "as a common standard of achievement for all peoples," in a word, it is a world-wide goal at which to aim. Mankind always needs a goal towards which it may move, the more so when the immediate circumstances are grossly at variance with the ideal which is set up. When Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence that "all men are, and of right ought to be, free and equal" and that they are entitled to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," he set up an ideal standard. Jefferson's slaves were not free, nor were they his equals. Again, our Constitution guaranteed certain rights which we have notoriously failed to fulfill. We do not on that account repudiate our own Declaration of Independence and our Constitution; instead we work towards the attainment of the ideals they express. The beatitudes in the New Testament set up an ideal of conduct which none of us fully attains, but we do not reject the beatitudes. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a document of epoch-making significance because it is a comprehensive statement in simple language of the highest ideals envisioned by the revolutionary epoch of the last 150 years; because its foundations are spiritual—the recognition of the inherent dignity and of those equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family which are "the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace in the world"; because it does set forth social goals for which the great masses of men in all countries inarticulately long; and because it is sufficiently practicable to permit men to work towards those goals.

It is this last point which has been chiefly criticized by those who say that it holds out false promises of a utopia which it is powerless to fulfill, of which men may dream but which they can never hope to enjoy. It is impracticable, they say, because it fails to take into account economic considerations, such as the high cost of many items in its program. For example, the clause calling for universal free elementary education sets a standard not fully attained in certain sections of our own country because of its expense, and which many other lands have never even attempted and have not the resources to meet. The answer is that that clause is not a legislative enactment; it is a proposal universally recognized as essential

to the advance of human freedom and well-being. Each nation will have to meet the problem in its own way and time, though possibly at some future date with some form of guidance and assistance from the United Nations; and the expense must be regarded as an investment in social welfare eventually to be repaid as productivity increases with the spread of knowledge.

Similarly the Declaration does not and cannot deal with the problem of population with which the world is faced. How to increase agricultural productivity sufficiently to feed a rapidly multiplying population is a question with which all the peoples of the earth will be confronted in the next few centuries, but that fact does not invalidate, though it may make more difficult, the implementation of the Declaration. No man can possibly legislate wisely for the distant future, and the Declaration does not pretend to solve the economic issues with which mankind will hereafter inevitably be faced, whether men adhere to the Declaration or forget it. What it does is to point out the direction in which we can and must move if we are not to be overwhelmed by the counterrevolution.

Again the Declaration is criticized as promising individual rights which cannot possibly be guaranteed and which would have undesirable social results if they could be. Article 23, section 1, is a case in point. That section reads, "Everyone has the right to work, to the free choice of employment, to just and favorable conditions of work, and to protection against unemployment." If everyone is guaranteed free choice of employment, it is asked, who is going to choose the disagreeable but necessary tasks of the world, such as garbage collecting or coal mining? How can you protect against unemployment the person who is a misfit in the field of his choice, say a youth who chooses to be a lawyer but who proves incapable of earning a living in that profession? The obvious answer would seem to be that the provision cited from the Declaration is necessarily conditioned by circumstances of time and place and must be interpreted in the light of common sense. To take a fantastic illustration: suppose a youth in Tierra del Fuego, under the guarantee of that section in the Declaration which his country has approved, announces that his choice of employment is the care of ostriches, although there are no ostriches in that land of rocks and snow where wintry gales would blow the feathers from their backs. Obviously he cannot be guaranteed against unemployment. Circumstances would oblige him either to transfer his chosen occupation to the herding of penguins or to emigrate to Africa or to an ostrich farm in Southern California. To return to the more sensible and realistic case of the youth who wants to be a lawyer, the obvious meaning of the provision would seem to be that he shall not be prevented from entering that profession by any arbitrary discrimination on account of race, color, or limitation to

a privileged group. He has the right to make a free choice. But, no less obviously, he must show the ability to get into and out of a law school and to pass the bar examinations, and after that to make a living at the law. If he fails to do so, he must choose another field of activity with only such provision against temporary unemployment as is made for any unemployed person.

The provision in that article does not and cannot possibly guarantee anyone that he will find, or that society must create for him, just the kind of job he would most like. What it does mean is that everyone should be permitted to seek the job most to his liking for which he is fitted among the occupations offered by the community in which he lives, and for some persons the job of garbage collector or coal miner will offer as good an opportunity for earning a living as any he can find. What the article is intended to prevent is the arbitrary exclusion of anyone from a field which he can fit himself to enter and in which he can find employment, or the coercion of anyone to do work for which he is unfit and which he hates. It is directly aimed at any policy of forced labor in factories, uranium mines, concentration camps, or other forms of slavery.

We can and we shall find our way through the tangled jungle of our present "time of troubles" if we are willing to go forward instead of turning backward; and going forward means adherence to the great moral and spiritual as well as material gains of the last 150 years, now threatened by the counterrevolutionary forces. We are, indeed, confronted with many and great dangers, but we also have a great opportunity open to us if we have the courage, faith, and wisdom to take advantage of it. Emerson's great saying is as true now as when he wrote: "If there is any period one would desire to be born in, is it not the age of Revolution, when the old and the new stand side by side and admit of being compared; when the energies of all men are searched by fear and hope; when the historic glories of the old can be compensated by the rich possibilities of the new era?"

There is no salvation for us in a return to stereotyped traditional forms of thought, or outmoded ways of living, or police-regulated despotisms, all of which are only road blocks to any further advance. Instead, the goal before us is a world in which many varied political and social systems have learned to live together in tolerance, coöperating for the common welfare, and settling their disputes by conference in the bright light of an enlightened world opinion. The organization of the United Nations has set up a method to bring this about. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has set up a world-wide goal at which to aim. If we can use the United Nations as our instrument, and keep our eyes on the Declaration as the goal towards which to move, there will open before mankind the long prospect of a world order far better than anything the masses of men have ever known before.

"TOTALITARIAN" SPARTA

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"THE greatest threat to humanity today" (so declared Emil Brunner) " . . . is the totalitarian state." This declaration might have been made in the 1930's, when many of us were expressing quite similar sentiments. Actually it is a quotation from an article written not many months ago.[1] The distinguished Swiss theologian went on to assert: "Whether this [the totalitarian state] has nazi or communist coloring or even wears the form of a bourgeois democracy is immaterial. . . . Totalitarianism is something much more momentous than any form of government. It is the 'stateizing' of the whole of human existence, the lordship of the state over man, body and soul, whatever its governmental form."

Such statements are nothing unusual nowadays. From every side come warnings against political encroachments on individual freedom not only in the field of material concerns but in the life of the spirit as well. "Today," wrote a worried Britisher not long ago in the correspondence columns of the *Spectator,* "the omnicompetent State threatens to control the individual from cradle to grave, prescribing with brutal thoroughness the way he is to think and the Leviathan he is to worship." Sometimes this threat is referred to as "totalitarianism"; sometimes other terms ("statism," "the absolute state," "the police state," "the planned society") are used, but with no significant difference in meaning.

The reality of the danger, whatever terms may be used in describing it, cannot fail to be apparent to all thinking persons. Men everywhere are expecting more and more in the way of governmental services. Government is looked upon today in a different light from what it has been in the past. It is regarded as an indispensable agency for achieving otherwise unobtainable benefits for society. In the process, government inevitably acquires ever-expanding powers, which it is constantly tempted to use in more arbitrary fashion. The cost of the welfare state is not merely financial. The Jeffersonian maxim that "that government is best which governs least" has in practice no widespread popularity today.

The time is past when the individual citizen can say, "I will 'do what I will with mine own.'" For government, national and local, will do what *it* wills with a sizable portion of what he acquires. And there is no foreseeable likelihood that the portion exacted by government will significantly decrease. We shall have to resign ourselves with the best grace we can to governmental demands upon our pocketbooks.

[1] In the *Christian Century,* LXVI (July 6, 1949), p. 817.

But official regulation of what we do and where we go and even what we think is a more serious matter. In these days when visés are refused to distinguished artists and scholars and when a person might be subjected to congressional inquisition merely because he once belonged to the Epworth League, can we doubt that the danger of official domination of conduct and conscience is acute? As Albert Schweitzer said in his address at the Goethe celebration in Colorado in July, 1949, "The task immediately before us is to safeguard the integrity of the individual within the modern state."

In view of this situation in our modern world, it should be of some value to focus our attention on that state in the Greek world where governmental control over the individual's life and thought was carried to its most horrific extreme. Even if we accept without reservation the cynical Hegelian dictum that the only thing we learn from history is that we learn nothing from history, ancient Sparta and its political experience can hardly fail to arouse our attentive interest. We have witnessed within our lifetime the rise and fall of régimes that, to a large extent, have embodied Spartan principles; and we are face to face today with other similar embodiments, embryonic or fully developed—on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

Before reminding ourselves of the numerous points of resemblance between diminutive Sparta and the gigantic totalitarian régimes of our own day, it might be well to consider this term *totalitarian.* What is its meaning? Can it properly be applied to a small-scale city-state of ancient Hellas? It has in fact been used of Sparta by several writers. But is this use justifiable?

The word, it may be noted, is a comparative newcomer in our language. The *Oxford English Dictionary,* where *totalitarian* appears only in the supplement and *totalitarianism* not at all, quotes no occurrence of the word earlier than 1928. When first used, it was regularly limited in its application to nations in which only a single political party is authorized or permitted. This meaning is the only one recognized in that dictionary or even in the most recent editions of *Webster's Dictionary* and the *Encyclopædia Britannica.* The *Encyclopædia of the Social Sciences* also mentions "the abolition of opposition parties and the substantial elimination of parliamentary institutions" as a characteristic feature of totalitarian régimes. This original and somewhat technical use of the term obviously has no relevance in discussions of ancient Sparta. But the word has come to be widely used in a looser sense (illustrated in the quotation from Emil Brunner with which I began) as referring to governmental control of all phases of life within the nation—economic, æsthetic, educational, and religious. In this sense of the term we are perhaps justified in using the phrase "totalitarian Sparta," though with certain reservations that will become clear as we proceed.

Incidentally, it is questionable whether employing modern political and economic terms with reference to ancient conditions is in general a desirable practice. There are good grounds for believing that the use of terms like *party, democracy* (Greek though the word itself is), *capitalism, socialism, communism, bourgeois, proletariat,* in dealing with ancient institutions is more apt to distort than to clarify the picture for many modern readers. The enlightenment that may be gained by pointing up historical analogies may be more than offset by the misconceptions implanted in the minds of those who do not make sufficient allowance for basic differences between ancient and modern conditions.

I

Various points of resemblance between Sparta and the fascist or bolshevist régimes of our own day come readily to mind. Most obvious of these is the militaristic emphasis. The paramount concern of Mussolini's Italy, of Hitler's Germany, and of Stalin's Russia—to say nothing of lesser totalitarian régimes—for the building up of their national military potential is a topic that needs no elaboration for anyone who has lived through the past quarter of a century. But fifth- and fourth-century Sparta carried this concern to still more fantastic extremes. The whole Spartan régime was focused on the task of maintaining a military machine superior to any other that could be found among the Greek city-states. Nothing mattered but the breeding and training and provisioning of heavy infantrymen of matchless quality.

The discipline (*agōgē*) to which the Spartan citizen was subjected was rigorous, comprehensive, and prolonged. From the tender age of seven he saw little of his home. Most of his waking hours for years on end were spent in military drill or other strenuous forms of physical training. When he himself was allowed a breathing spell, he had the task of observing others with a critical eye as *they* drilled and exercised. He was constantly under the stringent supervision of officially appointed taskmasters as well as the exacting scrutiny of his fellows. His meals were eaten with the other members of his platoon, and he slept in army barracks. The training did not end when a lad grew up. The communal life continued even after a man's marriage for a considerable time; in fact, the requirement of attendance at the common meals was lifelong. The whole program was designed to develop to the highest possible degree the citizen's strength, agility, endurance, courage, and loyalty.

His time was left entirely free for this toughening régime because all farming and business was carried on by noncitizens or second-class citizens. He was supplied with food by the serfs (*heilōtes,* or helots, as they are commonly called) who farmed his allotment in the country and who were

required to contribute to his support a goodly portion of their crops. This, if we can take at their face value some words of Tyrtæus quoted by Pausanias,[2] at times amounted to as much as half of what the serfs produced. What manufacturing and commerce there was in Laconia was carried on by the "circumhabitants" (*perioikoi,* or periœci, as they are called). These residents of the communities outside the city of Sparta—some on the frontiers of Laconia, some closer by, a few in parts of Messenia—had a peculiar status. They were apparently regarded as Lacedæmonian citizens, but on a distinctly inferior level to that of the Spartiates. They did not enjoy full political privileges and were not subjected to the full rigors of the Spartiates' training. But they served in the army and paid taxes to Sparta. In spite of having to take orders from the Spartan government in some matters, they were allowed a considerable amount of independence and for the most part exercised local self-government in their own communities. What is more, they were not debarred from occupations forbidden to the Spartiates. It seems likely that many of them were originally of the same racial stock as the Spartiates; but they were less exclusive, and there was probably a fair amount of infusion of other strains. Some of the "circumhabitant" settlements were presumably established at the time of the original Dorian conquest of Laconia, while others may have been founded later as colonies, under the pressure of increasing population at Sparta. In any event, the life in these communities was apparently a more normal one than the life in Sparta, and they supplied such manufactured goods as were needed there.

The effectiveness of the strenuous, full-time training to which the Spartiates were subjected was increased by the competitive spirit fostered among them in boyhood and carried over into their mature years, and also by the powerful sanction of public opinion. The slightest wavering in the observance of the accepted code of duty and courage was visited with unlimited infamy and abuse. Plutarch[3] says that the Lacedæmonian polity was held together more by fear than by anything else, and that the Spartans had in their city a shrine dedicated to Fear. The merciless and inhuman treatment of the hapless survivors of Thermopylæ, who had perfectly good reasons for being absent from the battle, is well known.[4] We have abundant evidence concerning the intolerable existence that anyone who was considered deficient in bravery was forced to lead. It will suffice to quote the description given by the author of the *Constitution of the Lacedæmonians*[5]:

> . . . in other communities, when a man proves himself a coward, he is subjected merely to being called a coward. He does his marketing, his lounging, his exercising

[2] IV, xiv, 5.
[3] *Cleomenes* ix, 1.
[4] *Cf.* Herodotus VII, 229-232.
[5] ix, 4-6.

right in the same place, if he so desires, as the brave man. But in Lacedæmon anyone would be ashamed to accept a coward as his messmate or as his opponent in a wrestling bout. Frequently, when they choose the players for a ball game, he is left out; at the choral dances he is relegated to an ignominious position; in the streets he must make way for others; when he occupies a seat he must relinquish it, even to his juniors; he must support his spinster relatives at home and be held answerable for their remaining old maids; he must be content with a fireside not shared by a wife, and pay a forfeit besides; he must not stroll about looking happy and prosperous or adopt the manners of blameless men, under penalty of receiving a whipping from his betters. I am not at all surprised, in fact, since such disgrace is heaped upon the coward, that death is there preferred to a life so fraught with ignominy and contempt.

The problems connected with the origin and development of the Spartan *kosmos* ("orderly system")—which was the inclusive term applied to the régime as a whole—should not be completely disregarded. But they are too complicated for anything like a thorough discussion here. "Spartan history," as Professor H. T. Wade-Gery remarked, "is indeed an interminable row of open questions"; and some of the most baffling of these have to do with the way in which Sparta was transformed from a centre of culture into the garrison state we normally think of when we hear its name.

The British excavators, digging at Sparta in the early years of this century, found unmistakable evidence that in the days when Hellenic civilization was in the first stages of its phenomenal flowering, Sparta was culturally in the forefront of the cities of Greece. The presence there in the seventh century of distinguished poets and musicians had been a fact long known but often overlooked. The archæologists, however, revealed the existence of flourishing activity in the plastic arts in a variety of forms. Notable artistic results were achieved in the working of clay, wood, ivory, metal, and stone. What, then, happened to all these cultural interests? Why should so promising a representative of Hellenic civilization have turned its back upon its rich heritage? The obvious answer is that the Spartiates were such a small minority of the total population of the area they controlled that only by becoming a military caste could they hope to maintain their domination. The numerical relation between the full citizens and the other elements of the population cannot be determined. The proportion of one Spartiate to every one hundred inhabitants that has been inferred from a passage in Xenophon[6] may be greatly exaggerated. But that the Spartiates were in a desperately small minority cannot be doubted; and we have Thucydides' word for it that "most of the institutions of the Lacedæmonians were at all times designed for protection against insurrections of the serfs."[7]

[6] *Hellenica* III, iii, 5. [7] IV, lxxx, 3.

In the eighth century Sparta presumably felt the same pressures of increasing population and decreasing fertility of the soil that induced many Greek cities to engage in overseas colonization. But Sparta followed a different path. Tarentum, to be sure, was founded, perhaps by Spartan refugees, at the end of that century. But colonization was not the solution adopted by Sparta for her economic problem. The solution she did adopt, while successful after a fashion, had the result of involving her in another problem of a different kind. By the conquest of Messenia she added fertile farm lands to her dominion and acquired the serfs to till them, but she greatly increased the disparity in numbers between her own full citizens and those whom they controlled. A portion, at least, of Messenia was conquered during the latter part of the eighth century; and a couple of generations later occurred the gallant revolt commonly designated as the Second Messenian War. The Messenian insurgents were supported by a coalition of states hostile to Sparta, including—so Pausanias tells us[8]—Elis, Arcadia, Argos, and Sicyon. The revolt was at first successful, and the Spartans had need of all the martial vigor Tyrtæus could inspire them with to turn the tide of fortune. The Messenians were eventually defeated and forced to retire to the northern stronghold of Eira near the borders of Arcadia, where under the leadership of their great national hero, Aristomenes, they held out for many years, apparently making frequent guerrilla raids from their impregnable base. Eventually, after years of difficult fighting, the insurgents were forced to capitulate and all Messenia became, in the phrase of William Morris, "a Spartan farm." But their heroic resistance had taught the Spartans a lesson. If Sparta was to be spared a repetition of the desperate crisis she had been through, she must clearly pay more attention to the morale and the military efficiency of her fighting men.

There were, to be sure, further uprisings of the Messenians. Well known is the one mentioned by Thucydides[9] that was set off by the disastrous earthquake of 464 B.C. But there were pretty certainly others, including one about the beginning of the fifth century, that have been largely ignored. Sparta was able to put down all of them, however, until Epaminondas and his Thebans restored the independence of Messenia after the battle of Leuctra.

We should not, I think, assume that as a result of the Second Messenian War Sparta immediately transformed her whole way of living and subjected herself to what is one of the most rigorous patterns of communal discipline known to history. The war, to be sure, had been a formidable threat to Sparta. But we are hardly justified in supposing that her citizens, or even her leaders, got together and said to each other, "Go to, now!

[8] IV, xv, 7. [9] I, ci–ciii.

we will transform our city into an armed camp." The evidence for believing the characteristic Spartan régime to have been the result of gradual development is too strong. The time did come when Sparta stood still—"with arms presented like a soldier on parade," as Toynbee[10] puts it—but it had not come to this complete military halt until several generations after the days of Aristomenes and Tyrtæus.

Consider, for example, the evidence for continued cultural activity provided by a study of sculpture. It has recently been stated that "in the sixth century, Laconian art presents a remarkable variety or even divergence of styles. . . . No other region of the Peloponnese has produced an equal abundance of archaic plastic works. . . . A characteristically Laconian sculptural style in stone developed soon after 600 B.C., if not earlier, and lived on for at least a century."[11] The best known example of this is the masterly statue now in the National Museum in Athens, unhappily minus arms and legs, which was recovered in the early 20's of the present century by British excavators. Whether or not it represented Leonidas, the hero of Thermopylæ, as suggested by its discoverers, we cannot be sure. But it is a masterpiece which no one who has seen it can ever forget. Clay masks, bronze statuettes and mirror stands, marble funeral reliefs, and votive reliefs of limestone also attest to intense and varied activity in the arts during the sixth century.

It is true that foreign importations almost entirely ceased and the carving of bone replaced that of ivory during the first half of the century and that the furniture of everyday life showed some artistic decline in the second half. But Laconian vase-painting was at its best in the second quarter of the century, and one of the most sumptuous structures in all Greece, the "throne" of Apollo at Amyclæ, for the decoration of which a famous Ionian artist was imported from Magnesia on the Mæander, was erected at the very end of the century. All of this goes to prove that there had been no sudden revolution in manners or outlook traceable to the great Messenian revolt.

Ancient writers, to be sure, believed that the *kosmos* in its entirety had been inaugurated by Lycurgus. But there was no agreement as to when he had lived or as to the details of his biography. Modern scholars are still debating whether he was a man who once actually lived or a local divinity demoted to human status. In any event, it is commonly and reasonably assumed that the creation of the rigorous Spartan régime came to be attributed to him, after it had completed its development and become rigidly fixed, in order that it might acquire the binding authority of a supposedly venerable and august tradition. This was the more easily

[10] Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, III, p. 68.
[11] George Karo, *Greek Personality in Archaic Sculpture*, p. 143.

accomplished because the ancient Greeks were in the habit of assigning the credit for social changes to notable individuals.

It has recently been fashionable to assume that Chilon, in the middle of the sixth century, had a good deal to do with the consolidation of the militaristic régime. But we have seen that there is little reason to believe that a social revolution was effected by the legislation of one man at one specific time. Diogenes Laertius[12] reported that Chilon was the first to "yoke the ephors alongside the kings," and Chilon was a sufficiently influential person to be listed among the traditional Seven Sages. But the grounds for picking him out as a particular sponsor of the Spartan *kosmos* are really pretty slim.

Herodotus[13] speaks of a reform, primarily military, which had revitalized the Spartan state not long before the war with Tegea. This war, which is commonly dated in the decade before 550 B.C., was caused, according to his account, by the Spartans' overconfidence in their renewed strength. He attributes the reform to Lycurgus; and some scholars have been tempted to assume that he simply transferred the credit for what was really Chilon's achievement to Lycurgus. But if there was any real historical basis for Herodotus' account, the reform must have been put through somewhat earlier than Chilon's ephorate, the date of which is established with reasonable certainty as 556/5 B.C.

There are good reasons for believing that primitive Hellenic institutions, which had persisted in Sparta but had pretty well disappeared in other Greek states as civilization progressed, served as the foundation stones of the strange edifice into which the Spartan community eventually shaped itself. It is, indeed, not unlikely that the fully developed régime was in some respects a return to older times. Primitive institutions which to some extent had been in abeyance during the period of Sparta's cultural flowering were revived to meet the necessities of her later military situation.

The suggestion has been made that this strict regimentation was necessitated not only by the overwhelming numerical superiority of those whom the Spartiates had to control but also by a native deficiency of courage. It seems indeed paradoxical to suggest that a people celebrated in ancient and modern times alike for their courage may have been fundamentally lacking in that virtue. But the distinguished Irish Hellenist, J. P. Mahaffy, had the boldness to speak of Spartan valor as an "artificial and factitious" thing[14]; and that view has more recently been elaborated and supported by an American scholar.[15] The great lengths to which the Spartans went to

[12] I, 68.
[13] I, 65-66.
[14] *Social Life in Greece,* p. 24.
[15] Preston H. Epps, "Fear in Spartan Character," *Classical Philology,* XXVIII (1933), pp. 12-29.

instill bravery into their fighting men and the repeated instances of timidity and caution in the history of Lacedæmonian military activity and foreign policy lend considerable color to the view that their proverbial heroism was not "a natural outgrowth of an inborn quality." Be that as it may, they certainly achieved an amazingly effective soldierly discipline, "dictated by obedience, tradition and—fear."[16]

However it was brought about, the social system reflected in the pages of the *Constitution of the Lacedæmonians* (preserved among the writings of Xenophon and attributed by a recent writer,[17] with some plausibility, to Antisthenes) or of Aristotle's *Politics* or of the *Life of Lycurgus* and various other writings of Plutarch was something unique in the Greek world. A few of its peculiarities, notably the public meals, could be paralleled in Crete; but nowhere else was the whole life of the community so obviously and so completely directed towards the end of military efficiency. Even by the Greeks themselves Sparta was referred to as a "camp" (*stratopedon*), a term used by Plato,[18] Isocrates,[19] and Plutarch.[20] All æsthetic activities and interests had been banished, the intellectual element in education had been reduced to a minimum, and cultural petrifaction had set in. It may well be that the stark simplicity of life in Sparta was not as universal as has generally been supposed; there are reasons for suspecting that wealthy persons could manage to acquire forbidden *objets d'art* and to cultivate other amenities. But on the whole we are amply justified in saying, with Toynbee,[21] that Sparta "had sold her birthright. Thenceforward, [she] was in Hellas but not of it."

So much, then, for the first point of resemblance between Sparta and the totalitarian states of our own day—the militaristic emphasis found in all them. Other parallelisms must be dealt with more briefly.

II

Closely connected with the militaristic emphasis is the second common characteristic, aggressiveness. Mention need hardly be made of Fascist Italy's attack on Ethiopia, of Nazi Germany's successive invasions of the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, to say nothing of the "occupied countries" during the war, or of Soviet Russia's acquisition, by overwhelming preponderance of power rather than by military conquest, of the Baltic States and her present control of the "satellite" nations. As for Sparta, it is unnecessary here to trace out the history of the expansion of her power in the Peloponnese; but we may note that when she altered her policy in the middle of the sixth century from one of conquest to one

[16] V. Ehrenberg, *Aspects of the Ancient World*, p. 99.
[17] K. M. T. Chrimes, *The* Respublica Lacedæmoniorum *Ascribed to Xenophon.*
[18] *Laws* 666E.
[19] VI, 133A.
[20] *Lycurgus* xxiv, 1.
[21] *Op. cit.*, III, p. 61, n. 1.

of binding states to herself by alliances, she controlled what was far and away the largest area controlled by any Greek city-state, two fifths of the Peloponnese. When this change in her policy occurred, it was pretty certainly caused not by any loss of ambition to increase her power but by the realization that she lacked the man power necessary for administering a larger territory and keeping it in subjection. After the Peloponnesian War we again see the Spartans greedy for foreign aggrandizement. But at that time their aggressiveness, combined with other factors in the situation, proved disastrous for them.

III

The third characteristic that Sparta shared with modern totalitarian states was ruthlessness. The citing of examples from our own day is unnecessary; they remain all too vividly in our memories. Sparta's ruthlessness was directed primarily against the serfs, who, Tyrtæus says,[22] were "worn down by great burdens like asses." The methods employed to keep them under control were cruel beyond description. The cruelty assumed what was perhaps its mildest form in the indignities to which the serfs were subjected. They were periodically compelled, for example, to exhibit themselves in a drunken state in order to impress both themselves and their masters with the idea that they were an inferior race fit only for servitude. What dire punishments were visited upon derelictions in the matter of turning over to their masters the required proportion of what they produced, we do not know. But we can be sure they could expect no mercy, excessive and intolerably burdensome though the requirements were. That is obvious from what we are told about the *krypteia,* or secret service. Young Spartans, apparently between the ages of eighteen and twenty, secretly patrolled the countryside to kill off all the serfs whom they found reason to regard with suspicion. Any who had shown symptoms of restiveness or merely of unusual ability and initiative were marked out for destruction. They mysteriously disappeared at the hands of members of this secret force, who took cover by day and ranged abroad at night to carry out their grim task. A semblance of legality was given to this brutal institution by an annual declaration of war against the serfs, proclaimed by the ephors when they entered upon their office.

The farthest extreme of Spartan ruthlessness was the wholesale assassination of those serfs who responded to a call for volunteers when Sparta was hard pressed in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian War. A proclamation was issued, says Thucydides,[23]

[22] As quoted by Pausanias IV, xiv, 5.
[23] IV, lxxx, 3-4.

that all the serfs who claimed to have rendered distinguished war service should be set apart for the purpose of receiving their freedom. The Spartans were actually testing them, in the belief that those who claimed, each for himself, the right to be granted freedom first would be those most likely, by reason of their self-reliance, to attack their masters. About two thousand of them being set apart, they placed garlands on their heads and made the rounds of the temples, as though they had already been granted their freedom; but the Spartans not long afterwards did away with them, and nobody ever knew how any of them met his end.

There are reasons for believing that some of them did escape extermination. But that fact does little to diminish the horror of the tale.

There were other inferior groups, too, that suffered from the cruel temperament of the Spartiates. In the account of the abortive conspiracy of 399 B.C. given by Xenophon,[24] the leaders of the conspiracy, Cinadon and his associates, are quoted as listing the "probationers" (*neodamōdes*), "inferiors" (*hypomeiones*), and "circumhabitants" alongside of the serfs as disaffected groups. No one belonging to any of these groups, they said, when there was any talk going on about the Spartiates, could conceal the fact that he would be delighted to eat them raw. No wonder the Spartiates were obsessed with the idea that they must at all times keep themselves at the very peak of their military effectiveness!

But the Spartiates were not only ruthless towards the inferior groups; they were ruthless towards themselves. Aristotle[25] says that the discipline prescribed for the citizens was so excessively severe that they could not endure its rigors and, by secretly playing truant from it, gave themselves up to sensual pleasures. They imposed upon themselves an inhumanly rigorous mode of living and made life intolerable for any who failed to live up to their common standard of behavior. A redoubtable, but hardly an attractive breed!

A particularly revolting manifestation of Spartan ruthlessness was the scourging of boys at the altar of Artemis Orthia. In origin probably a primitive fertility rite, it was converted into a competition in the endurance of pain. Even in Plutarch's time centuries after any military purpose was served by the discipline to which they were subjected, boys were not infrequently keyed up to such a pitch that they actually died under the lash rather than give in.[26] "The essence of this scene," says Toynbee,[27] "in which a superhuman—or inhuman—feat of endurance is performed without flinching, yet to no effect, is characteristic of the Spartan êthos and emblematic of Sparta's fate."

IV

The fourth point of resemblance is exclusiveness. In this particular Soviet Russia, with its "Iron Curtain," has gone much farther than the

[24] *Hellenica* III, iii, 6.
[25] *Politics* 1270 b 33-36.
[26] *Lycurgus* xviii, 1.
[27] *Op. cit.*, III, p. 77.

other modern totalitarian states—but not a great deal farther than Sparta. In order to keep their citizens from being demoralized by contact with foreigners, the Spartans had a law forbidding residence abroad, and they repeatedly put into effect alien exclusion acts (*xenēlasiai*) to keep foreigners out. We recall, in contrast, the pride with which Pericles, in the great Funeral Speech,[28] reminds his Athenian fellow citizens that they have no such exclusion acts but keep their city open to all. Sparta, so notoriously inhospitable to strangers and so reluctant to have her people see anything of the outside world, for fear of getting ideas into their heads, was a pitiable counterpart in the Greek world of the U.S.S.R. and its satellites in ours.

Another aspect of Sparta's exclusiveness, which had ruinous consequences, was the extreme reluctance to admit non-Spartans to the status of full citizenship. The result was that the numbers of Spartiates became more and more depleted as time went on. If a liberal policy of admission to this exclusive caste had been adopted, the later history of Sparta might not have been the inglorious tale that it was. It has sometimes been asserted, to be sure, that it was easier for outsiders to become full citizens in Sparta than in most Greek states. Theoretically, perhaps this is true. At Athens, for example, from the time of Pericles, citizenship was reserved for persons both of whose parents were citizens; while at Sparta it was possible for "half-breeds" (*mothakes*) and even serfs and, in a few instances, foreigners to qualify, if they displayed true Spartan spirit and had successfully undergone the full rigors of the compulsory training, for admission into the inner circle. But the evidence we have, from Aristotle and others, about the drastic decline in the number of Spartiates outweighs any theoretical considerations to the contrary and provides ample proof of the extreme exclusiveness of the Spartan system.

The desire to preserve racial purity is still another aspect of this matter of exclusiveness. It is unnecessary to point out that in this regard the Spartans were more like the nazis than the Soviet Russians. The fantastic and iniquitous nazi doctrine of race is too well known to require discussion. It is unlikely that there was any such quasi-mystical glorification of racial solidarity in ancient Sparta. But the Spartans were proud of what they believed to be their pure Dorian descent, and they strove to keep their breed uncontaminated by admixture from without. They were highly successful in doing so, and the inner circle of Spartiates was undoubtedly of a purer Dorian strain than could be found anywhere else. But they paid a high price for their success. This price was constant decrease in numbers and a loss of the benefits that might have resulted, biologically and spiritually, from intermixture with folk among whom there was less inbreeding.

[28] Thucydides II, xxxix, 1.

V

Reference may next be made to the early enlistment of children's interests and the early commencement of military training. Anyone who was in Italy during the fascist régime will certainly never forget the sight of youngsters under ten years old dressed in black-shirted fascist uniforms and obviously well indoctrinated in fascist tenets. There was a highly developed program which took care of boys from eight to fourteen in the Ballila organization and of lads from fourteen to eighteen in the corps of Avanguardisti. There is no need to mention the Hitler Jugend and its imitations outside of Germany or the diminutive Russian cadets of whom photographs have appeared in American magazines. The Spartan children, as was mentioned above, began their training at the age of seven. They were grouped both in age-classes called "herds" (*bouai*) and in cross-divisional "packs" or "droves" (*agelai*) which included boys of all ages and were more important than the *bouai* in the boys' education. The younger boys in an *agelē* were under the authority of a group leader called the *ilarchos,* who had been chosen from among the older boys and who put the youngsters through their paces, with no nonsense permitted. Supervising the training of the boys by their group leaders was a director of public education (*paidonomos*), but every Spartiate regarded it as his duty to assist in directing the educational process.

The *agelai* were junior counterparts of the *phiditia,* the adult "messes," in which were grouped together Spartiates of various ages from twenty-one to sixty, the forty-year period during which they were liable to military service. When a Spartan lad had finished his thirteen years of preliminary training, he was a candidate, at the age of twenty, for admission into one of the messes, which was the only way he could become a full-fledged Spartiate. He could become a member only by coöption, and a single vote against him was enough to keep him out. Those who thus failed to make the grade, as well as those who after acquiring membership in a mess failed to keep up their contributions to the common meals, were relegated to the unenviable status of "inferiors" (*hypomeiones*). Conversely, in rare cases, boys of non-Spartiate birth were permitted to undergo the discipline, and if they went through it successfully, to apply for admission to a mess. These "half-breeds" (*mothakes*), if they had acquitted themselves with distinction, were apparently just as eligible as born Spartiates for full citizenship. But, as I have already said, there were certainly no large numbers of them.

I shall not enlarge upon the severity of the boys' training or on the erotic relations between the boys and their leaders, which were encouraged for the strengthening of the sentiments of loyalty and devotion. The sole

point I wish to emphasize here is the early age at which the state asserted its interest in its future citizens.

VI

Another parallelism between Sparta and the modern totalitarian states lies in the way girls and young women have been enlisted for patriotic ends. In Fascist Italy, corresponding to the organizations of boys and lads that have been mentioned, were the almost equally numerous *piccole Italiane* (under fourteen) and *giovani Italiane* (over fourteen). In Nazi Germany girls drilled and participated in supervised athletic sports in great numbers, as they do in Soviet Russia to this day; and we hardly need to be reminded of the Russian women who saw active service in the armed forces. Spartan girls, we are told, were given a training similar to that of the boys. Spinning and weaving and the other normal occupations of the Greek lady were regarded in Sparta as occupations fit only for serving women, and girls trained for these tasks could hardly, it was thought, grow up qualified to become the mothers of a vigorous breed of warriors. So their instruction was not in specifically feminine accomplishments, and they were not kept secluded from the other sex.

Spartan girls engaged, in public view, in athletic contests of various kinds, including running, wrestling, and boxing. They wore for these activities a very abbreviated garment with a slit skirt, so that they were spoken of by Ibycus and other poets as *phainomērides* ("displaying their thighs"). In addition, they sang, danced, and marched in processions, often in scant attire, at religious festivals and were frequent spectators of the exercises and contests of the boys and men. Needless to say, their freedom in these respects was a scandal to people of other cities where the conventions were different, and it was inevitable that most Greeks should think the worst of them. The general opinion is expressed in a well-known passage from Euripides' *Andromache,*[29] which begins: "Not even if one wished it, could Spartan maid be chaste." Aristotle, too, was very severe in his estimate of the morals of Spartan women, who, he says, indulged in every sort of license and lived a life of luxury.[30] This view was directly contrary to that of the writer of the *Constitution of the Lacedæmonians* and of Plutarch, both of whom spoke of Spartan women as models of virtue and modesty. Even if we remember that both of these authors were given to extravagant idealizing of everything Spartan, it is impossible to reconcile what is said on this subject by them and by Aristotle. The truth of the matter we shall never know.

It was usually believed, too, that the women of Sparta did a great deal by their words to inspire their menfolk with courage, and many

[29] 595-596. [30] *Politics* 1269 b 22.

famous sayings of praise, exhortation, or reproach were attributed to them. But in this respect again Aristotle takes a dim view of their influence, which he refers to as "utterly mischievous."[81]

We may well believe that some of them were noble and virtuous and heroic and that some were not. But in saying that, we are, of course, merely saying that they did not differ fundamentally from women anywhere at any time.

The women of Sparta were renowned for their beauty, and undoubtedly the amount of exercise they had in the open air as girls had something to do with that. Their early training, in fact, would seem to have been more wholesome than their manner of life as mature women, when they must have had an inordinate amount of time to themselves without male companionship. Even on his wedding night the Spartan bridegroom was expected to be in his barracks and could only slip away by stealth for a brief tryst with his bride. He continued for a considerable period to spend no time with his wife except on such clandestine nocturnal visits; and it sometimes happened that not until they had had children born to them did married couples see each other by daylight. The ban on the husband's sleeping at home was eventually relaxed. But dining at home, as we have seen, was never allowed as long as he lived. There were various ways, then, in which the state called upon the women of Sparta to do their bit and to accommodate themselves to the strange and abnormal life their menfolk were forced to lead.

VII

Mention of ways in which Spartan women had to subordinate their personal feelings to public concerns suggests a seventh parallelism which has to do with official promotion of eugenics. In all modern totalitarian states determined action has been taken to encourage marriage and the production of large families. But it was in Nazi Germany that most attention was given to improving, from the point of view of the dominant group, the quality of the breed. Persecution of political opponents has been practiced by every totalitarian government. But only there was it carried to the length of exterminating vast numbers of harmless individuals for the sole purpose of developing what was regarded as a purer race. The two aspects of nazi policy in this field were embodied in the command to the "Aryan" women of Germany, whether married or unmarried, to produce children and in the command to the S.S. to kill those not fit to live. In Sparta bachelors were subjected to all sorts of disabilities and held up to public ridicule, while fathers of three sons were exempted from military service and fathers of four from all taxes as well. But with all

[81] *Politics* 1269 b 37.

this encouragement of the breeding of sons, it was only sound, healthy sons that were wanted. The decision whether a newborn child should be allowed to live did not rest with the child's father, as it did elsewhere in Greece. The infant was examined by the elders of the tribe into which it had been born, and if it seemed to them weak or unhealthy, it was put out to die of exposure on the wild slopes of Mount Taygetus. Moreover, a Spartan husband was commended, so we are told, rather than criticized if he undertook to improve the quality of his wife's progeny by arranging that a man more robust than himself should visit her for the purpose of begetting children by her; and the wife herself could arrange this with impunity on her own account if her less virile husband failed to take the initiative in providing a substitute for himself. It has been suggested that the references in our sources to the sharing of wives and husbands were derived from Plato's theories concerning the community of wives and children in the *Republic* rather than the actual state of affairs in Sparta. According to this view, the dissolution of strict family ties was in reality a late development and a symptom of Sparta's decline. But we are told[32] of an incident which was supposed to have taken place during the First Messenian War, long before the inauguration of the so-called "Lycurgan" régime, and which, if not pure fiction, would indicate that Spartan women had traditionally held unorthodox views concerning sexual relations. The wives of the Lacedæmonians, so the tale goes, complained to their husbands, who had been off campaigning for nearly ten years, that the Messenians had an advantage over them. Fighting as they were near their own homes, the Messenian soldiers were begetting children all the while, whereas the Lacedæmonian troops had left their wives to desolate widowhood, with the results that their country was in danger of running short of men. The Lacedæmonians therefore sent home a number of the most vigorous young men, who were not bound by oath, as the older men were, to remain in the field until Messene was destroyed or they had all lost their lives. These young men, cohabiting with the unmarried girls, begot many children, of whom the boys were called *partheniai* (*i.e.*, "maidens' sons"). Another version of the tale made the *partheniai* the sons of serfs and Spartiate mothers, born while the Spartiate men were absent from home for a long period. In any event, tradition had it that the *partheniai* got into trouble at home and migrated to Italy, where they founded Tarentum. Actually, the derivation of the term *partheniai* is far from certain; and these stories may well have arisen to explain it. But the very fact that they *were* told and widely accepted indicates that they did not seem inconsistent with the moral attitude of the women of Sparta.

[32] Strabo VI, iii, 3, quoting Ephorus.

VIII

The eighth and last similarity that calls for consideration has to do with the enforcement of conformity. Here again Nazi Germany carried it to the greatest extreme of all the totalitarian countries, though it is characteristic of every one of them. The term *Gleichschaltung* was, indeed, one of the key words of the nazi régime. It is a process which, when it gathers momentum, stops practically nowhere. That was certainly true in Sparta, where any manifestations of individuality were suspect and where the whole tendency of the discipline was to produce rigid uniformity. As the totalitarian states have carried regimentation farthest in the modern world, so Sparta carried it farthest in the Greek world. The result was a general lack of initiative, enterprise, and adaptability on the part of her citizens. No wonder that she made a mess of things when she tried to take Athens' place as a ruler of many cities after the Peloponnesian War. Inefficiency of administration and the hostility of the ruled were the inevitable result of the "fatal rigidity" of the pattern to which the would-be rulers had been trained to conform.

This same excessive regulation of the citizens' lives was responsible for the banishment of all æsthetic interests from the state. For about three hundred years (from the beginning of the fifth century to the early part of the second) no traces are found of artistic activity of any kind in Sparta. It was a bleak æsthetic wilderness that contrasted strangely with most of Hellas, which was at the peak of its cultural development during this period. A contributing factor to this artistic desolation was undoubtedly Sparta's retention in its internal dealings of a form of currency elsewhere obsolete. The use of this awkward medium of exchange was probably insisted on as a deliberate policy. But whether policy or merely excessive conservatism was the explanation, the effect was a constricted economy which contributed not a little to the paralysis of the arts. We have witnessed in our own day all too clearly the blighting effect of totalitarianism on the arts—the arbitrary definition of acceptable artistic styles, the repression of artists who have not won official approval, the fantastic differentiation between "bourgeois" and "proletarian" art, and the like. All of this is but one aspect of the enforcement of conformity.

The sinister advance of this menacing scourage of regimentation is something we, who cherish our freedom, must ever be on the alert to withstand. We must avoid at all costs following the example of Sparta, which, like the totalitarian countries, surrendered for its citizens what Hobbes, in his *Leviathan,*[83] described as "the liberty to buy and sell and otherwise

[83] Chapter xxi, paragraph 6.

contract with one another; to choose their own abode, their own diet, their own trade of life, and institute their children as they themselves think fit."

IX

I have indicated eight points of resemblance between Sparta and the totalitarian régimes of our own day: 1. militaristic emphasis; 2. aggressiveness; 3. ruthlessness; 4. exclusiveness; 5. supervision of children at an early age; 6. enlistment of feminine participation and support; 7. eugenic practices; 8. enforcement of conformity.

Over against all this may be set the ringing words that Herodotus[34] puts into the mouth of the banished Spartan king Demaratus, addressed to Xerxes when he was meditating his attack on Greece: "The Lacedæmonians, even when fighting singly, are inferior to none; but together in a body they are the best of all. For they are free men—though not wholly free, for over them there is a master, Law [or Tradition], whom they fear far more than your people fear you." We may compare Archidamus' proud characterization of Sparta in the first book of Thucydides[35] as a city "alike free and eminently illustrious" and other noble affirmations of Lacedæmonian independence.

Aristotle, Polybius, and other political theorists of antiquity lauded Sparta for combining in its constitution the principles of monarchy (represented by its dual kings), aristocracy (represented by the *gerousia* or senate), and popular government (represented by the annually elected ephors). All mature Spartiates were members of the *apella* or assembly, which met every month; while it did not have the privilege of debate, it listened to proposals submitted to it by the ephors or the senate and signified, by acclamation, its will on important matters, such as military appointments, foreign policy, and questions of war and peace. Its most important power was the right of election each year of the five ephors, who gradually took over most of the executive functions of government, leaving to the kings, for the most part, only military and ceremonial prerogatives. Other magistrates, too, were elected by the assembly; and no changes in the laws could be made without its approval. Moreover, it filled vacancies in the senate when they occurred. This body consisted, in addition to the two kings and for certain purposes the five ephors, of twenty-eight elders, men who were actually over sixty years of age; these had to be chosen from among a small inner circle of noble families, whereas all Spartiates were eligible for the office of ephor. The senate was on the one hand a deliberative and administrative body and on the other a high court of justice.

[34] VII, 104.
[35] I, lxxxiv, 1.

The body of full Spartan citizens, then, retained in its own hands the ultimate determination of fundamental matters of policy and the choice of the most powerful officials of the state. Moreover, the annual election of ephors guaranteed, at least in theory, the popular control of the executive.[36] In Sparta there was no *Duce* or *Führer*—at least until Nabis came along at the end of the third century—no self-perpetuating and irresponsible *Politburo;* and in spite of our long list of resemblances, it is obvious, I think, that we should use some caution in applying the term *totalitarian* to Sparta.

But while Sparta had some of the characteristics of a democracy, it was a democracy for insiders alone. The Spartiates were all known as "peers" (*homoioi*), and this very name proclaimed their pride in their equality. But we have seen what a small exclusive caste they formed in relation to the total population. We are reminded of the oligarchies of which Aristotle[37] speaks, where the members of the privileged class formed a sort of democracy among themselves.

The Spartans gloried in their liberty. But we may well recall the remark that Archbishop Temple used to make, that "the chief test of the love of liberty lies in the demand for the emancipation of others." Freedom and independence mean very different things to different people. Here, for example, is what Stalin says:

> We did not build this society in order to restrict human liberty, but in order that the human personality may feel really free. We built it for the sake of genuine personal liberty, liberty without quotation marks. . . . Real liberty exists only where exploitation has been abolished, where there is no oppression of some people by others, where there is no unemployment and poverty, where man is not haunted by fear that tomorrow he may lose his job, home, or bread. Only in such a society is real—and not paper—personal and every other kind of liberty possible.[38]

Stalin's kind of liberty is not our kind. Nor was the Spartans' kind our kind, either.

"A nation is a work of art and a work of time," said Disraeli. The Spartan nation was, much more than most, the product of conscious creation. But one cannot help wishing the result had been a more beautiful thing. It was an entity that had an intense fascination for its contemporaries and has had for men ever since. The term *Spartan* has through the centuries been proverbial for rugged asceticism and blind courage. But what did Sparta really accomplish? She gave the world some attractive archaic art, mostly in the smaller forms; she sponsored some delicately

[36] There are some reasons for believing, however, that the ephors, because of bribery and pressures of various kinds, often served the interests of the dominant oligarchical clique more effectively than those of the citizenry that had elected them.

[37] *Politics* 1308 a 10-13.

[38] Quoted in Julian Towster, *Political Power in the U.S.S.R., 1917-1947*, p. 385.

lovely poetry by Alcman and some not very inspired verse by Tyrtæus (however inspiring the Spartiates themselves may have found it!); she provided for all future time a glorious example of unwavering gallantry in Leonidas' last stand at Thermopylæ; she did Greece a really great service by assuming the military leadership against Xerxes and by putting an end to the Persian threat at Platæa; she nobly rejected her allies' demand for the destruction of Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War; and she created a legend.[39] But what other contributions to human welfare or progress did Sparta make? A German historian[40] used of her a striking expression, the "dishonesty of seeming greatness" (*Unehrlichkeit einer scheinbaren Grösse*). A devastating phrase, but an apt one! In view of the meagreness of Sparta's actual achievement, who could say that it was worth all the pain and cruelty it cost?

The perfect epitaph for the Spartan state is contained in these words of Aristotle[41]: "Today the Spartans no longer possess an empire; and as a consequence they are obviously not a happy people, and their lawgiver was a failure. Absurd it is, surely, that a people which has faithfully observed his laws and has suffered no hindrance in adhering to them has nonetheless let slip the opportunity of living nobly."

[39] It is perhaps worth noting that Sparta was one of the ideals of the nazi régime; and Metaxas, the Greek imitation of Hitler and Mussolini, told his long-suffering fellow countrymen that the Spartans and the Macedonians were the peoples of antiquity who were worth imitating.

[40] Helmut Berve, *Sparta,* p. 147.

[41] *Politics* 1333 b 22-26.

PASTORS AND PROPHETS

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I

SOME TIME AGO in the *New Yorker,* that mine of religious inspiration, there was a cartoon by Whitney Darrow, Jr. Its subject was clergymen but its wider implications touched modern religion in general. The setting was the study of an established minister. All the indications of worldly success are present as the artist has drawn the picture. The clergyman himself is obviously a man who has done well. Beside the desk there is a young man, also a clergyman, who has evidently just finished his seminary training. Now he is ready to begin his work. What does it take, he wonders, to succeed in his chosen profession? This question has brought him to the luxuriously appointed study of his senior. The question has been asked. And then the answer is given: "Drawing upon my not inconsiderable experience, Andrews," says the prosperous parson, "my advice to a young man ambitious of preferment in our calling is to steer clear of two subjects—politics and religion."

Perhaps we smile; but we need not look very far beneath the humor to discover the barb. Like so many of the things said in the *New Yorker* about modern religion, this one contains astringent criticism with its apparent humor.

What the cartoonist perceived so clearly is that the Christian religion is a dangerous thing, though you might never believe that to watch it at work in the modern world. To proclaim the gospel in its fullness is a revolutionary undertaking. This is why it is so seldom attempted. Every minister is aware, at least to a certain degree, of what a dangerous thing religion can sometimes be. Many become at times painfully conscious of that danger, finding themselves severely censured for doing what they were sure was honest preaching of the gospel. The result is a timidity of which most parish ministers, when they are honest, will admit knowledge. Whenever the mantle of the prophet looks as though it is about to fall on our protesting shoulders, we quickly look about, attempting to survey the situation from all angles, endeavoring to avoid the imminent descent of that uncomfortable mantle. For the prophet is not only without honor; he is often without a pulpit. The mantle is to be accepted, we feel, only when the consequences have been carefully weighed, and alternative occupations painstaking surveyed.

That this is not a false picture is indicated by some comments made by a seminary professor. Writing in *Crozer Quarterly* in that section called

"Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly," the professor recalls having received a letter from a friend, a layman. The letter was written shortly after the layman's return from a Sunday morning church service. A sentence from it haunted the teacher: "Do all our boys conform and sink to the level of the thinking in their pews?" This question set the teacher off on some reflections of his own. Two explanations were rejected. It is not enough to say, he contended, that the people of the churches are not ready for rigorous, honest thought and prophetic preaching. Nor will it do to condemn seminary graduates, accusing them of having no message and of having lost contact with the people in the pews. Having rejected these explanations as being too superficial, the teacher writes:

> But the difficulty as I see it goes still deeper. Through the years I have seen many graduates for whom I had had high hopes come back to the campus. And not infrequently I have felt, in the midst of that pleasure of seeing once again a former student which every teacher knows, a pang. So frequently, quite despite the greater maturity and ease and urbanity which the years have brought, I have sensed a loss, the lack of something—a spark, an urge toward far-off summits—which I had glimpsed and prized as I had seen them in class. Good men, earnest men, essentially honest men—nearly every one of them. But that evanescent something was no longer there.
>
> And I think that was what my friend missed in that sermon that Sunday morning. Life has a way of smoothing off rough edges; that is all to the good. But unfortunately it also has a way of smoothing cutting edges which ought to be kept sharp; that can be tragic.[1]

Surely, this marks a real dilemma in the minds of many ministers. The cooling of the prophetic fire with which many ministries began is a fact too commonplace to need illustration. Because it is so tragic and will ultimately prove so costly to the forces of religion, it may not be amiss if we try to find an answer to the ponderings of the seminary professor. Why is it that so many men, out in the parish ministry for a few years, lose that sharp cutting edge of prophetic fire?

It is perfectly true, of course, that there is no single explanation of this loss. Many reasons enter into the picture, and individual cases will doubtless often prove exceptions to generalizations. The thesis I want to endeavor to defend in this paper is that part of the reason for the loss of the prophetic fire and the waning of the prophetic impulse is due to the conflict occasioned in the parish minister who tries at one and the same time to be both pastor and prophet. It is surely no accident that in religious history priest and prophet have frequently, if not always, found themselves in opposing camps. The two sides have often hurled heated invectives at each other. The dilemma of the modern Protestant parish minister

[1] *Crozer Quarterly*, "Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly," Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (October, 1949), p. 339.

is that he must attempt to combine in himself these two functions. What was formerly warfare between two different religious groups is now transferred to become warfare between two conflicting ideas within the mind of the parish minister. No wonder, then, that the conflict is a real one and that many parish ministers feel themselves caught in a dilemma for which they can find no solution.

Whenever he thinks of himself in his rôle as a pastor, he develops one type of approach to his daily work. The focus then is found in the people of the parish. His primary intention is to help these people to face and, if possible, to solve the various problems and difficulties which they confront. To do this well means that he must know his people, and that knowledge must go deeper than merely knowing that their names are to be found on the rolls of his parish. He must take time to enter into their experiences to as full a degree as possible. But it means something more than this. It means that he can fulfill his duty as a pastor only as he maintains with his people a friendly relationship. He must let them know that his time is theirs. They must come to understand that no problem is too trivial for the pastor to help them with it. But most of all the pastor must be careful not to alienate them by his attitudes and views. If, for example, there is a heated discussion raging in the community concerning a very controversial question, the decision of the pastor to take a determined stand may mean that some of his people will become angry and therefore less willing to accept him as a pastor. The prophet in that case has gotten in the way of the pastor.

Similarly, when the parish minister thinks of himself in the rôle of the prophet, a different type of approach to his work is indicated. The prophet is interested in people as well as is the pastor, but the prophet sees the helping of people fundamentally in terms of solving some of the problems which harass them. The orientation of the prophet is to God's will. He feels upon himself a responsibility to find that will and then, with neither fear nor favor, to proclaim it. He cannot stop to ask himself whether he might be offending Mr. So-and-So, who is a member of the city council, by taking a stand on a certain issue. If the minister does ask that question and as a result either says nothing or tempers what he had planned to say, the pastor has interfered with the work of the prophet.

It seems clear, then, that there is a conflict in the minds of many Protestant parish ministers in this area. The conflict may seldom rise to consciousness, but it is often present. We may not face it openly, but we must make peace with it in some form or other. The form of this peace quite often is the quenching of the prophetic fire.

II

It is not hard to find reasons which will account for this loss of the prophetic fire in modern Protestantism. Explanations are to be found both in the nature of the task of the modern minister and in the general religious climate of opinion now prevailing.

Bliss Perry once said in crossing Harvard Yard, "I feel as though I were going through a cemetery, for there are teachers buried under those roll-top desks." One feels in going past some of our huge church buildings a similar sentiment about the harried individual who serves as the minister. Somewhere beneath all that administrative routine we may have buried one of God's true prophets. Certainly it is true that the modern parish in America is an amazing enterprise. Its motto is "Something for Everybody." If there is an age group which seems to be left out with—heaven help us!—nothing to do in the church but worship, that grave situation must be remedied with all possible haste. It is, of course, the minister who must devise another group, outline its aims, policies, and organization, and pilot it through its first tentative steps toward becoming a lusty part of the church's total program. The parish minister today must not only do the things the minister has always done—preach, teach, comfort, and counsel. He must in addition supervise the finances of the church, a task which some think is the most important thing he has to do. They will put up with a lack of balance in preaching sooner than they will accept a lack of balance in the budget. The total oversight of the program, which often takes in every single day in the week, is the minister's responsibility. He must, of course, show his interest in the church school, teaching a class perhaps and certainly helping in finding others who will teach, giving general attention to the entire educational program of the church. And then, too, there are the young people, who expect the minister to show his interest in youth by providing several groups for them and supervising one of them himself. This could go on almost endlessly.

It is easy, I know, to become very cynical and more than a little rebellious about all this. There are times when we wonder if our English visitor, Alec R. Vidler, was not correct when he likened the multifarious activities of the American parishes to "cushions," and claimed that their purpose, or at least their result, was to deaden the impact of the living God.

We are interested here neither in defending nor attacking the varied activities of the modern parish. From the point of view of the thesis of this essay, however, it is important to note that effective prophetic preaching becomes impossible when the minister must bear the heavy burden of administrative routine which he now must carry. For the office of the prophet, if it is to be adequately carried out, demands time for reflection

and for study. Issues today are far from simple; most of them are extremely complex indeed. To attempt to find a right way through the muddle of alternatives is not an easy thing. To do it at all demands a mind trained to a fine pitch and then, what is almost equally important, the time to consider quietly the various possibilities. A study of the prophets would reveal, I believe, that in every case they were men who had ample time for thought. Out of that thought came their flaming messages and their compelling conviction concerning God's will. The modern parish minister finds little time for that reflection as he hustles about keeping the machinery of the church going. It is significant that few prophets have had the task of guiding an institution.

Not only does the nature of the task of the modern parish minister make it difficult for him to fulfill the office of the prophet, but there is another difficulty which comes from the general religious climate of opinion now prevailing. For reasons into which we need not go here, we have lost the tension between the gospel and the world. Religion has accommodated itself altogether too well to our present civilization. Religion has settled down rather comfortably, accepted without much question as part of the general environment, a force with which we shall not need to bother ourselves unduly. The danger of religion disappears when the sense of tension is gone. It blesses whatever is the prevailing practice and would not think of raising its feeble voice in condemnation of what the majority desire. Leo Brady in his novel, *The Edge of Doom,* describes the religion of one character in words which might well be applied to religion in our culture: "Her religion trotted at her heels like a pet dog, carefully groomed and fed, a well-mannered, characterless animal with no nasty habits." Those words are not an unjust description of the weak and flabby type of religion which we have today.

This outlook in which religion is looked upon, not as a force by which to judge the practices of the day but as a power to reinforce contemporary prejudices, has a baneful effect upon the minister who aspires to be a prophet. If he once loses sight of the fact that the gospel can never be completely at home in the world, he will find that his conception of his task will alter. No longer will he think that at least one part of his task is that of judging the practices of his day in the light of the will of God. He will then seek to make religion back up the prejudices of our day and age. Religion will be blessing; it will not be judgment.

This has happened time and again in religious history. Men have always been in danger of confusing the transient ideals of their day with eternal truth. Every era of history would furnish examples of that. In 1873 a financial crisis gripped the nation. Trouble was in the air. Unemployed men walked about the cities and the highways. Talk of radicalism

was rife, and Marxian socialism was winning its first converts. In July of 1877 the railroads east of the Mississippi ordered a ten per cent wage cut and thus started one of the most destructive labor battles of American history. But the religious groups were all set for it. They lived by certain theoretical certainties, derived not from the gospel but from their own prejudices, and chief among these certainties was the sanctity of property values. They saw the angry mobs as hostile threats to the very order of society. Their reaction was instantaneous. As the rioting persisted, the *Independent* gave vent to its feelings:

> If the club of the policemen, knocking out the brains of the rioter, will answer, then well and good; but if it does not promptly meet the exigency, then bullets and bayonets, cannister and grape—with no sham or pretense, in order to frighten men, but with fearful and destructive reality—constitute the one remedy and the one duty of the hour. . . . Napoleon was right when he said that the way to deal with a mob was to exterminate it.[2]

Thus one of the respected Protestant journals of that day demonstrated how the critical religious judgment can be lost. Henry Ward Beecher, the outstanding preacher of the day, entered the discussion in two sermons. He himself earned a large salary, and his royalties and other incomes enabled him to indulge his taste for driving fine horses and for carrying handfuls of uncut gems in his pockets. Yet he took time to denounce the employees for not being willing to bear their poverty more nobly:

> It is said [he wrote], that a dollar a day is not enough for a wife and five or six children. No, not if the man smokes or drinks beer. It is not enough if they are to live as he would be glad to have them live. It is not enough to enable them to live as perhaps they have a right to live in prosperous times. But is not a dollar a day enough to buy bread with? Water costs nothing; and a man who cannot live on bread is not fit to live. What is the use of a civilization that simply makes men incompetent to live under the conditions which exist. . . .[3]

Nothing so quickly quenches the prophetic fire as the loss of the tension between the gospel and the world. Whenever that happens, the minister becomes not so much a leader as a means of expression. To conform and sink to the level of the thinking of the pew is one of the persisting temptations and perhaps one of the besetting sins of the modern minister. In a stimulating essay on William Jennings Bryan, Richard Hofstadter writes:

> Presumably he would have lost his political effectiveness if he had learned to look at his supporters with a critical eye, but his capacity for identifying himself with them was costly, for it gave them not so much leadership as expression. He spoke

[2] *Independent*, August 2, 1877, p. 16; quoted in Henry F. May, *Protestant Churches and Industrial America* (New York, Harper, 1948), pp. 92-93.

[3] *Christian Union*, August 1, 1877, p. 93; quoted in May, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

for them so perfectly that he never spoke to them. In his lifelong stream of impassioned rhetoric he communicated only what they already believed.[4]

This is the danger of the minister as well. He may speak so perfectly for his people that he never speaks to them. In the entire course of his ministry he may only communicate what they already believe. This is surely one of the most tragic failures that can befall a minister. It is what inevitably happens, however, when he forgets the tension between the gospel and the world. If he forgets that tension, he may continue to be a pastor, keeping an institution going; he is no longer a prophet, commissioned to declare God's will. When he loses that sense of tension, he fails in a vital aspect of his ministry. He knows then what Phillips Brooks meant when he said: "The saddest moments in every preacher's life, I think, are those in which he goes away from his pulpit conscious that he has given the people, not the highest that he knew how to give, but only the highest that they knew how to ask."[5] When the minister conforms to the level of thinking in the pews, that always happens. He speaks *for* his people not *to* them.

To these two reasons for the decline of prophetic preaching—the burden of administrative work and the loss of the tension between the gospel and the world—must be added the difficulty of speaking as a prophet in a day when issues are as complex as they are today. Living in the midst of such complexity, we find it very difficult indeed to discover with any assurance the will of God. Yet the distinguishing characteristic of the prophet has been the assurance with which he spoke. "Thus saith the Lord." That mark of authority is absent from much contemporary preaching, perhaps inevitably so.

When issues are as complex as today's, it is more and more impossible to take any given way of proceeding and place upon it the stamp of Christian approval. We must be cautious, saying "on the whole" and "in the long run." Our ideas must be qualified with many an "if" and a frequent "perhaps." All this may make for accuracy in thought and discrimination, but it does not mark the manner in which a prophet speaks. The very difficulty of discovering the Christian way in the modern world leads many a parish minister to be content to be a pastor; he does not aspire to be a prophet.

Every man, I am sure, is aware of what we are now talking about. Few of us have never faced an issue and been overwhelmed by its complexity. John C. Bennett, a careful thinker and a well-balanced theologian, has wrestled long and hard with this problem of finding the Christian way through the issues that confront us. He asks: "Why is it so difficult to

[4] Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition and the Men Who Made It* (New York, Knopf, 1948), p. 187.

[5] Phillips Brooks, *Lectures on Preaching* (New York, Dutton, 1877), p. 31.

find a straight line from Christian ethics to the concrete problems of society?"[6] He indicates then some of the reasons which make it difficult to choose any one course of action and call it fully Christian. Among the reasons, he cites the long historical tradition, with its vested interests, encrusted prejudices, fear, hatred, and vindictiveness; the fact that decisions on public policy involve a large number of people who are not Christians; the lack of direct personal relationships; the power of group-interest to distort the needs of other groups; the power of the human spirit to cloak self-interest with idealism; and the fading sense of personal responsibility. All these characteristics of modern social life make it extremely hazardous to proclaim any one way of action fully Christian. The minister is a brave soul indeed who, in the face of all these difficulties, would utter final judgments on controversial questions.

Before the baffling issues of the day many a minister has retreated. The arena of social religion, in which the prophet must be active, is too complicated. Nothing can be said with any certainty. The prophet concedes defeat.

There are many other reasons which enter into this quenching of the prophetic fire, but the three which I have mentioned seem to me to be of the greatest importance. For these reasons many parish ministers have abandoned the prophetic office, immersing themselves in administrative details and liturgical extravagances.

III

But this is a tragic thing. There has rarely been a time when the need for honest, prophetic preaching has been more acute and desperate than at the present time. The spectacle of the minister relinquishing his prophetic task at the very moment when men are perplexed and bewildered is not a reassuring sign of religion's vitality and vigor. With all the difficulties—and they are, as we have seen, real enough—the suspicion persists that we have given up too easily. Our struggle to find the Christian way has not been intense enough, and our consequent failure to find that way is not so much an indication of the impossibility of its being found as of our inability to discover it. The matter comes very close to being an affair of our courage once that Christian way has been found. It has been said of the Bible that the disturbing things in it are not those which cannot be understood but those which can. Of God's will in our day the same thing can be said. What is disturbing is not so much those issues about which we do not feel that we have any insight into God's

[6] John C. Bennett, *Christian Ethics and Social Policy* (New York, Scribner, 1946). p. 17. The entire discussion of Chap. II is of great value.

will but rather those questions upon which we know that we see God's will clearly enough to proclaim it.

A distinguishing characteristic of our age is the manner in which men are becoming members of groups. With that alliance there results a tendency to see things only from the perspective of the interest of that particular group. Its fortunes determine, often unconsciously but nevertheless conclusively, our approach to certain questions of the day. No one wholly escapes this, but what is disturbing today is that so few seem to escape it even to a slight extent. The businessman thinks primarily as a member of the business community. The union man thinks primarily as a member of the union. So it goes with all the groups of modern society. No longer do men look at issues with clear and honest eyes as individuals seeking the truth. They look at issues as members of groups seeking privileges.

This situation makes it all the more imperative that some attempt be made to maintain, in a day of vast collective groups, centres where honest individuals try to give an accurate and unbiased report of current affairs. The need is for men who are independent enough to scorn allegiance with any group. It seems clear that the Protestant pulpit is one of the few remaining places where, if the minister is aware of his great opportunity, an effort can still be made to "see life steadily and see it whole." The phrase may be hackneyed; the need is urgent.

There are, of course, no end of voices today urging us to this or that course of action. The air, indeed, is a bedlam of strident cries, all of them pointing the one way to salvation. In the midst of all this, however, there is very little of what we might call, to borrow Lynn Harold Hough's phrase, "the Christian criticism of life." This is the very thing the minister who is also a prophet can provide.

If the minister does not seek to provide it, then it will not be forthcoming. It is his high and holy task to attempt to view life from the standpoint of eternal values. It is his responsibility to judge modern life and to say of our practices that they depart here and here from the will of God. Without that sort of criticism, there is little hope for that renewal without which we are in for some very desperate times indeed.

The two great contributions which prophetic preaching can make to our day—independent criticism and analysis based upon something more real than the presumptuous prejudices of modernity—are the very things for which men are hungry. They seek guidance. They want to know the direction in which they should go. Within great numbers of the laymen of our churches there is a wistful yearning to do what is right provided only that the minister will try his honest best to help them to know that way. If the minister, either through cowardice or through lack of effort,

does not attempt to give guidance in the perplexing realm of social action, it means that the men and women of the churches have no alternative but to turn to voices which are neither independent of special interest nor capable of transcending current prejudices. In such an event the minister has no right to complain that his people do not follow Christian ways. They cannot follow ways which they have not been shown.

This demand has been given vigorous expression by the editors of *Fortune Magazine:*

> The voice of the Church today, we find, is the echo of our own voices. And the result of this experience, already manifest, is disillusionment. . . . This is a profound and absolute spiritual disillusionment, arising from the fact that when we consult the Church we hear only what we ourselves have said. . . . There is only one way out of the spiral. The way out is the sound of a voice, not our voice, but a voice coming from something not ourselves, in the existence of which we cannot disbelieve. It is the earthly task of the pastors to hear this voice, to cause us to hear it, and to tell us what it says. If they cannot hear it, or if they fail to tell us, we, as laymen, are utterly lost. Without it we are no more capable of saving the world than we were capable of creating it in the first place.[7]

This is the challenge which confronts the minister who would also be a prophet. He is aware of the need for prophetic preaching and also apprehensive about it. He knows that he needs a strategy for prophetic preaching.

IV

One element in that strategy is obvious enough but often, I am afraid, lost sight of. It is that all our prophetic preaching must be deeply rooted in Christian doctrine. When the laymen demands that the minister furnish guidance, he does not ask that the minister mount his pulpit and deliver an enthusiastic defense either of socialism or of free private enterprise. The reason, one feels, for the opposition of the laity to much which the minister dignifies by calling prophetic preaching is the suspicion on the layman's part that the minister is not looking at issues as a Christian so much as he is airing his views derived from a prejudiced viewpoint. If the layman begins to have that suspicion, he may be pardoned if he decides that he will seek light and guidance from an expert. If prophetic preaching does not grow out of and rest back upon a firm understanding of Christian faith, it is just one more voice added to the modern welter of opinions swirling around the head of the layman.

This is a peril which has often tempted the believers in the so-called social gospel. The original formulators of that movement in American religious life were careful to base their positions upon Christian doctrines, but their successors have often departed from their example. It is a very

[7] "War and Peace," *Fortune Magazine,* January, 1940.

easy thing to allow the "gospel" to be lost and social causes to claim one's attention. Often enough these causes are good and worthy of the support they receive, but we must always be careful to see that it is the gospel we proclaim, a gospel which is neither individual nor social but total. The layman, I am persuaded, is ready and eager to listen to any minister who makes an honest attempt to work out his position on contemporary problems from the basis of Christian doctrine.

One of the notable ministries of our day was that of Henry Sloane Coffin in the Madison Avenue Presbyterian Church. During that ministry social issues found expression time and again from the pulpit. Series of sermons were preached on the Ten Commandments, the social aspects of the Cross, and on a more Christian industrial order. There was in these sermons no sparing of criticism of the existing order. They are the utterances of a true prophet. But they are also the utterances of a man who tried at all times to ground his views in his Christian doctrines. That ministry won, from all sorts and conditions of men, an enthusiastic hearing; and the reason, I believe, is to be found not only in Dr. Coffin's undoubted skill as a preacher but also in the fact that no one hearing him could doubt that he was listening to a Christian minister. People will listen if, as part of the strategy for prophetic preaching, the minister lets his social views grow out of his Christian doctrines.

Another thing which ought to mark a strategy for prophetic preaching is the absence of omniscience. The prophet must speak with assurance—that is true enough; but to speak thus does not demand that a man give the impression that he knows all the answers to all the problems. As with all preaching, no matter what its subject, humility is a virtue as wonderful as it is rare.

This is not an easy thing to achieve. The minister may seek to give such an impression of assurance that he fails to give any indication of humility. Yet he has, I think, good precedent for admitting on occasion that he has no "word from the Lord" but that he is willing to give his own judgment. It would be well if the minister would be honest enough to let his people know when he does not feel that he has any burning message from God. To proceed in that way may persuade the people of the parish to listen more attentively on those occasions when the minister does feel upon himself the need to make plain the will of God *as he sees it.*

Those last four words are important. Always the minister proclaims God's will *as he sees it.* His view is open to correction in the light of events. Prophets have been known to be wrong, and it is perhaps far better to be humble in the beginning than humiliated at the end. The minister makes no claim to omniscience. He seeks only to state honestly what he sees of God's will. His people can ask no more and will ask no less.

A final part of the strategy for prophetic preaching is that it must be done in the spirit of Christian love. One of the most unfortunate things about many ministers who fancy themselves to be remarkable prophets is the meanness of spirit which characterizes them. They are so censorious in their approach that the people, even if persuaded intellectually of the minister's correctness, may emotionally be so antagonized by his manner that they will not follow him. There are temperance speakers who have often made me feel like getting drunk. There are fundamentalists who have driven me close to paganism. There are liberals who have made me cast wistful glances at the dogmatic rigidity of Catholicism. The manner in which a man preaches is of great importance.

The minister who would be a prophet should be sure that he does not speak in hatred of any group. This does not exclude righteous indignation, which is far different from hatred of people. The orientation is to the evil done, not to the evildoer. Like Jesus himself, the prophetic preacher, aware of how easy it is to stumble and fall, does not condemn unmercifully the mistakes, foibles, and sins of men. But he does not for a moment compromise with the evil done. Again this is a realm where no hard and fast rules can be laid down. Let the minister be sure of his love for men. Let him also realize that he, along with his people, is implicated in the web of responsibility which has brought about the chaotic conditions of today. He does not say, concerning blame for modern conditions, "you" but rather "we." Out of the identification of minister and people will come a relationship of mutual trust which will enable a man to speak the truth in love. When that happens, people will listen; and, as in the past, God "by the foolishness of preaching" will save both individual souls and our society.

"Do all our boys conform and sink to the level of the thinking in their pews?" Many unfortunately do. But the hope of honest religion is in those who, while not ceasing for a moment to be good pastors, will also try to be God's true prophets.

HENRY SCOUGAL: GENTLE REVOLUTIONIST

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REVOLUTIONS are usually born of violent and tempestuous spirits: men like Luther who defy kings and emperors and like Savonarola who make the streets echo with denunciations of the high and mighty. No one would ever dream that a quiet and serene discussion of the devotional life would contribute in any significant way to movements of real importance and vast proportions. And yet that is the story of Henry Scougal, who through his writings helped supply the spiritual dynamic of the Wesleyan revival in England and the Great Awakening in America. Even more strange is the fact that his influence did not begin to be felt until a half century after his death, but for more than one hundred years thereafter his writings constituted one of the most potent forces in the spiritual quickening that swept the western world.

The nineteenth century has been called "the Great Century" in the history of Christianity, but it would be more accurate to include the eighteenth century in this evaluation, for the two centuries were inseparably linked by a single movement of renewed evangelical religion, which constituted a real revolutionary force in society. During these two centuries, a surge of new vitality and power brought the gospel to the industrial slums of Great Britain, evangelized an entire continent in the New World, stimulated great movements of moral reform on both sides of the Atlantic, and produced a missionary outreach that penetrated more lands and touched more lives than ever before in Christian history. Never before had Christianity been so widely dispersed or claimed the allegiance of so many people. Never before had it set itself so earnestly to deal with the evils of society. Under the impetus provided by the Clapham sect in England, slavery was abolished, wages and hours and conditions of labor began to be regulated, legislation was adopted to improve the lot of the wards of society, and charitable foundations and educational institutions were established. Similar tendencies were present in the United States—associated primarily with the activity of Charles G. Finney, the Tappan brothers, and their spiritual descendents among the radicals of the eighties and nineties. What was called "the Nonconformist conscience" spoke in Great Britain with an authority that could make or break a prime minister, while the reformers who dominated the American political scene during the greater part of the last century were, as Alice Tyler has pointed out in *Freedom's Ferment*, "the product of evangelical religion." Back of this revolutionary ferment, of course, was the spiritual revival of the eight-

eenth century which continued to make its impact felt throughout the nineteenth century. And among those who played a part in the rebirth of a powerful evangelical spirit, the name of Henry Scougal should not be forgotten.

Henry Scougal was born in 1650, the son of a Scottish Presbyterian minister who was to become the bishop of Aberdeen after the restoration of the Stuarts as the rulers of England and Scotland. Dying before his twenty-eighth birthday, Henry Scougal spent his brief life, except for one year in the parish ministry, at the University of Aberdeen—first as a student and then as a professor. Had it not been for two friends—Gilbert Burnet, the future bishop of Salisbury, who secured the publication of *The Life of God in the Soul of Man;* and George Garden who collected his sermons—Scougal's name would have been forgotten and his influence would largely have ceased with the passing of the student generation which last sat under his instruction. Once having been released to the world, however, his writings found an ever-widening circle of readers for the next two centuries and were reprinted again and again on both sides of the Atlantic.

Scougal had reacted strongly against the twin evils of sectarianism and formalism in religion. The second he regarded as the source of the first. When men begin to locate the essence of religion in outward forms and rites, Scougal felt that dissension is inevitable and Christianity is transformed from a "bond of love" into a "bone of contention." Men's minds are diverted from the heart of religious experience to the peripheral questions of polity, ceremony, and subtle theological distinctions; and the consequence of this is serious indeed, as he well knew. "The religion of Scotland at this unhappy period," writes John Cunningham, "consisted mainly in the rival parties hating, cursing, and excommunicating one another." Pitched battles were fought, men were murdered, and the final phase of the struggle is known in Scottish history as "the killing time."

Disturbed and revolted by the bitter conflicts of his day, Scougal called upon people to put first things first. "It were to be wished," he said in one of his sermons, "that there were less noise and debate about matters of this nature and that, being agreed in the more substantial parts of religion, we did all charitably acquiesce in that excellent advice of the Apostle, which he giveth in a parallel instance, *Let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not; and let not him that eateth not, judge him that eateth.*" Controversial matters should be relegated to the secondary position they deserve, and emphasis should be placed upon "the great uncontroverted truths of religion" upon which all men are agreed. Thus, the divisions which plagued the church might be bridged and men might be reunited.

Scougal, however, was realistic. He knew that reason would scarcely prevail in the heat engendered by controversy. Men are more apt, he said, "to be reasoned out of their erroneous persuasions by a good life than (by) many arguments." Furthermore, if formalism was the source of sectarianism, then there was little hope of peace being restored without a rebirth of real spiritual life which would shift attention from the incidentals to the fundamentals of religious experience. The only sure antidote to partisan zeal was a renewal of vital, powerful, ethical religion—a religion defined in terms of the "union of the soul with God."

The Life of God in the Soul of Man is the best known of Scougal's writings, having gone through innumerable editions[1] and having become one of the classics of Protestant devotion. In it Scougal summarizes his conception of true religion, which conception is as timely today as it was in the seventeenth century. The countering of religious formalism and sectarianism by the renewal of vital, personal religion is a need as urgent today as it was then. Now, as then, the springs of spiritual life have been running dry, leaving a void in the lives of countless people for whom the externals of religion have long since lost their meaning; a sectarian spirit still plagues a world which desperately needs a unifying faith to transcend the differences which separate man from man; and in too many instances religion is more of a form than a force.

"Men may write big volumes and, as one says, talk much and say little; but it is a great matter to talk little and yet say much." It was the latter happy faculty that George Garden attributed to his friend, Henry Scougal, for *The Life of God in the Soul of Man* is, indeed, a little book. Its "great usefulness," Garden continued, is "to inspire us with the spirit of true religion, to enlighten our minds with a right sense and knowledge of it, to warm our hearts with suitable affections and breathings after it, and to direct our lives to the practice of it."

The nub of the problems, Scougal maintained, is a fundamental misconception as to the nature of religion. The trappings of religion are taken for religion itself. Actually, the external forms and rites of religion bear about the same relationship to true religion as a puppet to a man. True religion is life, not form. It is not making orthodox affirmations, saying prayers, going to church, receiving the sacrament, or doing any other external act. These are but aids to religion. True religion is the "union of the soul with God, a real participation of the divine, the very image of God drawn in upon the soul; or, in the Apostle's phrase, *it is Christ formed within us.*"

[1] It was reprinted on an average of at at least once every three years during the eighteenth century, and during the first half of the nineteenth century the rate of publication more than doubled. It also was translated and published in French, German, and Welsh. The most recent edition was published by the Westminster Press in 1948.

The outward forms of religious expression and devotion, Scougal asserts, are not to be repudiated but subordinated. Not only did an undue emphasis upon externals produce bitterness and division; it transformed religion itself from a joyous and spontaneous expression of the divine life into a series of duties to be performed. Religion thus becomes forced and artificial, heavy and languid, cold and spiritless, scant and niggardly; whereas true religion is "an inward, free, and self-moving principle, and those who have made progress in it are not actuated by external motives . . . nor constrained by laws," but are naturally inclined to the exercises of religion and delight in the performance of them. No law need be prescribed to those that love God, for the "divine love wherewith they are actuated makes them become a law unto themselves."

"I know not how the nature of religion can be more fully expressed," Scougal states, "than by calling it *a divine life.*" The root of this divine life is faith, and the "chief branches" of it are: "love to God, charity to man, purity, and humility." He then proceeds to set forth the nature and excellence of these four branches of the divine life, and closes with an extended discussion of the practical aids to their realization. "It is true," he writes, that "God hath been found of some who sought him not; he hath cast himself in their way, who were quite out of his. . . . But certainly this is not God's ordinary method of dealing with men. Though he hath not tied himself to means, yet he hath tied us to the use of them, and we have never more reason to expect the divine assistance than when we are doing our utmost endeavors." It is for us to "break up our fallow ground, and root out the weeds, and pull up the thorns," so that God may have his way with us.

Scougal gives major attention to love as an expression of the divine life "hid with Christ in God," and his definition of love is strikingly familiar to those acquainted with recent Swedish theology. "Perfect love is a kind of self-dereliction, a wandering out of ourselves; it is a kind of voluntary death, wherein the lover dies to himself and all his own interest, not thinking of them nor caring for them any more, and minding nothing but how he may please and gratify the party whom he loves." Little wonder, then, that Scougal had scant use for men who sought to "frame a notion of God according to their own wishing," in order to avoid the force and rigor of Christ's commandments. The Sermon of the Mount was to be taken seriously and its injunctions were not to be looked upon "as only counsels of perfection, commendable in themselves, but which may yet be neglected without any great hazard."

It should not be supposed that there was anything soft or sentimental in Scougal's application of the principle of love to life. The demands of love were rigorous and uncompromising, and the divine life was to be

pursued with no thought of reward: it was its own reward. He knew full well that a cross as well as a crown may stand at the end of the road. Nor did he discount the difficulties that stood in the way of the pursuit of the ideal life set forth in the New Testament, but he did not give way to despair. "Why should we think it impossible that true goodness and universal love should ever come to sway and prevail in our souls? Is not this their primitive state and condition, their native and genuine constitution as they came first from the hands of their Maker? Sin and corruption are but usurpers, and though they have long kept the possession, yet from the beginning it was not so."

Henry Scougal has been called "Aberdeen's immortal mystic," but it is evident that he was not a recluse in retreat from the world. Solitude he cherished, and when he was able to get out of "the noise and hurry of the world" and sit alone and keep silence, contemplating the divine perfections," he felt as if he were in "the suburbs of heaven." But this was never an end in itself. A strong emphasis upon the ethical obligations of the gospel was perhaps the most characteristic feature of his thought. The love of God inevitably involved compassion for his children, and therefore one can never abandon the world or render himself "useless to mankind." "The great business" of any Christian was "to advance the divine life in the world, to make religion sway and prevail, to frame and mould the souls of men into a conformity with God" to the end that "the honor of God and the welfare of others" may become "as dear unto men as their own concerns." It was Scougal's deepest conviction that the life of God in the souls of men could become effective in a troubled world; yet he scarcely could have imagined the full impact upon a troubled world his words were destined to have. Like Kierkegaard who was ignored, neglected, and forgotten in his own day, Scougal's influence can be measured only in terms of the leaders of a later generation who found in him one who spoke to their spiritual need.

So well did *The Life of God in the Soul of Man* succeed in its irenic mission that men of all parties and denominations came under its spell—"high church" and "low church" Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Methodists, Baptists, and even Unitarians. But even more significant was its contribution to the quickening of that vast tide of spiritual life which characterized Great Britain and America during the eighteenth century.

The men who first became aware of the spiritual power to be found in the writings of Henry Scougal were members of the Latitudinarian party in the Church of England. They stood in the tradition of the Cambridge Platonists and were equipped by inclination and temperament to find Scougal's interpretation of religion congenial, but they were not

equipped to lead a spiritual revival. Having experienced the blight of religious animosities, they distrusted any radical display of emotion and feared enthusiasm. It was not until memories of the religious wars in England and Scotland had grown dim that leaders emerged who dared risk releasing the pent-up emotions of religious feeling.

One of the centres from which the new spiritual life had its rise was the Holy Club of the Wesleys at Oxford, and there is evidence that *The Life of God in the Soul of Man* played its part in shaping the devotional life and religious spirit of that little society of earnest students. Dugald Butler calls it the "text-book" of the Holy Club. The term "text-book" may imply too much of an academic interest to be entirely appropriate, but it does serve to indicate the central position the volume occupied in the life and thought of the spiritual fraternity Charles Wesley had organized. That it was a continuing influence is attested by the fact that John Wesley published and promoted the sale of an abridged edition which went through several printings before the end of the century.

The initial contact of the group with Scougal's little treatise is relatively obscure. Susannah Wesley was one of the many who were captivated by the spirit and beauty of *The Life of God in the Soul of Man.* She referred to it as "an excellent good book" with which she had become acquainted "many years ago." It probably had been brought to her attention by her husband, Samuel Wesley, and she in turn commended it to her sons, and they came under its spell during their formative years. The most important evidence of the place it occupied in the life of the Holy Club comes from the testimony of George Whitefield. "I never knew what true religion was," he tells us, "till God sent me that excellent treatise by the hand of my never-to-be-forgotten friend." The "never-to-be-forgotten friend" was Charles Wesley. Whitefield had come to him in deep spiritual perplexity and Charles had put into his hands a copy of Scougal's treatise.

> At my first reading it, I wondered what the author meant by saying "that some falsely placed religion in going to church, doing hurt to no one, being constant in the duties of the closet, and now and then reaching out their hands to give alms to their poor neighbors." "Alas!" thought I, "if this be not religion, what is?" God soon showed me; for in reading a few lines further that "true religion was a union of the soul with God, and Christ formed within us," a ray of divine light was instanteously darted in upon my soul, and from that moment, but not till then, did I know that I must be a new creature.

It was from this moment that Whitefield dated his conversion.

> O what a ray of divine life did then break in upon my soul! I fell a-writing to all my brethren and sisters. I talked to the students as they came into my room. I laid aside all trifling conversation. I put all trifling books away, and was determined to study to be a saint, and then to be a scholar. From that moment God has been carrying on His blessed work in my soul.

"I know the place," Whitefield writes elsewhere. "It may be superstitious but whenever I go to Oxford I cannot help running to the spot where Jesus Christ first revealed himself to me and gave me the new birth."

So steeped did John Wesley become in the religious spirit and ideas of Henry Scougal that his most characteristic utterances easily could have come almost word for word from the pen of the Scottish mystic. Among the many possible illustrations, a quotation from Wesley's letter to the father of William Morgan will serve to indicate the remarkable parallels that exist.

> Nay, but let me first tell you what religion is. I take religion to be not the bare saying over so many prayers, morning or evening, in public or in private; nor anything superadded now and then to a careless or worldly life; but a constant ruling habit of the soul; a renewal of our minds in the image of God; a recovery of the divine likeness; a still increasing conformity of heart and life to the pattern of our most Holy Redeemer.

It is not unreasonable to suspect that the extraordinary catholicity of spirit displayed by Wesley, as well as by the other leaders of the English revival, was due in large measure to the fact that they had derived their notion of true religion from the writings of the Aberdeen professor. The new crusade was to be no sectarian affair. Wesley was explicit in repudiating the idea of imposing a doctrinal test upon those who might seek admission to the societies he had organized.

> Let them hold particular or general redemption, absolute or conditional decrees; let them be churchmen or dissenters, Presbyterians or Independents, it is no obstacle. Let them choose one mode of baptism or another, it is no bar to their admission. The Presbyterian may be a Presbyterian still; the Independent and Anabaptist use his own mode of worship. . . . One condition, and only one, is required—a real desire to save the soul. Where this is, it is enough. . . . "Is thy heart herein as my heart? If it be, give me thy hand."

It was such a sentiment that Henry Scougal had sought to foster, for he knew that it was only by such a spirit that the divisions into which Christianity was "so unhappily divided" could possibly be healed.

In Scotland and America, sectarianism was an even more critical problem, and in the two countries *The Life of God in the Soul of Man* was utilized explicitly, not only as a source of spiritual renewal, but as an antidote to excessive denominational strife. The efforts which were made, in this connection, to secure a mass circulation are interesting and significant. In 1739 a cheap, paper-covered edition was printed at Edinburgh, "price 6*d.*, or 5*s.* a dozen for giving away." Principal William Wishart, of the University of Edinburgh, contributed the preface. "Since I had the happiness to become acquainted with this book," he wrote, "I have heartily blessed God for the benefit I have received to my own soul by the

perusal of it, and have earnestly wished it had a place in every family, was carefully perused by every one who can read, and that the sentiments of pure and undefiled religion it contains were impressed upon every heart." Urging the clergy to give it to the people under their care, he observed that if we had "more of that true Christian spirit, so beautifully delineated and so warmly recommended in this book, I cannot but think that the fierceness of our contentions and animosities about things of lesser moment must considerably abate."

In America a similar venture was undertaken. Five leading ministers of Philadelphia published *The Life of God in the Soul of Man* in tract form so that it might enjoy a wide distribution. This was in 1805, and Ashbel Green seems to have taken the lead in the enterprise. Green was later to become the recognized leader of the Old-School party among the Presbyterians, but at the time he was deeply interested in pushing forward the Plan of Union between the Presbyterians and Congregationalists as well as in promoting other interdenominational activities designed to meet the tremendous religious needs of the American frontier. As late as 1825, this paper-covered edition was still being reprinted, and—to use the words of the preface—by directing attention from "matters of doubtful disputation, about which the best and wisest men differ" to "matters of the greatest importance, about which all good and wise men must agree," it undoubtedly contributed largely to that great tide of coöperative activity which characterized the early decades of the nineteenth century in America.

Long before this, however, *The Life of God in the Soul of Man* had been carrying on a quiet ministry of the printed page among the people of the New World. John Wesley had first introduced the book to America by reading it publicly in Georgia as a "counter attraction to the ball held in the town that evening." Although the first American edition in English was not published until 1766, Whitefield's repeated travels from colony to colony had undoubtedly stimulated the importation of copies from the mother country. This source of supply, to be sure, was of little use to the German-speaking inhabitants of Pennsylvania, and this may explain the fact that Whitefield's visit to Philadelphia in 1754 was followed by the printing of a German translation at Germantown in 1755 by Christopher Saur, and the publication of another translation a year later by Benjamin Franklin. An alert business man, Franklin did not intend to allow a rival printer to monopolize the sale of a best seller.

As in England, so in America, the leaders of the revival were characterized by an irenic spirit and a humanitarian concern. It is not unreasonable to attribute these qualities in large measure to the influence of Henry Scougal. This is notably true in the case of George Whitefield, whose ecumenical spirit was even more conspicuous in the colonies than

at home. He felt equally at ease in Congregational, Presbyterian, Reformed, and Episcopalian pulpits, and he never tired of telling the story in which Father Abraham retorted to denominationalist prodding by saying that the only name known in heaven was "Christian." The same spirit was evidenced by the other leaders of the Great Awakening. The comment of Samuel Davies, key figure in the Presbyterian phase of the southern revival, is typical:

> My brethren, I warn you against this wretched, mischievous spirit of party. . . . A Christian! A Christian! let that be your highest distinction; let that be the name which you labor to deserve. God forbid that my ministry should be the occasion of diverting your attention to anything else. But I am happy that I can appeal to yourselves, whether it has not been the great object of my zeal to inculcate upon you the grand essentials of our holy religion, and to make you sincere practical Christians. Alas! my dear people, unless I succeed in this, I labor to very little purpose, though I should presbyterianize the whole colony.

In like manner, the proponents of evangelical religion exhibited a profound concern that religious experience should issue in ethical activity. The love of God must express itself in a generous, charitable, and compassionate regard for his children. For, as Henry Scougal had said, our love towards God must "spring forth in charity towards men," did we but mind "the interest that he is pleased to take in them and consider that every soul is dearer unto him than all the material world." "Look through the gospel," he says elsewhere, "and you shall find charity and bounty so passionately recommended, so frequently inculcated, and so indispensably required, that you may easily conclude there are no Christians in earnest but those who practice it." It was from such a conception of religion that the great reform movements of the nineteenth century received their initial impetus.

Looking back from the vantage point of our time, we can be grateful that the men who were so largely responsible for the revival of powerful evangelical religion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries drew so much of their own inspiration from so gentle a revolutionist as Henry Scougal. For without the irenic spirit on the one hand and the humanitarian concern on the other, which he identifies as the distinguishing marks of true religion, any spiritual renewal they might have been able to effect would have been sterile of any positive social results. Indeed, as has been true at other times, the release of a flood tide of religious emotion—narrowly individualistic and sectarian in its expression—could have been socially disastrous.

WHERE THE CHURCH FAILS

GEORGE C. ANDERSON

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Reports indicate that over fifty per cent of marriages in this country end either in a divorce or a separation. This would be a serious problem for a secular society, but for a Christian nation the awful implications from this appalling tragedy in family life must indeed be staggering. The story is told of a man who accosted a woman on the street with the inquiry, "Do you remember me?" When she replied, "No," he said, "Don't you remember that I proposed to you once?" Looking slightly surprised, she inquired, "And were we ever married?" Although the story may be funny, it may not be too far from the truth and highlights the degradation in the marriage relationship which is all too common in our nation today.

Rather than implying that the marriage relationship should enlist the clergymen's interest merely as an extracurricular activity, I am asserting that the whole problem is central in the work of a clergyman, because of the importance of the institution of the family in religion. Our knowledge of early Hebrew life, which establishes many precedents for modern Christian society, clearly indicates that the religion of the Hebrews was centred around the family. The responsibility of the father for the preservation of the family unit is reiterated in Hebrew literature, and one of the most cardinal of all sins was to disrupt the loyalty which existed between the father and the mother, and parents and children. The home was regarded as a sanctuary—in a very real sense an annex to the temple—and many important religious observances were part of the family life and practiced in the home. Some of the ceremonies of the Passover feast are recited in the home and are not temple ceremonies. The Christian religion inherited the sanctity of the family from Jewish antecedents. When Jesus spoke of God as Father and all men as brothers, he was merely developing the Jewish family idea into a larger world relationship. The family is central in the Christian religion and thus places a responsibility upon the church to insure the preservation of family life.

The Christian religion depends on the quality rather than on the quantity of the Christian home. Unless there are high spiritual values, reasonable economic conditions insuring a minimum of material security, and physical conditions which permit good health among the members of the family, the full flowering of the Christian religion cannot be realized. It seems superfluous that in these modern days of sociological research it is necessary to be reminded that home life is seriously jeopardized by the absence of any one of these values. Obviously, clergymen have a concern in all areas of family problems, but their prime concern is in the realm of spiritual values. Nevertheless, they have an obligation to strive for

adequate economic patterns in society so that poverty may be eliminated, and each family enabled to acquire through honest labor those means necessary to provide food, clothing, and shelter, and to urge health facilities and whatever other scientific services are necessary to insure the health of those within the family.

Of deep concern to those who are convinced that adequate spiritual, economic, and physical values must be maintained in order to permit the full realization and development of the Christian life in the family unit is the subject of birth control. This subject is taboo in some quarters, but it is so essential to family life that one cannot bury his head in the sand like an ostrich and pretend that one need not discuss it. The Christian church must necessarily be concerned with birth control because it concerns the most important unit in the whole structure of the Christian religion—the family. Birth control can either be a blessing or a curse. The dangers of promiscuous birth control are apparent to anyone. Modern society faces the danger that birth control can reduce the marriage relationship into a condition of legalized prostitution. The Christian church has traditionally held that the purpose of marriage is for the procreation of children. Although modern psychiatry has indicated the importance of sexual relations in the stabilization of the emotional life, the Christian church must always insist that marriage is a sacred relationship and that the church cannot condone any practice which makes of marriage anything less than this. No doubt some of the opposition of the Roman Catholic Church to birth control stems from this very fear, and clergymen, regardless of their denomination, must recognize that in this respect the Roman Catholic Church is again reiterating what is part and parcel of the Christian meaning of marriage. Unless Christian motives activate all behavior within the family, Christian values cannot be said to obtain. Christian leaders must insist that the Christian life be permitted to flow within and without the family and that steps be taken to remove any hindrance to the full flourishing of the Christian spirit.

If one desires to establish spiritual values in the home, it becomes clear that the quantity of a family may under certain conditions largely interfere with the spiritual quality of the family life. Christian parents have no right to bring into the world children who cannot be insured of adequate economic security, careful and individual spiritual training, strong and healthy bodies, and a mother who has the health to maintain the home and train the child. In our modern society it is nothing less than a crime to bring children into the world without providing them with the safeguards that even common decency demands. The justification of birth control can be clearly seen as an important factor in guaranteeing Christian qualities of life in the home and for the child. Whenever economic, spiritual, and physical factors are adequate enough to insure the making of a good Christian citizen, the parents should not be hesitant (and in fact should feel

an obligation), to increase the size of their families. Race suicide can result, not only from too many children of the wrong kind, but also too few children of the right kind. Thus, planned parenthood not only involves proper spacing of children so that the family is equipped to nourish and sustain the children once they are ushered into the world, but it also involves an obligation for parents of good health, economic stability, and strong moral fibre, to have as many children as possible. But whenever quantity of children prevents a high quality of the family life, then religious values cannot flourish. The clergy has an obligation to set aright any factors which preclude the flourishing of the Christian life in the family.

Probably no other group of men in our modern society has as much experience in family life as the clergy. They know of the broken homes and tragedies of divorce. They know the casualties among the children and the high percentage of youngsters who come before our courts from bad homes. These tragedies in family life may be caused by one of three things. First, the unwillingness to live up to the marriage responsibilities and privileges; second, an ignorance of all that is involved in marriage; and third, a disregard of the spiritual factors which must exist in every family unit if it is to be a success. Someone has pointed out that the clergymen have a responsibility in the preservation of the marriage relationship if for no other reason than that they are the ones who generally marry the couple. Certainly it is the responsibility of the church to conserve the family and to prevent those disturbances in our society, particularly among our youth, which result from an incompatible home life and consequent destruction.

The high rate of divorce in American life, while due in part to the economic problems, is largely resulting from the unwillingness to think of marriage as "home making." Too often the marriage relationship is merely based on physical attraction. In contrast to many places of the world Americans magnify the romantic element in marriage out of all proportion to the more important things which are involved in the marriage relationship. Too many Americans emphasize sex to the exclusion of other values. This is one of the great contrasts between the people of the United States and of other lands. This is not to say that sex is not attractive to other peoples, but Americans make a fetish of it. Advertisers use sex appeal as one of their largest drawing cards. When marriage becomes merely a satisfaction of sexual demands, the more significant obligations of making a home are too lightly dismissed and indeed often ignored. Perhaps this is one reason why crime is such a problem in American life. Someone has said that "compatibility is a process, and not an accident." It is just as easy to fall out of love as to fall in it. Marriage is an achievement which requires love, courage, and knowledge. Clergyman cannot provide the love, but they can stimulate the courage and provide the knowledge. Some

adults are not able to make the marriage adjustment without direction, and if clergymen have an honest interest in people they will see to it that they give them whatever counseling lies within their province.

Here, of course, arise several practical questions. What kind of counseling should clergymen give? What techniques can be employed? Dr. Roy A. Burkhart has defined pastoral counseling as a way in which the clergy "help two people come to build their lives in harmony with the attitudes of God." Certainly this is the task of the church, and although it does it indirectly as it trains young people in the Christian life during their early years as members of churches, there comes a time when they must get concentrated information in specialized fields. There are those who feel that the clergy should give counsel on every aspect of the marriage relationship, even to the most intimate details of birth control. This kind of counseling is not imperative upon the clergy. Fortunately, agencies within communities are often far better equipped to deal with such problems than is the church, and it is very important that clergy make known to other people the services which are available in agencies such as the planned parenthood movement, family and health agencies, child-guidance clinics, and other agencies dealing with the family. Clergymen, however, do have a responsibility to make the couple aware of the many aspects of the marriage relationship, such as the giving of each to the other, the careful consideration of the privileges and responsibilities in marriage, of the respect for the other's person, of the importance of birth control and planned parenthood, of the emotional and physical factors in sex, together with the importance of the child-parent relationship, the importance of spiritual power and laws as a factor in cementing marriage relationship, and the importance of the place of religion in the home. Obviously, the church is not expert in all of these subjects—its specialty lies only within one field—the religious field. But it can at least discharge its responsibility in counseling by acting as a referral agent so that it can acquaint those to be married with the problems of the marriage relationship and advise where specialized information and advice should be sought. If Dr. Burkhart is correct that our responsibility is to "help two people come to build their lives in harmony with the attitudes of God," then here is a field which definitely belongs to the clergy. If a Christian marriage is not valid unless the Christian spirit dominates the home, then it should be the prime concern of the clergy to do everything in their power toward the accomplishment of this ideal. Thus the clergy has a responsibility to counsel those who are anticipating marriage, and the counseling should be done in two ways. First, by making the couples aware of all the implications involved in the marriage relationship, and acting as a referral agent so that the couples may obtain the specialized information they need on various aspects of the marriage relationship; and secondly by urging that

the relationship be based on the highest spiritual motives, giving the marriage the sanctification that can come only from a life lived together in communion with God.

The idea of marriage counseling is not new. Thousands of clergymen throughout the country have been engaged in it for years. Various methods and techniques are employed. Any religious education which is given to the growing child should be pointed to the higher development and fruition of religious living in adulthood. Many churches have programs among high school and college groups intended as preparation for marriage. In most cases the spiritual aspect of the marriage relationship dominates the program. Sometimes psychiatric factors are discussed. Other clergymen have regular marriage clinics as part of the parish program and have stated hours when they advise or have psychiatrists and doctors advise on marital problems both for those already wed and those contemplating marriage. Other clergymen insist on at least one conference which may be as long as two hours. The information given obviously is determined by the training of the clergyman. It is indeed possible that some clergymen may be giving information about which they know nothing, and there is a real danger of clergymen attempting to give information in highly specialized and scientific fields without having been carefully trained in this knowledge. Other clergymen prefer to give the young couple books or pamphlets in which pertinent information can be found. There is much literature now available to the clergyman for his own use on counseling, and information for those about to be wed. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America has excellent pamphlets, and many social welfare agencies have quantities of material which they would consider it a privilege to distribute without cost. What happens to the future of the United States and indeed to the world does not depend on our foreign policy, economics, or even the use of atomic energy, but upon what happens to our families. Without religious families generating spiritual impulses and giving to the world children of spiritual powers, the world is hopelessly sunk. Only a fool would fail to see this. As the Federal Council has said, "Christianity stands for attitudes, values and beliefs which are the most important things in life. These values will be effectively transmitted only if there is adequate family life carrying them. The people we send out into the next generation are more important than all our material achievements, however brilliant and world-shaking these might be. The bringing into being and the giving of Christian nurture to an adequate number of children is more rewarding then financial success, social and intellectual standing, or political power. A good family is the highest of achievements."

It is imperative that the clergy be concerned with marriage counseling. As religious leaders, they simply cannot afford to ignore it.

Where Ignorance Is Bliss, 'Tis Folly

In his sermon, "The Rich Man's Salvation"—which might be reread with profit by many people today—Clement made a memorable observation: "The sayings which appear to have been simplified by the Lord himself to his disciples are found even now, on account of the extraordinary degree of wisdom in them, to need not less but more attention than his dark and sententious utterances." With this remark most students of the New Testament would heartily agree although they might hesitate to follow Clement in all of his elucidations. Just as it is not the long and involved constructions which usually baffle the translator, but the little words, the particles and prepositions, so in interpretation, not only of the reported words of Jesus but in other parts of the New Testament too, it is not infrequently those words which often seem to the English reader so simple and lucid over which conscientious translators have toiled the hardest.

Among those riddles of translation none is more uncertain than the hauntingly beautiful first Christmas carol, which we have all been singing during the all-loveliest season which has now just ended. In its most familiar form, that found in the King James translation, it reads: "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will to men." But what is meant by "in the highest"? To the English reader it may well suggest "in the highest degree," that is, "in its most complete expression," but this is scarcely a fair rendering of the Greek which can hardly mean other than "in the highest places," that is, "in high heaven." The next question is less certain. How many clauses are there, two or three? Most interpreters are agreed that the absence of a second connective in the Greek makes it likely that there are but two clauses, the one with its expression of glory to God, the other with that of peace to men. But there are two distinct problems left. To which of the clauses does "on earth" belong, and is the familiar translation "good will to men" warranted?

The latter query arises from the fact that there is a distinct disagreement in the Greek manuscripts and versions as to the last word of the hymn. The manuscripts known to the translators of the King James version read a nominative, which they quite naturally rendered "good will." Since those days many manuscripts have been discovered which seem to indicate that in the earliest text that word was not in the nominative but the genitive—not "good will toward men" but rather "toward or among men of good will." But again the English is misleading: the "good will," as many interpreters have pointed out, is scarcely the kindly and friendly sentiment of men which will warrant and assure the presence of peace. Rather it appears to mean God's "approval" or "good pleasure." Thus there has been an increasing tendency among recent interpreters and translators to render the phrase: "among men in whom he is well pleased"

(ARV), "among men who please Him" (Weymouth), "for men whom he favours" (Moffatt), "to the men he favors" (Goodspeed), "among men with whom he is pleased" (RSV). And thus to all attempts and purposes "peace" is nearly synonymous with "salvation."

So far as the other question is concerned, that is, in which line "on earth" is to be placed, most translators have favored letting it stand with what follows, even though that makes the first line distinctly shorter than the second. Many years ago Dr. Hort suggested reading "on earth" in the first line as the completion of "in heaven," not as a mere coördinate with it, but with what he called "an ascensive force," so that now in this moment of new beginning the accustomed rendering of glory to God "in the heights of heaven" would be in a special sense extended to earth. This judicious observation does not appear to have received the consideration which it warrants. Most translators have disregarded it—it stands in a most obscure essay, "Notes on Select Readings," and was not adopted in the accompanying Westcott-Hort text. Goodspeed, on the other hand, accepts it and renders the first line:

"Glory to God in heaven and on earth!"

There seems to me much to favor this arrangement. As Goodspeed properly remarks, it is entirely in keeping with the other liturgical passage in the Lord's Prayer, "on earth as it is in heaven."

A final question remains: Whom did the evangelist mean by these men "whom he favours" or "with whom he is well pleased" or, as I would venture to translate it, these "men of his choice"? It appears to me highly probable that early Christian readers of this gospel would instinctively think that it meant the "new Israel," that is, the Christian church. And it is entirely likely that they were right.

The fundamental insistence of this author, so clearly seen as soon as Luke-Acts is viewed as a single writing, is that Christianity is actually a new people. Salvation has come to all men irrespective of birth, of race, of status. Thus he strikes the keynote in an early chapter, where Jesus in the synagogue in Nazareth proclaims it openly and buttresses it with his argument drawn from the earlier actions of Elijah and Elisha; and the same note is struck again and again in the attitude of the Samaritan traveler, in the gratitude of the Samaritan leper, in the assembled multitude at Pentecost, in the word of Peter to Cornelius, of James to his hearers in Jerusalem, of Paul before the Areopagus, to end with the ringing challenge of Paul at Rome: "Be it known therefore unto you, that this salvation of God is sent unto the gentiles; they will also hear."

Nor is this anything new in the judgment of the evangelist. It had been in the world since the moment of the Messiah's birth and had been hymned above the Judæan plains by the heavenly host:

> "Glory to God in highest heaven above and on earth,
> His saving peace to the men of his choice."

From Off the Campus and On

THE DAWN of a new year is the traditional time for the starting of diaries and the making of good resolutions. And not infrequently we discover that in both of those praiseworthy efforts it is as true as Miss Hankey was inclined to think it was for religion that "the 'early dew' of morning has passed away at noon." One of my friends, who was wont to remark, somewhat self-consciously I always thought, at the dawn of each new year that it was his resolution to make no new-year resolutions, told me sometime ago that he had finally decided not to make even that one again, for he found it quite impossible not to break it. Be that as it may, one thing is sure. It is always easier, and on the whole more pleasant, to help other people make their good resolutions than it is to make one's own. May the editor of CROZER QUARTERLY come to your assistance at this point? Many of you have been very gracious during the past year in writing to him to express appreciation for this article, that particular book review, or just to say a gracious word about the QUARTERLY as a whole. Don't stop doing it. We are shameless—but it is an honest shame—in our satisfaction at them. But why not take the next step? Tell some other intelligent friend of yours—a parishioner, colleague, business associate—what you have told us. Show him a carbon of your letter. Undoubtedly it will make our cheeks burn, but we are always ready to suffer in a good cause. And in the showing, urge him to send in his subscription too. Or to make it easier, send it in for him. You will thus have obeyed the golden rule, which is a task worthy of any man (or woman), and you will help us really to enjoy the new year with all its heartaches, headaches, and golden opportunities.

Dr. Foote is a Unitarian minister of distinction. After graduating from Harvard, both the college and the divinity school, he had pastorates in New Orleans and Ann Arbor and was for several years secretary of the department of education of the American Unitarian Association. For ten years he was on the faculty at Harvard, teaching preaching and parish administration, and serving as secretary of the divinity faculty. Then followed a long pastorate in Belmont, Mass. He has written many books and articles, among which may be mentioned *Three Centuries of American Hymnody* (1940) and *Thomas Jefferson: Champion of Religious Liberty, Advocate of Christian Morals* (1947). It is a pleasure to welcome this distinguished clergyman and scholar back to our pages. Our readers will remember his earlier essays and pointed reviews.

Professor Shero is an eminent classicist. A native of Pennsylvania, he has been professor of Greek at Swarthmore College since 1928. He is a graduate of Haverford, Oxford, and the University of Wisconsin (Ph.D.). He was annual professor at the American School of Classical Studies at Athens (1936-1937), and president of the American Philological Association (1949-1950). His essay on Sparta, it may be hazarded, will be read with interest not only by professional classicists and politicians —we hope that the latter do actually read—but by many others who will discover that this "dead past" is actually not dead at all.

Mr. Middleton is minister of the First Baptist Church of Haddonfield, N. J. He went to that church last May after a pastorate of nearly five years in Narberth, Pa. He is a graduate of Colgate University (A.B.) and Colgate-Rochester (B.D.). He is also a member of the faculty of the Baptist Institute in Philadelphia.

Professor Hudson is James B. Colgate professor of the history of Christianity at Colgate-Rochester, from which school he graduated in 1937. He holds an A.B. from Kalamazoo and a Ph.D. from Chicago. He is also managing editor of *Church History,* vice-president of the American Baptist Historical Society, and a former president of the American Society of Church History. The subject of his present essay, Henry Scougal, has long been of interest to Dr. Hudson. In 1948 he edited, with an historical introduction, Scougal's *Life of God in the Soul of Man.* Several essays and book reviews from his pen have appeared in the pages of CROZER QUARTERLY.

Mr. Anderson is now rector of St. Luke's Episcopal Church, Mountain Brook, a suburb of Birmingham, Ala. He had formerly been rector for seven years of Trinity Episcopal Church, Swarthmore, Pa. During his stay in Pennsylvania he was also consul of Paraguay for the area centring about Philadelphia and vice-president of the Pennsylvania League for Planned Parenthood.

With forty-one reviews and book notices from thirty reviewers we feel that this department of CROZER QUARTERLY needs no apology or *apologia.* Apparently our readers feel the same way. Frankly, we may confess, it is not always an easy task to keep this lively department within due bounds. We are happy and grateful that so many competent and busy scholars are so uniformly gracious in making this department possible. Again an appreciative tip of the editorial eyeshade to all thirty of them, who must be satisfied with a bare sentence of introduction. Dr. Banning is professor of theology at Bangor Theological Seminary. Dr. Bean is associate professor of church history at Crozer; it is a pleasure to welcome a new colleague to these pages. Professor Beck is head of the department of Bible and religion at Syracuse. Dr. Blanton is president of Crozer and a former dean at Wake Forest. Dr. Braden is professor of the history and literature of religions at Northwestern. Professor Brush has the chair of church history at Andover Newton. Mr. Enslin is a writer living on Cape Cod. Professor Ferré has the chair of theology at Vanderbilt. Dr. Foote has already been introduced. Dr. Grey is minister of the First Congregational Church in Woburn, Mass. Professor Hamilton is head of the department of history and philosophy of religion and Christian missions at Oberlin. Dr. Hartt is professor of theology at Yale. Dr. Herrick is president *emeritus* of Andover Newton. Dr. Hershey is minister of the Lutheran Church of the Holy Communion, Philadelphia. Dr. Hightower is head of the department of sociology at Kalamazoo. Dr. Ivey is minister of the Second Baptist Church, Richmond, Va. Professor Keighton is head of the department of preaching and worship at Crozer. Dr. McCasland is head of the department of religion at the University of Virginia. Dr. Pritchard is professor of Old Testament at Crozer. Dr. Roberts is professor of theology at Union. Dr. Rose is minister of the First Baptist Church, Philadelphia. Dr. Ross is head of the department of religion at Southern California. Dr. Shepherd is professor of church history at Episcopal Theological School, Cambridge. Dr. Shryock is rector of Grace Church and the Incarnation, Philadelphia. Dr. Skoss is professor of Arabic at Dropsie College. Dr. Smith is minister *emeritus* of the Ardmore (Pa.) Baptist Church and a former executive of Crozer. Dean Sperry is the distinguished head of the Harvard Divinity School. Dr. Van Dusen is president of Union Theological Seminary. Dr. White is head of the department of religion at Defiance College. Dr. Wright, *fides Achates* among reviewers, is Stone professor of philosophy *emeritus* at Dartmouth.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Foot of Pride, by Malcolm Hay, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. xxii, 352, $3.75.

The subject of this book is the persecution of Jews by Christians through the centuries, coming to its awful climax in the demonic efforts of Hitler at complete extermination. Numerous writers have attempted to give the world some idea of the concentration camps, the gas chambers, the brutal intimidations, multilations, and murders, but no author has done it with a sincerity greater than Malcolm Hay has achieved in this book. Moreover, Hitler's satanic revels in blood are only the point of departure from which Mr. Hay leads us on a tour of the devilish scenes and spectacles which have been produced by Christian hatred of Jews for some eighteen hundred years. We are given a thorough orientation in that golden period of the Middle Ages which gave the world the great crusades whose purpose was to recover the Holy Land from the unspeakable infidels. The infidel Jews were so much more accessible than the Moslems—and so much less dangerous too, no doubt—that the good crusaders sated their thirst for blood on them.

The crusaders themselves on the whole were mainly just the common variety of ignorant savages engaging in sadistic revels, but they were inspired by their papal and priestly mentors in a way that will be a disgrace—and ought to be a shame—to the church as long as the world stands. The kind of fiendish theology used to inspire the bloody orgies may be illustrated by the words of the good St. Agobard, archbishop of Lyons in the ninth century, addressed to the bishop of Narbonne, rebuking him for friendliness toward the Jews:

> Knowing therefore, Venerable Father, that "as many as are under the works of the law are under a curse," and consigned, as to a garment, to a curse which entered into their very bowels, like water, and into their bones, like oil: cursed also in the cities, and cursed in the fields: cursed in their going in, and cursed in going out: cursed the fruit of their wombs and of their lands and of their flocks: cursed their cellars, their granaries, their warehouses, their food, and the very remnants of their food: and that none of them may escape that curse, so monstrous and horrible, except through Him who for us is a curse.

Or take the pious eloquence of the great Chrysostom of an earlier period:

> The synagogue is a criminal assembly of Jews . . . a place of meeting for the assassins of Christ . . . a house worse than a drinking shop . . . a den of theives; a house of ill fame, a dwelling of iniquity, the refuge of devils, a gulf and abyss of perdition. Whatever name even more terrible could be found, will never be worse than the synagogue deserves.

While there were a few very hardy souls who protested from time to time, a majority of Christians appear to have justified their brutality toward Jews by sayings that as the murderers of Christ, no suffering could be too great for them, and that it was no less than the Christian's duty to serve as the Jew's executioner.

Space does not permit to list the ways in which Jews have suffered at Christian hands: pillage, exile, murder, exclusion from professions, clothing badges, ghettoes, etc. Hitler came only as a natural culmination of a river of hate that is deep, wide, and long. The author has used adequate sources and worked them thoroughly and equipped his book with a good bibliography. Anyone whose appetite is unsatisfied by the book can find more in the ample literature cited. Mr. Hay has told an awful story. It is a dark blot on our Christian history, and one which, I fear, will require more than a purgatory to purge away. Even a skeptical reader will find himself wishing, even if he does not believe in one, a hell with genuine sulphur flames for God's

convenience in dispensing justice to all the good Christians who have abused the Jews through the ages.

The author of this book is himself a Christian, a Roman Catholic. The monograph is a fine tribute to his Christian charity. Yet I am forced to point out that while his heart is full of sympathy and his mind of information, he has not by any means arrived at a real understanding of the problem with which he deals. It is simply not true that Christian theology is the origin of anti-Semitism. If Mr. Hay will read the history of the Jews earlier than the rise of Christianity, he will discover that pogroms were an old phenomenon in the ancient world long before Jesus was born. To begin with the first century itself, one will find evidence of anti-Semitism in such Romans as Cicero and Tacitus; and discover that Josephus wrote an entire book, *Against Apion,* as a refutation of calumnies about the Jews. Throughout all his writings, Josephus reflects a consciousness of the unfriendly attitude of the men of his time toward the Jews. Or read Philo's *Flaccus* and his *Embassy to Gaius* to learn of one of the bloodiest pogroms of history, which occurred at Alexandria about A.D. 38, before the Egyptians had ever heard of Christian theology with its charge that Jews are deicides and under a curse. Certainly Philo himself did not blame it on the Christians. He refers (*Flaccus* 29) to the "ancient and innate hostility" of Egyptians toward Jews. Indeed, he is on firm historical ground in doing this. From the papyri of Elephantine we learn that Egyptian enemies had destroyed the temple of a colony of Jews who lived there about 400 B.C. Egypt had a tremendous Jewish element in its population. Philo remarks that there were at least a million Jews in the area from Libya to Ethiopia. There was so much anti-Semitism that Philo himself led an embassy to the emperor in an attempt to alleviate the conditions of Jews there. Nor should one forget the effort of ancient Egypt to exterminate the Hebrews in the time of Moses. I suppose that the Exodus should be regarded as the first great exile of the Jews in history, unless perhaps the lonely figure of Abram departing from Ur was the first.

But to return to events which are better authenticated, we may remember the effort of Antiochus Epiphanes about 174-165 B.C. to exterminate either the Jewish religion or the Jews themselves. Then there is the story of Esther. This is of course mainly a legendary affair. Nobody should take its gory details seriously. Yet there must be here proof of a deadly anti-Semitism in Persia at a time considerably earlier than the the rise of Christianity. A somewhat similar situation under Persian rule may be inferred from the stories of opposition to the Jews related in Ezra and Nehemiah. The hatred of Edomites, Moabites, Ammonites, Syrians, Philistines, and Samaritans is equally well known.

Now we are not in a position to say whether this pre-Christian anti-Semitism was given a theological interpretation or not, but the fact of its existence throughout antiquity cannot be denied by one who has had a moderate training in reading and interpreting historical documents. Anti-Semitism is at least as old as the time of Moses; and it may well date back to Abraham, 2000 B.C. This shows that the anti-Semitism which has been such a scourge to Western culture did not have its origin in Christian theology. That is not to justify the inclusion of hatred of the Jews in Christian theology. There is no way to wash this stain from Christian history. But the great antiquity of anti-Semitism suggests that Christian theology simply took over as its own and *rationalized* a hatred which goes back to a prehistoric past. Christians found a new theory for their hatred, but they continued to hate just as their forefathers had done. There was no change in the hate itself, and it wrought its deadly work of destruction in times of great social crises.

I fully agree with Mr. Hay that Christian theology ought to wash these blood-stains of hatred from its garments. It is not only cruel and inhuman, but fantastically absurd for Christians to look upon Jews as deicides and to hate them for this reason. It is not a question of whether Jesus was put to death by the Jews or by the Romans. Any scholar knows that the Romans nailed Jesus to the cross. He also knows that the Jewish leaders of Jerusalem were the instigators of the execution and would have carried it out if they had had the power. Yet scholars know that this elimination of a rival who is considered a heretic is a routine matter for state religions, a procedure in which both Catholics and Protestants have at times been adept. They cannot justly blame Jewish leaders for manifesting the same arrogant bigotry which they themselves have too often practiced. Nor can Jews be permitted to forget the Jewish effort to exterminate early Christianity; or how John Hyrcanus converted the Edomites; or how good King Josiah and Jehu and Elisha kept religion pure in their times; or what happened to the native Canaanites at the hands of Joshua and his successors down to Solomon.

This cruelty and intolerance of the ancient Jews, however, is no more of a disgrace to them than are such inhuman practices in any other people ancient or modern. The lesson which these ancient matters teach is that religion is likely to become a terrible force for evil whenever it is a state religion and its leaders are able to use the sword to exterminate heresy. Jews became powerful believers in religious liberty after their own state was destroyed and they became dependent on the tolerance of other religions for their own survival. They begged and demanded of others something which they had never practiced while they had the power to be intolerant. But, again, this applies also to Catholics and Protestants. What we know of religious freedom is a development on American soil under conditions where denominationalism with its bitter rivalries made it impossible for any one religion to become supreme. Perhaps we should all thank God for sectarianism!

This analysis leaves us without an answer as the origin of anti-Semitism. It may be simply the natural and inevitable response to the social, religious, and cultural isolationism of the Jews through the centuries. The extraordinary tenacity with which Jews have clung to their own identity and continuity and have hedged themselves about with strict laws and customs in order to preserve the purity of their religion and culture is one of the most amazing facts of history. This shows that they have been unwilling to sink to the common level; that they have considered their culture superior to that of their contemporaries. That they have been right in this belief much of the time cannot be successfully denied. That their culture in ancient times was superior to that of their neighbors hardly needs to be mentioned; and I hazard the opinion that Jewish culture in more recent times has always outshone that of their persecutors.

It appears to me that the only way in which Jews could escape the bitter efforts at annihilation from time to time through the centuries would be to yield themselves up fully to the forces of cultural, religious, and racial assimilation. There would no longer be a Jew in the world. Anti-Semitism would at last be a thing of the past. But that would be a fearful price for peace. Some things in this world are more precious than peace. Faith is one of them. Of course the Jewish cultural isolationism has often bred personality traits which intensified irritations and led to hostility on the part of their neighbors. So, in looking for a solution, one tends to go round and round in a circle. I am very doubtful that the new Israel will be a solution. A resurgence of nationalism brings many ominous problems which Jews did not have before. The dispossessed Arabs remind one of the exterminated natives of ancient

Canaan; and the not inconsiderable reservoir of good will of Arabs and Moslems for Jews in the past has now been completely dissipated.

But Mr. Hay has written a thought-provoking book. It has a wonderful fund of information. It will be a good tonic for any person who is interested in the great problems of our time. Anti-Semitism is a cultural disease, and with some degree of validity one may characterize Semitism in the same way. Mr. Hay has dealt with one important symptom but not with the disease itself.

S. VERNON MC CASLAND

Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning, by Karl Mannheim, New York, Oxford, 1950, pp. xxiv, 384, $5.

Karl Mannheim was in his fifty-third year when he died in London, England, on January 9, 1947. The nazi régime had forced him from a professorship at the University of Frankfort; so he became a lecturer in sociology at the London School of Economics in 1933. From 1945 until his death he was professor of education at the Institute of Education, University of London. He left behind a number of partially completed manuscripts, which, at the invitation of the author's widow, are now being edited by a team under Dr. Adolph Lowe. The Rockefeller Foundation has provided a grant to finance the preparation of the material for publication. Apparently this is the first of several posthumous volumes. This revelation by the chief editor serves as a deterrent to full appraisal of the book. Admiring disciples with a deceased author's notes have decided advantages in interpretation.

With the publication in 1936 of the English translation of *Ideologie und Utopie* (1929) Mannheim became known in America as the chief exponent of the "sociology of knowledge" (*Wissensoziologie*). From early studies of epistemology he turned to the view that the most intimate ideas can be explained in terms of social factors. He was influenced by Marxian conceptions, but differed from him in his explanation of intellectual competition and social confusion. Outmoded ways of thought which failed to meet the realities of society, Mannheim designated "ideologies." In contrast, "utopias" were projected ideas of things to come. The former were misrepresentations of the past, while the latter were capable of realization in the future. But not all utopias could come to fruition in the social order—only the *true* utopias conceived by the minds of a free intelligensia. Mannheim identified himself with this group, that is, until Hitler made his own revision of German society and Mannheim left for England.

The volume under review was drafted during Mannheim's residence in London, and after he had awakened to the fact that considerable diversity could coexist with a rather high degree of unity—if a workable amount of tolerance prevailed. Nevertheless, Mannheim continued to be conscious of an impending social crisis, and continued to rely upon his own ability as an intellectual to delineate a *true* utopia. Irrational and emotionalized masses, with their conflicting pressure groups, were a challenge to his fertile mind. The publication of *Diagnosis of Our Time* (1944) reveals Mannheim the intellectual reorienting himself and his analyses to the new situation. The present new book is an extension of his thinking to social data drawn largely from Great Britain and America. He became deeply enamored of the prospect of social planning in a democracy that would preserve a measure of individual freedom, and at the same time promote social integration around common values. He undertook to set forth a strategy with guidance for the planners. He finally concluded that religion must be responsible for ultimate integration of human values. The real planners of the integrated society, however, seem to have been envisioned as none

other than the intellectuals with whom Mannheim identifies himself. He was not just a diagnostician; he also had plans for society.

Freedom, Power, and Democratic Planning is a provocative book. If read, let us say, as a sequal to George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four,* it may seem to be an essential book for those who think about the future of Western society. A sampling of the challenging ideas set forth will show its distinctiveness: "As we contemplate the chaotic state of unregulated capitalist society, one thing becomes quite clear: the present state of society cannot last long. . . . This of itself indicates that the age of laissez-faire is over and that only through planning can catastrophe be avoided" (p. 21). It is the purpose of the book "to state the essentials of democratic planning" (p. 23). "Our task is to build a social system by planning: . . . planning for freedom, . . . planning for social justice, . . . planning for cultural standards, . . . planning that counteracts the dangers of a mass society, . . . planning for balance, . . . planning . . . in order to encourage the growth of personality; in short, planning but not regimentation" (p. 29). Mannheim became thoroughly convinced that there is a "Third Way" between the ideologies and the utopias, between the unregulated liberalism of the nineteenth century and the rigid control systems of totalitarian states in the twentieth century. This third way, of course, is the way of democratic planning. Governing under the third way calls for reconciliation of opposing ideas (p. 107) and "should preserve existing fields of free competition alongside the planned sectors, just as it will have to find ways of combining scientific and other methods of selecting personnel" (p. 98). The author believed that depressions are man-made, and that "elimination of the traditional business cycle has become the key problem of democratic economic planning" (p. 120). Contrary to the opinion of some writers, "bureaucracies are no real threat to democracy" (p. 132). The one thing which democracies "cannot tolerate is propaganda for violence as a method of settling disputes" (p. 138). He supports the two-party system as a moderating influence against the danger of reversion to crowd behavior. Since custom and tradition cannot integrate personality in modern society, this must be done with the assistance of the social sciences. The planners will make use of the social sciences in educating the individual, also in manipulating "the environment so as to foster growth of the desired personality type" (p. 207). "In our democracies we are in the process of moving from a high degree of individualism toward development of democratic personality" (p. 233). Yet, behind this progress there lurks the possibility of "reversion to barbarism" (p. 243). It is the function of education to prevent such a calamity and to stimulate the average adult out of his apathy. A planned society has to "make up its mind (*sic*) about ultimate issues" (p. 288). Finally, ultimate integration is the function of religion which embodies the sociological approach, "in order that we may understand social change and its causes" (p. 312).

This is not a volume to be taken lightly. It is thoughtfully written and heavily documented. In this age of varieties of collective planning it discusses the crucial points of freedom, power, and integration. Perhaps its principal weakness lies in the fact that it is all prolegomena, with the real analysis never quite coming to the fore. Certain particulars will illustrate this observation:

1. There is noticeable resemblance between the third way and the social gospel which had great vogue in the United States for several decades before World War I. This early attempt to marry Protestantism and social science to bring about a Christianized social order was frustrated by world movements over which it had little or no influence. In spite of Mannheim's great interest in America he must

have been poorly informed on the history of the social gospel and on the conflict groups in Western religion.

2. Neither in this volume nor in his previous works did Mannheim succeed in reconciling his cultural determinism with social life molded by the wills and desires of the living. There is a basic inconsistency which is never resolved.

3. Although Mannheim lived successively in three cultures, having grown up in Hungary, his proposals are not adequate for the integration of the world society. He seems to have been restricted by his enthusiasm for the particular part of the world in which he lived. As a German the solutions were to be found in the *sozial freischwebende Intelligenz;* as an Englishman they were left finally with religion. One might well wonder where they would have been found had Mannheim fled to Russia in 1933.

4. Chapter 10 of the volume is entitled "Education as Groundwork." The modern school under the third way "no longer considers the transmission of accumulated knowledge as its only task" (p. 249). Among other things it is the school's special function "to interpret all phases in terms of democratic experience" (p. 250). But an independent intelligensia must be preserved as "intellectual oases" in an "Age of Masses" (p. 265). In their introductory note to the book Bramsted and Gerth state that Mannheim's association with certain prominent Christian thinkers in England led to his assigning to religion "the task of an ultimate integration of all human activities" (p. xiv). Just how this is to be done is not explained. It is one thing if a disinterested intelligensia controls the masses through the use of religion, but another if integration of society is to be the province of an organized religious priesthood. As the editors have noted, the book abruptly ends without clarifying the precise function of religion as an integrating agency (p. 313).

Coincident with Mannheim's taking up residence in England the United States began a program of social planning under the controls of the federal government, from which it has not relaxed for these seventeen years. This author's writings should prove helpful to those in quest of a philosophy of social planning. However, a more realistic approach to the American scene must take into account the fact that the very men responsible for administering controls often profess to abhor them.

RAYMOND L. HIGHTOWER

A History of Philosophical Systems, edited by Vergilius Ferm, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. xiv, 642, $6.

The whole range of philosophic thought has now become so extensive, the editor of this book affirms, that no one writer can deal competently with the whole of it, and any adequate survey must be a coöperative effort. So this volume consists of forty-seven chapters, written by forty-one different philosophers, mostly Americans, each of whom is a specialist in the field of which he writes. The word *system,* as employed in the title, means "the general trend or course of thought of a particular time, school or group of thinkers . . . the main purpose of the book is to direct attention not to the thinkers as such, but to the main patterns of thought represented by them and their school" (p. v). Of course a book should be judged by what its author (or authors) attempts to do, and not condemned because it does not accomplish something different. This book does not try to afford readers acquaintance with the personalities of the various philosophers, or with the spirit of the ages in which they lived, in any respect other than their "systems" of philosophy, as above explained.

The volume begins with chapters upon Indian, Zoroastrian, Buddhist, Chinese, and Ancient Jewish philosophy. It then proceeds in successive chapters to discuss

the "systems" found in early Greek philosophy, and in Platonic, Aristotelian, Hellenistic-Roman, Alexandrian, Early Christian, Arabic and Islamic, Mediæval Jewish, Early Christian Scholastic, Revived Aristotelian, and Thomistic philosophies, as well as Scotism and Ockhamism. These seventeen chapters occupy 224 pages, averaging about thirteen pages each. The remaining chapters are equally condensed. Kant is the philosopher discussed at most length of any in the book—in a chapter of ten pages. The following chapter, covering fourteen pages, includes accounts of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Lotze, and others. Next follow chapters on dialectical materialism, absolute idealism, and positivism. All the chapters throughout the book are carefully written, and are impressive illustrations of the possibilities of condensation. Each is followed by a brief, carefully chosen biliography. The careful study of these extremely terse accounts should be sufficient to organize and systematize the knowledge of graduate students and other readers who already have some acquaintance with the topics discussed and a working vocabulary of technical philosophical terms. It seems more questionable whether undergraduates who have previously had only one course in philosophy will be able to profit much by the study of this book, although the editor hopes that they will (p. vi).

Through the chapter on positivism the ground covered is common to the various histories of philosophy, and the only two unique features of this book are its extreme condensation, and its concentration upon "systems" to the exclusion of biographical and other material usually supposed to be essential to the adequate understanding of a philosopher's thought. Can the history of philosophy be more profitably studied in abstractions of this kind, or in a more concrete presentation of each philosopher's thought as a systematic whole (so far as it is one), considered in the light of his biography and the milieu in which he lived and wrote? Something of course can be said for each alternative, and more for the first than most of those who have not read this book probably realize.

Beginning with Chap. 27 (personalism) the book deals chiefly with the "systems" of the twentieth century. The successive chapters treat of phenomenology, evolution, vitalism, pragmatism, existentialism, the new materialism, naturalism, panpsychism, contemporary Thomism, logical positivism, semantics, values, recent schools of logic, epistemology, philosophy of the sciences, æsthetics, ethics, and philosophies of history, culture, and religion. These chapters are probably the most valuable part of the book, containing as they do, information nowhere else brought together into a single volume. A study of these chapters will give the reader an orientation into the more important fields of inquiry upon which the attention of professional philosophers is centred today.

The editor and contributors have rendered an invaluable service in producing this excellent and timely volume. For years to come this will remain a standard book of reference for those interested in the history of philosophy. For all time it will be employed as a principal contemporary authority upon the philosophical interests of Americans in the middle of the twentieth century. WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

Basic Issues in Christian Thought, by Albert C. Knudson, Nashville Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1950, pp. 220, $2.75.

Dean Knudson needs no introduction to the theological public. For many years, at Boston University and throughout the country, he has been a wise and valiant leader in the realm of Christian thought. His books are many and distinguished. The present volume comprises the Quillian Lectures at the Candler School of Theology of Emory University.

The topics of the lectures are: "Can the Christian Faith Be Rationally Justified?" "Is God Personal and Man Free?" The Evils of Life and Their Meaning," "How Are We to Think of Christ?" "Divine and Human Factors in Christian Experience," and "Basic Points at Issue in Christian Ethics."

In the first lecture instead of starting with his own declared "true way," Dean Knudson briefly characterizes and curtly dismisses Barthianism, Neo-Thomism, and the "modified irrationalism" of the reviewer. He defends instead the outright equation of philosophy and theology. He is happily free even from the problems which prevent some from easily identifying faith and reason. What we cannot see does not bother us while, on the other hand, we are also prevented from helping others who do see the problems. The chapter on personalism and freedom contains much good writing and many wise insights. It makes easy reading to some extent because it stays clear of many philosophical and theological hazards. The chapter on evil again abounds in good observations and true interpretations, but fails to put evil in the framework of God's eternal purpose and its organic connection to nature and history. It lacks also a deep conception of sin.

On the negative side, this book will "rile" some who are exceptionally alert to present problems; it will perhaps also astonish many because of its failure to grapple with some profounder levels of the Christian faith. On the positive side, however, it will appeal for its simple, direct style. It is not taxing for the general reader who wants a clear affirmation, devoid of problems. It will be reassuring to many people who want to believe in reason and experience without the cost of using reason or the pain of probing experience. There *is* such a thing as vicarious solving of intellectual, if not of life's, problems. Those personalists who want a neat system at the expense of neglecting some thorny problems will also be comforted by it—as will countless ordinary readers who never have become aware of the deeper reaches. Many of Knudson's former students who have quietly accepted his theology will be especially gratified for the directness and clarity of these lectures.

Somehow the volume, however, is symbolic of a passing era. The quietness of the nineteenth century broods over it. God grant that we can find such smooth sailing again, but for most children of our own day that will come only after the conquering of many a fierce storm. Though the rough treatment of our faith ought to lead to organic thinking on a deeper level, one cannot help but salute with honor, love, and gratitude those who sailed well, according to their day, the smoother seas.

NELS F. S. FERRÉ

Stoic, Christian, and Humanist, by Gilbert Murray, Boston, Beacon, 1950, pp. 189, $2.

Professor Gilbert Murray is one of the most honored men of our times. He is best known for his translations of Euripides and his interpretation of the ancient classical culture. We have felt even more indebted to him for his courageous and tireless support of the many humanitarian causes of our day to which men of good will are pledged. He was England's most zealous advocate of the League of Nations during its hopeful years. The depth of his feelings, the candor of his mind, the catholicity of his sympathies are a precious possession which we all value.

Now, in his eighty-fifth year, he has been prompted to give us this profession of faith, since he thinks that those who have brooded deeply upon human life owe an *apologia* to their fellows. He admits that what he has here written may alienate or pain some of the friends with whom he has worked so happily in the service of great causes. This may well be so. But those who have known him in past years, through his writings, will have no cause for surprise in these pages.

Gilbert Murray is an unequivocal humanist, and an appealing exponent of humanism at its best. In his final chapter he cites Auguste Comte as the typical, if not the classical, humanist of modern times. He knows that Comte's positivist church, founded in Paris a century ago, was not an institutional success. He attributes its failure in part to Comte's mistaken attempt to try to reproduce in humanistic form the patterns of organization and liturgy found in theistic churches. But he goes on to attribute what may seem to be the "complete failure" of Comte's positivist movement to "the general acceptance of his main doctrines." Thus the apparent failure is to be judged a real success. It remains a fair question whether Comte's life and work are, from the standpoint of contemporary humanism, the most serviceable case history the author might have found.

The title of the book is rather equivocal. The bulk of its pages, 118 out of 151, is devoted to the philosophies and religions of the Græco-Roman world. The first chapter deals mainly with Plato and Aristotle, the second chapter with Epicureanism and Stoicism. Professor Murray's treatment of their spiritual insights and their moral idealism is sympathetic and laudatory. Here he is on his own sure ground. The title would seem to promise an independent chapter on Christianity. This chapter is missing. Christianity is cited only incidentally and then as a derivative movement dependent largely upon its parent Judaism for many of its more incredible dogmas. Thus, "The main articles of Christian faith and practice were already latent in the ancient religion. . . . The Stoics were largely the source of the moral ideals of Christianity." In denying to Christianity the absolute novelty which its overzealous advocates have too often ascribed to it, Professor Murray has failed to allow for the element of originality which a generous non-Christian scholar like Montefiore has conceded to Jesus and his first followers.

Given his own premises, Professor Murray attempts to be fair to Christianity, but with the best will in the world he hardly succeeds in doing so. He is aristocratic and patrician in his tastes. He believes in the ascendancy of the philosopher-kings who should preside over, if not rule as dictators, the affairs of society. His predilection for moderation in all things—the golden mean—makes it hard for him to share the enthusiasms of primitive Christianity, to say nothing of the fanaticism of many of its later forms.

The truth is, as Professor Murray says in his preface, that he developed very early in life a temperamental distaste for Christianity. He was born and in his early years brought up in Australia. He was a sensitive boy, outraged by the cruelty to animals which was the order of the day in a frontier society. Indeed, even in these last years it has been the spread of sophisticated cruelty in the modern world which has pained and offended him most. Thus, as a child, the story of the Gadarene swine put him off the gospels and the figure of Jesus. In adolescent years his early studies in anthropology convinced him that the claim of orthodox Christianity to be the only religion deserving that title was false, and satisfied him that the Christian religion is, at the best, merely one among many. He never recovered from his dislike of organized and dogmatic Christianity, which gives him in this work his warrant for stressing the less credible and lovely parts of the Bible, as of orthodox theology. There are a great many professors like him in our American universities. Perhaps Professor Murray's most serious error is his inclination to regard the Bible as a philosophical treatise of a rather mediocre kind, rather than the historical record of a religious tradition, painfully maturing itself over a thousand years of spiritual and moral self-discipline. The classical philosophies, which Professor Murray finds so congenial, sought a still world of eternal verities. Indeed, religions so historically

minded as Judaism and Christianity have little initial appeal for the philosophic mind. The ineradicable strains of apocalyptic and eschatology in such religions seem to mark them as being of a lower rather than a higher order. Hence Professor Murray's patent preference for Platonism and Stoicism, which he is prepared to reaffirm in the terms of modern humanism. WILLARD L. SPERRY

A History of the Baptists, by Robert G. Torbet, Philadelphia, Judson, ©1950, pp. 538, $6.

The very appearance of a new history of the Baptists is sufficient to arouse considerable interest. This one is intended for laymen as well as for ministers and students of church history, but the price of the book will keep it from having the reception it deserves. Dr. Torbet has traced Baptist history from its earliest roots to the present. In general his treatment of the whole span of Baptist history is excellent. While it is undoubtedly true that no one can write a truly objective history, Dr. Torbet's is as objective as they come. He is to be commended for his refusal to follow those who try to prove a spiritual apostolic succession. He asserts, and rightly, that the first Anabaptists did not practice immersion and that this was probably true of the earliest Baptists. Unlike most other writers on Baptist history, he does not exaggerate the importance of Roger Williams. He rightly concludes that "In view of the brevity of his Baptist testimony, Roger Williams is to be honored chiefly for his consistent and courageous allegiance to the principle of religious liberty." It is regrettable, however, that Dr. John Clarke, founder of the Baptist church in Newport, R. I., is accorded so little space. A wholly inadequate—and partly inaccurate—section is that which deals with the Free Will Baptists. Dr. Torbet makes the mistake of relying on secondary sources when primary ones are readily available for this group. Thus he states that Benjamin Randall, the founder of the Free Will Baptists, felt convicted for his refusal to go to hear Whitefield preach when the latter was in Portsmouth, N. H., but there is abundant evidence that Randall heard him several times. The author says that Randall was "called to the New Durham Church in 1777" and that "he accepted." Randall was called in 1777 but refused to go. When the people persisted in wanting him, he finally went in 1778. This book suggests that the merger of the Free Will Baptists with the Northern Baptist Convention in 1911 was possible because of "tolerance" on the part of the Convention. It seems much more likely that the general acceptance of the tenets of the Free Will Baptists paved the way for this union. Readers in New Hampshire, at least, are going to inform Dr. Torbet that New Hampton was not one of the academies founded in Vermont. In the discussion of recent trends in education, there is a list of seminaries founded in the present century, but one searches in vain for a reference to the merger of Andover and Newton as well as that of Colgate and Rochester. Surely these have been as important to the Baptists as the creation of another seminary or two. Dr. Torbet gives Negro Baptists but little treatment although they constitute a very significant percentage of the total Baptist witness. There is no mention of the proposed merger of the American Baptist Convention and the Disciples in this country although a possible union of Baptists and Disciples in Britain is touched upon. In his discussion of "Baptist Contributions" Dr. Torbet credits the Baptists with having influenced pædobaptist denominations "to give to infant baptism a status very much akin to a dedicatory ceremony." It is highly improbable that he could find very many ministers in those denominations who would agree with him. One disturbing note in the book is the author's frequent reference to the Baptists as "anti-Catholic." He says, for example, that "the rising role of Roman Catholicism in the United States has stirred

Baptists to fresh expression of anti-Catholic feeling." But the overwhelming majority of Baptists are not "anti-Catholic." They are opposed to Roman Catholicism's bigotry, persecutions of non-Catholics, and claims of temporal power. Thus they are, in the words of Dr. Torbet himself, "against Roman Catholic aggression in behalf of sectarianism in education and political favor." But this is not tantamount to saying that Baptists are "anti-Catholic," for they have no prejudice against those who are en route to their heavenly home via the dogmas of Rome so long as they do not attempt to restrict the liberties of others. With the above safeguards in mind, Dr. Torbet's book affords an excellent history of the Baptists. Such a work is not easy to produce, and we are much indebted to Dr. Torbet for his courage and labor.

RAYMOND J. BEAN

Preaching in the Great Tradition, by Ray C. Petry, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1950, pp. 122, $2.

This book is no mere exhortation. Unlike the "busy and destinguished" preachers who address seminary students on the art of preaching, Dr. Petry neither warns the overconfident about pitfalls that lie ahead nor points out short and easy ways to power for the timid soul. Much less does he advertise his own achievements by modest implication. Today's pulpit is not the lecturer's subject, though one suspects that he had it very much in mind when these chapters were delivered as the Samuel A. Crozer Lectures for 1949. What is unmistakable is Dr. Petry's acquaintance with and admiration for those patristic and mediæval evangelists who proclaimed "the full Christian gospel." Yet, while the book is wholly objective and retrospective, it should become prophetic to any preacher who can hear the challenge which lingers in the muted echoes of history.

What is it to preach in the great tradition? The reviewer must beware lest he gather where the author has not strawed; nonetheless it seemed to him that every page bore the implication that a stern belief in human dereliction and a joyous certainty of God's forgiving love were the roots of the Christian evangel in pre-Reformation times. How strictly does Dr. Petry intend we shall apply these standards? Not too strictly, one supposes, for if they were rigidly applied, in what company would Phillips Brooks march? Certainty of God's love pervades his every sermon; yet he was far more convinced of each man's inherent dignity and potential goodness than of the sin which afflicts the human race. And where shall we put Horace Bushnell who was less concerned about the conversion of sinners than about the nurture of children born innocent? Nor does confusion end here; the moods of our own day must be consulted. Must we leave outside "the great tradition" those preachers of a social gospel who seem to play down much of the individual's responsibility for his sins and to find some excuse for private offense in the very nature of society? And what of the minister trained in psychiatry for whom sin is often no more than a manifestation of maladjustment? Thinking might be further complicated by considering those humanists in Christian pulpits whose god is the human potential, whose hell ignorance, whose heaven the enjoyment of culture's sweetness and light. Are all of the foregoing to be judged outside the Christian tradition because, by patristic standards, they hold deficient views of sin?

These questions are raised, not merely that the reviewer may have something to say, but because they are of highest importance. If many in the modern pulpit have lost half of the classic motive for preaching, is the half that remains—namely, the joyous proclamation of God's forgiving love—enough to preserve the tradition? If so, what is it, specifically, that love now has to forgive? The individual's luckless

involvement in offenses bred by heredity and environment? His psychsomatic misfortunes?

One can but hope that every preacher will ask and answer these questions for himself. Those long in the field, as well as young men coming from the seminaries, ought to know what and why they are called to preach. It may well be that the modern pulpit wants the old-time power because preachers have few compelling convictions about the Divine Being, the meaning of human existence, the nature of society, or the nature of sin. Or, perhaps conviction itself, not the forms which it takes in successive periods of history, lends magnetism to the preacher's personality, eloquence to his lips. Yet—and this is a reflection of utmost significance—magnetism and eloquence are little worth unless they be devoted to the proclamation of what is everlastingly true. Which brings us again to the question whether the true is strictly bounded by the classic tradition or whether it is something to be sought down new avenues which the Spirit opens to the inquiring mind in every age.

None of the foregoing should be taken as criticism of Dr. Petry's lectures. All of it is a tribute to the skill with which he pricks the reader's mind. Perhaps the sincerest tribute which the reviewer can pay comes by way of confession. As he read the fascinating and soul-disturbing story of those who have preached in "the great tradition," he felt that broad and exact scholarship had been transmuted into splendid moral earnestness. Forced to measure himself against the hero preachers whom the Crozer lecturer brings from the dusk of past centuries, he found himself shrinking in stature as completely as did Alice when she refreshed herself at the table in Wonderland. And yet (so great and benevolent is the magic wrought in these pages) he heard a voice within that said, "By the grace of God you, too, are called."

ROBERT M. GREY

Responsible Christianity, by Justin Wroe Nixon, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 190, $2.50.

In this book Dr. Nixon combines three concerns to which he has devoted his energies in the course of a distinguished and useful career—the concerns of a pastor, a teacher of theology, and a church statesman. Having participated in a struggle against stifling influences from the past, the author here comes to terms with what he confesses to be the somewhat shocking realization that present threats are far worse than any of the old ones. Characteristically, he tackles the situation with a seriousness free from despair, and a sense of urgency devoid of hysteria.

He begins by describing how naturalism has eclipsed idealism, but he is mainly interested, not in theoretical issues, but in practical consequences. His thesis is that the dignity and freedom of personality, and readiness to strive sacrificially for social justice, cannot be perpetuated if our cultural, educational, and political life comes under the sway of naturalistic relativism and loses its grip upon those aims and standards which liberal Christianity preserves and transmits.

Accordingly, he then summarizes the basic contribution which the Jewish-Christian tradition has made to Western civilization—against the background of the pseudo religions of the twentieth century which now threaten both. His main stress falls upon the contemporary relevance of biblical conceptions of God, the religious life, the religious community, and their fruits in reverence, discipline, peace of mind, and freedom.

Thus a foundation is furnished for a discussion of specifically Christian claims. Turning away from the kind of theological terminology which seems technical and even absurd to so many contemporary people, Dr. Nixon sketches a Christology in which

divine love, as personally embodied in Christ, can be discerned as the basis of all human life, especially where "the transfiguration of motives" is concerned. Insofar as he suggests a philosophical framework for this Christology, the author draws on the categories of emergent evolution. In this same chapter he also discusses the traditional arguments for belief in God and concludes that though they are not rigorous proofs, "they do tend to show that the belief in such a God may be a live option which men need not reject on rational grounds" (pp. 120 f.).

The final chapter, entitled "A New Apostolic Age," draws a parallel between Christianity's earliest struggles and its present situation. Dr. Nixon argues that our main peril is individual and collective depersonalisation, and that Christianity alone can furnish the inner dynamism and the firmly grounded sense of meaning and value which will meet the emergency. As throughout the book, he continues to focus attention on practical consequences: the courage and decisiveness needed to bring about social reconstruction; the bearing of movements toward the unity of the church upon the integration of political and intellectual life.

This brief volume is a useful, readable sketch of the outlook of a large segment of American Protestantism. Having broken with fundamentalism, it now sees the need for strengthening some of the ties which an older Liberalism often neglected, and yet it can derive little nourishment from contemporary European theology. Because he covers such a vast range, it would be unfair to criticize the author for not dealing more exhaustively and comprehensively with the issues involved.

Nevertheless, this reviewer is probably not alone in feeling that, despite the merits already mentioned, Dr. Nixon has written a book which incorporates "things we all know already" (though disagreements over matters of detail may remain). One is dissatisfied, not with what he says so much as with what he fails to say. He has rightly called for, and in some respects suggested, the kind of "Responsible Christianity" that is needed. But its actual content must be considerably more incisive; more radical in its reinterpretation or rejection of theological resources; more shattered and revivified by the catastrophic forces of our age. Dr. Nixon is acutely aware of these forces; but one finishes his book with the feeling that he still can't believe his eyes.

DAVID E. ROBERTS

Diary of a Dean, by W. R. Inge, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. 228, $3.50.

To understand the thought of any man, the ideal starting point is his biography, better still his autobiography. Henceforth therefore, these reminiscences will be "required reading" for all who would comprehend or appraise the rôle of the "Gloomy Dean" of St. Paul's in the life and thought of our time.

Let it be confessed at once that the "requirement" is not a wholly agreeable assignment. For one thing, the "diary" has been doctored for publication; and there is no indication, and no way of guessing, where the authentic entry for a particular date ends and the author's supplemental reflections thirty years later begin. Moreover, although the original text has been expurgated (apparently, many of the most enlightening as well as some of the most spicy comments having been deleted), a majority of the entries which have been retained merely chronicle the dean's meetings with the great and the near-great. Here, for example, are four consecutive items from the year 1913:

June 23.—I played tennis with the Bishop of London against Sir Frederick Kenyon and a Mr. Parker. We beat them, for the Bishop, who is fifty-five, darted about the court like a boy.

June 26.—I attended the first meeting of the Birth Rate Commission. They made me convener of one of the sections. Preliminaries only were arranged; Bishop Boyd Carpenter presided.

July 1.—Baron von Hügel read a paper at the Religious Thought Society, a great act of kindness on his part.

July 4.—We gave a dinner-party to Earl and Countess Ferrers, Sir Albert and Lady Bosanquet, Mr. and Mrs. Humphrey Ward, Lady Blois, Campbell Dodgson, Mrs. Hills (Nina Shuttleworth).

This continuous parade of nobility who entertained the Inges or whom they entertained is tiresome. But the casual mention of Baron von Hügel, Archbishop William Temple, and a dozen more of the foremost Christians of this century with barely a word of description or comment is even more annoying.

American readers who recall Dean Inge's last visit to this country in 1925 are likely to turn to the section which records his experiences (pp. 100-104). It is reassuring to note his own misgivings over his Lyman Beecher Lectures at Yale: "They do not satisfy me, and I do not mean to publish them." Not a few of his auditors on that occasion described these lectures as quite unworthy of the great tradition of the lectureship. But the general impression made by the British visitor on that trip was too ready loquacity with too scanty preparation, and a continuous "talking down" to audiences who were assumed to be incapable of absorbing anything better—an all too common mistake of European lecturers on tour in this country between the Wars. It is gratifying, therefore, to note the visitor's delight in this country and those whom he met here, even if he somewhat misread the enthusiasm of the press and grossly exaggerated the importance of the front-page notice which his dry witticisms achieved. One lays this book down not quite certain whether its author is nauseatingly vain or just charmingly ingenuous, probably something of both.

Having said all that, let it be added that, among the wearisome listing of social events, there are many acute and not a few acrid comments upon men and events. And, despite the omission of significant references to von Hügel, Temple, etc., there are not a few others—Archbishop Davidson, Lord Haldane, Bernard Shaw—who stand forth on the dean's pages, etched with discerning and sympathetic lines. On balance, the volume justifies itself, at least to the person who is an Inge enthusiast or who *must* study him. Others will hold him in more favorable regard if they confine their attention to his self-interpretation in the earlier and utterly charming *Vale,* written in 1934 just after he had closed for the last time the door of the deanery of St. Paul's.

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

The Religious Revolt Against Reason, by L. Harold DeWolf, New York, Harper, ©1949, pp. 217, $2.50.

In this book Professor DeWolf makes an even-tempered critical analysis of the rejection of reason in contemporary Christian thought. He also comes to the defense of reason by meeting the charges of the rebels and by attacking the weaknesses in the position of the irrationalists. The rebels with whom he is most largely concerned are Barth and Brunner, of contemporary vintage, and Kierkegaard whom he quite properly regards as the wellspring of the revolt, at least so far as modern influences are concerned.

DeWolf states and discusses carefully the most serious charges leveled against reason. He believes that it is reason as such that is under fire here, and not simply theoretical and mathematical reason, and quite naturally therefore he believes also that this revolt is a very serious affair. The charges which he discusses in some detail are: attacks upon objectivity as being unchristian, impossible of attainment, and inferior to subjectivity; attacks upon the presumption of reason; attacks upon the effectiveness of reason; and finally the charge that reliance upon reason has evil results, *e.g.,* pantheism.

DeWolf is quite willing to admit that a successful defense of reason and a

successful counterattack upon the citadel of unreason alike presuppose the validity of reason. He does not look upon this as a disability, however; to the contrary, one wonders sometimes whether he supposes that the battle may not already be won in the very process of selecting the field upon which he hopes it will be fought. The whole question of the significance of reason must itself be discussed—reasonably. The so-called religious irrationalist could cheerfully grant this without fear of being taken from the rear.

The author of the book sees certain positive values in the revolt against reason. For one thing, there is its "forthright repudiation of religious relativism in all its forms" (p. 164), and this repudiation Dr. DeWolf heartily applauds. For another, the irrationalists have done us a real service in pointing out that God is certainly greater than our (rational) knowledge of him. We have profited also from their attack upon "sophisticated indecision"; and, finally, we see the important emphasis upon the dependency of reason upon faith. In the end, when once faith and reason are properly understood, there can be no conflict between them, that is, when reason is seen to be "comprehensive coherence" and thus a bar before which a fair hearing is accorded all truth-claims (*cf.* p. 202).

I suspect that Dr. DeWolf does not seriously hope that the irrationalists will be conciliated by his patient and honest approach to their position. They will almost certainly feel that his argument is tilted somewhat to begin with and that this can be seen in the relatively small attention given to the anatomy of faith. They may also be expected to say that they have never rebelled against a human faculty: what they repudiate are systems which claim extravagant things for this faculty, and for "worldly wisdom" in general. On the other hand, those of Dr. DeWolf's persuasion may well feel grateful for a clear and careful presentation of their case.

JULIAN N. HARTT

A Commentary on the Creed of Islam, by Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī, translated by Earl Edgar Elder, New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, pp. xxxii, 187, $3.75.

The small treatise *al-'Aqā'id* of Najm al-Dīn al-Nasafī (d. 1142) comprises a succinct exposition of the articles of belief of orthodox Islam. It has gained a widespread reputation in the Muhammadan world and has become one of the most noted treatises in Muslim religious literature. The Arabic text was edited more than a hundred years ago by W. Cureton (London, 1843); an English translation is given by Duncan B. Macdonald in his standard work *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory* (New York, 1903).

Among the several commentaries written on this treatise the best known is that of Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 1389). It has enjoyed a never-failing popularity throughout the centuries down to the present time. Indeed, it has been used for many years as the standard manual of Muslim theology by students at the great university al-'Azhar in Cairo. Al-Taftāzānī follows the position of orthodox Islam as formulated by Abū'l-Ḥasan al-'Ash'arī (d. 935), himself a follower at first of the rationalist Mu'tazilites, but later turned against them and became one of the leading exponents of Muslim orthodoxy, who is reputed to have saved the faith from corruption.

We are indebted to Dr. Elder for making al-Taftāzānī's important work available to the English reader. The brief but lucid introduction gives a concise historical survey of the development of Muslim theology since the death of Muhammad and of the rise of early theological controversy, which oftentimes had its origin in diverse political opinions. Many so-called heretical doctrines and schisms developed during

the early centuries of Islam, notwithstanding the traditions ascribed to the Prophet, which discouraged theological speculations. So one such tradition is reported by al-Shahrastānī (*al-Milal wa'l-Niḥal,* ed. Cureton, p. 3) and reads as follows: "My nation will be divided into seventy-three sects, of which only one will be saved and the rest will perish."

One of the most important sects in early Islam is the Mu'tazilites, separatists or schismatics, but who called themselves "People of Justice and Unity [of God]." Founded by Wāṣil ibn 'Aṭā' (d. 748), pupil of the famous divine Ḥasan of Baṣra, this sect advocated man's free will, denied the eternal attributes in God, maintaining that they are of his proper essence, denied any anthropomorphism, and asserted that a true believer who commits a grievous sin and dies without repentance occupies some middle position between paradise and hell. But the exponents of orthodox Islam, in refuting the rationalist doctrines of the Mu'tazilites, were themselves unconsciously obliged to make some concessions to systematic discussion of dogma.

For his translation of this important work on Muslim theology Dr. Elder used two Cairo editions of the Arabic text, and also consulted one Constantinople edition, all having supercommentaries. A competent Arabist and author of a fine Arabic grammar, inductive method (Cairo, 1937), Dr. Elder has acquitted himself on the whole with distinction in the task of translating a difficult text, containing many intricate problems of orthodox Islam. The work was done under the competent guidance of the late Duncan B. Macdonald, of the Kennedy School of Missions of the Hartford Seminary Foundation. He likewise received assistance from Professor Harry A. Wolfson, of Harvard University, in translating many difficult portions of scholastic reasoning. The translator's references to Sa'adya al-Fayyūmī and to Maimonides were probably suggested by the latter, who is one of the leading authorities in mediæval Jewish philosophy. Dr. Elder's explanatory notes and profuse references to sources are very helpful for the better understanding of al-Taftāzānī's exposition of Muslim orthodoxy. A selected bibliography and carefully prepared index enhance the usefulness of the volume, one of the series of "Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies," edited under the auspices of the department of history, Columbia University.

SOLOMON L. SKOSS

Conflicts in Religious Thought, by Georgia Harkness, New York, Harper, rev. ed., ©1949, pp. xix, 326, $3.

No lengthy explanations or apologies are necessary for issuing a new and revised edition of a book that has found practical use and popular appeal for twenty years. Perhaps the best statement of the intention which created it, is to be found in the author's own words in the preface: "In dealing with hundreds of college undergraduates in classroom and personal conference, the author has long felt the need of a book which would present the essential principles of the philosophy of religion in a form that could be understood by the person who has not had previous training in philosophy." This aim is reflected not merely in its being a "simple statement of the major problems of religious thought with some suggestions for their solution," but also in the choice of themes, which quite clearly follows the type of questions most generally asked by college students who have begun to probe religious beliefs. Thus there is considerable attention given to questions of the nature of truth and the tests of truth, the reasons for believing in God, the problems of human suffering, and the justification for prayer. It may be mentioned in passing that the reviewer found the chapters on the problem of suffering and the nature of prayer to be the best from the point of view of helpfulness and clarity of presentation.

The revisions which have gone into the making of the new edition of the book do not materially alter its character. The only major change was the addition to chapter six, dealing with the evidences for belief in God, of a section of four pages, on the "revelation of God in Jesus Christ." This addition was in the nature of a compromise from the plan to add a whole chapter. The addition is not particularly significant, since very little could be said on this major theme in the space of four pages. The other changes consist in the inclusion of occasional paragraphs and sentences, to reflect the "shifts that have taken place in the general philosophical and religious climate." The author may be right in believing that "what was true in 1929 is still the truth." This belief, however, ought not to interfere with the realization that there have been fundamental changes in perspectives since the date of the first edition, which cannot be treated too lightly, whether or not one has agreed with those changes. But it can be readily agreed that the new edition is a better book than the original.

In forming a new appraisal of the volume after twenty years, it must not be forgotten that it was intended for a very practical use. It still serves its purpose very commendably. The author is aware of its limitations from the point of view of scholarship, or theological and philosophical discipline. But a criticism of another nature needs to be added. The presentation of religious questions does not wholly escape the dangers to which all attempts at a simple and practical statement are subject, namely, those of oversimplifying to the point of misrepresentation and distortion. Thus, to resolve the conflict between science and religion by repeating the formula that "science is concerned primarily with facts, and the application of those facts to the external conditions of life," while "religion is concerned primarily with values, and the deepening of these values in the inner springs of life" (p. 92), is too easy a generalization. It seems to ignore the fact that science as well as religion offers a cosmology, an explanation of the real nature of things, which is a rival to the religious interpretation. The college student particularly cannot fail to recognize that fact. Similarly, to offer experience as an alternative to authority as a basis for the validity of religious affirmations is almost naïve. Experience is not a true alternative to authority, since it is too ambiguous, and inclusive, and may itself include the need for, and the acceptance of, authority. As a final example of this oversimplification must be mentioned the author's adoption of the principle of coherence as the test of truth. "Freedom from contradiction is the final test" (p. 65). Granted that coherence may be one of the characteristics of truth, it is too general and ambiguous to be a reliable and final test. It cannot be assumed that experience coheres of itself. It has to be made coherent by interpretation and evaluation. There are too many types and levels of coherence to make this a final test.

ANDREW BANNING

Bible History Digest, by Elmer W. K. Mould, New York, Exposition Press, ©1950, pp. x, 201, $3.

Professor Mould, who wrote the well-known college text *Essentials of Bible History,* here presents a brief objective history intended for use in secondary schools, in community schools of religious education, and for religiously interested people in general. After an opening chapter which outlines the entire story, biblical history is divided into eight compact chapters, factual in form and competently written with constant use of biblical books and passages as source materials. Using the principle, "This is the house that Jack built," each chapter opens with a summary which repeats and carries forward the story to the point where the chapter begins. The long and often complicated record stands out in simple clarity.

An outstanding aid for the beginning student appears in the twenty outline maps which illustrate all Bible lands. On these maps the places and peoples stand out clearly. Another visual aid is the use of numerous diagrams and outlines which set forth in orderly fashion, for example, the kings of Israel and Judah, David's governmental organization, the Hasmonæans, the Herods, and the Pauline Epistles. These annotated maps and dated diagrams constitute one of the outstanding features of the book.

The most important biblical passages, personages, and events are strongly indicated. Passover is "the most memorable night in all Hebrew history" (p. 23). David's reign is the "high noon of Hebrew political greatness" (p. 58), and his story is the "finest piece of historical prose narrative in the Old Testament" (p. 60). Jesus is the "most unforgettable character" (p. 163). Archæological resources are used to amplify biblical accounts. Important disputed points like the date of the Exodus are occasionally discussed (p. 20), but usually plain statements are given which represent the best judgments of modern scholarship which help to keep the main threads untangled in the hands of an average reader, though the judgments often seem dogmatic to an advanced student.

Sometimes viewpoints appear which are far from general acceptance. Can the Sea of Weeds be identified with the Gulf of Akabah (p. 23)? Likewise to say eschatology is a phase of apocalyptic reverses the usual view. "Eschatology is the wider term, apocalypse the narrower" (Bowman *The Intention of Jesus,* p. 53; *cf.* Grant, *Introduction to New Testament Thought,* p. 125). It is to be doubted that Paul "doubtless began immediately Christian missionary activity" in Arabia or continued there three years (p. 179).

Probably the limits of space compelled brevity but there are many terms which are too technical or historical for the first reader of this record. There is need for explanation which is often given but there is no uniformity of explanation. If the meaning of a proper name like Paul is stated (p. 178), why not the meaning of *Diadochi* (p. 137)? "Apologetic" appears on p. 35 but its explanation is delayed until p. 74. Professor Mould's vocabulary will require secondary school students to use a dictionary. They will look in vain for any listing of other readable books on Bible study. A brief selected list would strengthen this volume, especially since there are areas of interesting Bible reading not dealt with in this historical survey. The index shows no reference to books like Psalms, Job, Proverbs, or Ruth. The General Epistles are named but not discussed.

This is a clear, incisive, many-sided survey of historical biblical data, but the student must read the Bible itself for the complete record and for the glowing, realistic sense of a living God and a living people who created this timeless story which shines out of the pages of time.

DWIGHT M. BECK

Gandhi's Letters to a Disciple, with an introduction by John Haynes Holmes, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 234, $2.50.

The disciple in this case is Mira behn, the noted Englishwoman who became one of the inmost circle of Gandhi's followers. Reared as Madeleine Slade in an English country home, daughter of an admiral and former commander-in-chief of the East Indies Squadron, she was, as Dr. Holmes says in his introduction, "a popular social figure, highly educated, tall, beautiful, proud of bearing, with glowing eyes and liquid voice." Her spiritual sensitivity, however, was her great gift. She responded with an appreciation of unusual depth to the beauty of nature, to the music of Beethoven, to its interpretations by Romain Rolland. Meeting this noted Frenchman,

she first learned of Mahatma Gandhi. When his book on the great Indian appeared, she found therein something she had all along been seeking. "I read and read," she writes, "and as I read the dawn in my heart glowed brighter and brighter, and by the time I had finished, the Sun of Truth was pouring his rays into my soul. From that moment I knew that my life was dedicated to Bapu" (*i.e.*, Father, the name by which his disciples called Gandhi). The result was a year's self-preparation, a sailing for India, and her acceptance as spiritual daughter by Gandhi in his ashram at Sarbamati. Entering on this new life, she changed her name to Mira behn.

In the twenty-four years that followed, Gandhi wrote many letters to his unusual disciple in the midst of all his travels over India. This book is a selection of 351 out of 650 which Mira collected and treasured. In them we see another Gandhi than the great public figure which the whole world knows. Here is Gandhi the spiritual teacher, wise, tender, solicitous, sharing his own inmost thoughts and experiences in the effort to guide another along the way of the higher life.

Often brief, the letters are written under diverse circumstances, on trains, from distant cities, out of imprisonments, in the midst of great public events and pressures. Gandhi was incessantly busy in his great enterprises. Yet reference to these circumstances is of the most fleeting character. The letters are concerned with details of keeping physically and psychologically fit for the highest tasks. Dietary advice is given Mira on the basis of his own experiences with different kinds of fruits and vegetables. His views on fasting are expressed. He reports on fluctuations of his weight and state of his health. He counsels keeping within the limits of one's powers while at the same time organizing them for fullest effectiveness with regard to duties on hand. Gandhi believed in the most controlled self-discipline. He advises Mira on her readings in the *Vedas, Upanishads, Bhagavadgita,* the *Epics,* and *Puranas.* At times he quotes a passage, illumining it with surprising depth of meaning out of his own insight and experience. He tells of keeping up his spinning, and how much daily. He sends Mira his translations of Indian hymns and reports a plan to translate the whole of the *Gita.*

In many of the letters Gandhi's elemental faith in God comes to expression. "You are not to break. You must be seeing God's Grace pouring in abundance as never before." "Anxiety is incompatible with a living faith in a living God." "Having put one's whole heart into a thing entrusted or undertaken, one can leave the result to God." Phrases of scripture, Hindu, Christian, or Mohammedan, seem to rise readily to his mind according to their fitness for occasions. So, too, does a certain homely, practical wisdom as when he writes, "Rest properly and in due time taken is like the proverbial timely stitch." Of such varied content, frankly and spontaneously written down, these letters consist.

To the Western reader this book seems to be something apart, *sui generis.* It is a remarkable, informal expression of a great and unique personality—more remarkable, perhaps, for the spirit of wisdom and compassion which breathes through it as a whole than for the daily actualities about which the letters centre. Here we can see the Father (Bapu) which his disciples knew and loved. We can also glimpse the sources of that strength which led Mira to write that though he was full of love and gentleness, in his fight with evil he was relentless, and that this eventually caused again "the blood of an *avatar* to flow for the salvation of mankind."

CLARENCE H. HAMILTON

Out of My Later Years, by Albert Einstein, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. viii, 282, $4.75.

This is an anthology of fifty-nine essays, addresses, and excerpts written by Einstein between 1934 and 1950. Thus it is in a sense a supplement to his *The World As I See It.* The collection also includes an open letter from four Soviet scientists titled "Dr. Einstein's Mistaken Notions," which is an attack upon Einstein's position regarding limitation of national sovereignty. Einstein's reply is a marvel of reasonableness and restraint, revealing his spirit and method.

The essays have been divided into six subdivisions by the editors: "Convictions and Beliefs," "Science," "Public Affairs," "Science and Life," "Personalities," "My People." In the first section are grouped statements of Einstein's convictions on the relationship of religion, morality, and the sciences. "All religions, arts, and sciences are branches of the same tree. All these aspirations are directed toward ennobling man's life, lifting it from the sphere of mere physical existence and leading the individual toward freedom." The moral imperative "is not a matter for church and religion alone, but the most precious traditional possession of all mankind." Morality is "a task never finished." A religiously enlightened person is "one who has, to the best of his ability, liberated himself from the fetters of his selfish desires and is preoccupied with thoughts, feelings, and aspirations to which he clings because of their superpersonal value." These superpersonal objects or goals "exist with the same necessity and matter-of-factness" as the person himself. Religion is the age-old endeavor to become "completely conscious of these values and goals."

Einstein feels that the doctrine of a personal God should be relinquished since it can maintain itself only in the dark—that is, in those domains where scientific knowledge has not yet been able to set foot. Mature science purifies the religious impulse of "the dross of its anthropomorphism" while contributing to a religious spiritualization of our understanding of life.

The section on "Science" has interesting comments on scientific method as well as brief interpretations of the theory of relativity, the field concept, quantum theory, the laws of science, and the laws of ethics. The whole of science, Einstein states, "is nothing more than a refinement of every day thinking."

Einstein's criticism of capitalism and his arguments for socialism are included in the section titled "Public Affairs." He is not unaware of the dangers of an all-powerful bureaucracy, and the task of preserving the rights of the individual in a socialistic system. He is fully aware that all states in the world must relinquish much of their national sovereignty. States must be prevented from making war "by a supernational organization supported by a military power that is exclusively under its control."

The sections on "Science and Life," "Personalities," and "My People" also reveal Einstein's wide range of humanitarian interests, his profound sympathy for all human beings, his ethical sensitivities. Here is a citizen of the world who does not worship at any shrine dedicated to tribal religions—traditional or secular, scientific or anti-scientific. In him is found the exploratory method conscientiously applied to all major areas of human meaning.

FLOYD H. ROSS

The Heritage of the Reformation, edited by Elmer J. F. Arndt, New York, Richard R. Smith, 1950, pp. 264, $3.

Here are twelve illuminating essays contributed primarily for the centennial celebration of Eden Theological Seminary, Webster Groves, Missouri. That it should turn out to be remembered more as an excellent analysis and appreciation of the

"heritage of the Reformation" is inevitable. The authors, with the exception of the Niebuhr brothers, are all professors at the Seminary, and the two exceptions are alumni of the institution.

In symposium style, each essay approaches the common theme from a different angle. Although they are not labeled theologically, the reader will recognize the basic emphasis upon such matters as Christology, the sacraments, the Word, etc., in their relation to the Reformation movement. Education, ethics, prayer, and liturgics are other broad and practical avenues by which the Reformation heritage is tested.

This noteworthy addition to the voluminous material about one of the truly great periods of church history is distinctive in that it is both critical and appreciative. In an effort to bring the spirit of the Reformation to bear on the contemporary issues (older issues in their contemporary form) confronting the Christian church, there is no hesitancy in pointing out the weaknesses and well as the elements of strength in the Protestant movement.

For example: Elmer Arndt in his treatment of the sacraments, points out that the natural and historical conditions of the time were responsible for much of the acrimoniousness which crept into Reformation writing on the subject. He acknowledges that the place of grace in the thinking of the reformers led automatically to a sense of despair which could be precluded only by a sufficient faith—and faith in itself was a gift of grace. The rise of the "spirituals," who could see no value in the observance of the sacrament if it conferred no blessings that the Word itself did not bestow, is pictured as an attendant weakness of the Protestant movement. This chapter is an exceedingly concise and penetrating analysis of the real issue involved in the sacramental field.

Again, Purd Dietz, after acknowledging the *sola fide* principle which the Reformation used as a test in all liturgical matters, points out the incalculable and irreparable damage done by the perversion of the Reformation principle of truth and freedom.

It is to be regretted that except for an intimation that the Roman church thinks more of the pope than the Christ, plus a not too appropriate quotation from Luther, the essay on "Jesus Christ our Lord" has no connection with the Reformation. Despite the excellent presentation, one cannot help but feel that if the Christological contribution of the Reformation is no greater than the author states, his discussion is irrelevant to the theme.

This is also largely true in an otherwise excellent treatment of "Preaching the Word." The only apparent connection between this field of interest and the Reformation is that it was during the latter time that a needed emphasis on preaching was overdone and has resulted in our day in a substitution of learned essays and moralizing talks for the original Christian *kerygma*.

The most positive note of the book, struck a number of times in varying contexts, is the vital truth that the spirit of the Reformation is essentially a witnessing in behalf of spiritual truths revealed in Christ as over against a protesting against the practices of any one institution or hierarchy.

The unity of the book is accurately and effectively maintained by recognizing that the true heritage of the Reformation is a spirit. The spirit is characterized by its persistent concern to be faithful to the New Testament witness to the revelation of God's judgment and grace in Jesus Christ; by its striving toward an ecumenical understanding of the Christian faith; by its concentration on God's activity in creation and redemption; and by its serious effort to bring the whole of life into the free service of God.

ROBERT D. HERSHEY

Pelagius and the Fifth Crusade, by Joseph P. Donovan, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950, pp. 124, $2.50.

The author of this well-documented monograph modestly says that his study "does not offer any solution for our current world problems." It is only "the story of another failure seven centuries ago." The discerning reader, however, will not fail to draw from it one of history's many lessons. In unleashing the crusading movement, the mediæval church attempted to make war serve a spiritual purpose. It thus opened the way to such an onrush of material greed and thirst for power that it lost all control of the movement with respect to the ends which it sought to realize and in the end did irreparable damage to its own spiritual authority. No better illustration of the sad story can be found than the career of the papal legate, Pelagius, cardinal bishop of Albano, who served under three of the greatest popes: Innocent III, Honorius III, and Gregory IX.

Cardinal Pelagius has received from the hands of modern historians an unenviable reputation for tyranny, cruelty, and imprudence. The author tries to show that this judgment is not just, but is a reflection of certain sources which could not have been expected to be without prejudice. His first large assignment was to bring ecclesiastical order to the Latin empire of Constantinople—what the author calls "the fantastic result of Pope Innocent's desire for a crusade." To accomplish such a task would have been in any case little short of a miracle, given the atmosphere of hatred and mistrust between Greeks and Latins in both the political and the religious spheres. Pelagius apparently assumed that "the rule of the Latins implied acceptance of the Roman Church's jurisdiction," as was the case in the kingdom of Jerusalem. Pelagius' reputation for cruelty towards the Greek monks and clergy rests in large measure upon the testimony of two thirteenth-century Greek historians, both of whom took umbrage at Pelagius' regalia and bearing. Often Pelagius' efforts at reconciliation ran counter to the political aims of the Emperor Henry.

As the papal leader of the fifth crusade of 1217, that saw the capture of Damietta, Pelagius has suffered from the accusations of Frenchmen who have possibly sought to divert attention from the failings of John de Brienne and the French barons. Pelagius is, of course, responsible for the offensive directed towards Cairo in the summer of 1221, which ended in such miserable failure. But all historians admit that he did not have the best coöperation from John, and furthermore that he mistakenly supposed that the promised reinforcements from Frederick II would arrive according to schedule. Dr. Donovan believes also that Pelagius was moved to optimism concerning the venture by prophecies concerning two kings, one from the West and the other from the East who would subdue the land of the sultan. In this he shared the religious outlook of his age. His failure was due as much to circumstances over which he had no control as to his own imprudent judgment.

Finally Pelagius was a victim of the papal crusade against Frederick in southern Italy. As the author says, "it would be difficult in history to find a more topsy-turvy situation than that in 1229." Frederick, under the church's ban, was negotiating as king of Jerusalem with the sultan for the peaceful return to the Christians of the holy city, while the pope and John of Brienne, ex-king of Jerusalem, were battling the imperial forces in Italy to bring ruin upon the emperor. When Frederick returned and rewon his ground, Pelagius, who headed one of the papal armies, was broken in health, and died in peace at Monte Cassino in January, 1230. Thus a man of great abilities was consumed in hopeless tasks of no lasting value.

MASSEY H. SHEPHERD, JR.

Is God in History? by Gerald Heard, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. xii, 269, $3.

Gerald Heard's books are always interesting and highly original. His flights of historical fancy probably have no scientific standing. Yet they are provocative, and suggest to one's imagination exciting possibilities, although it seems unlikely that they actually occurred in precisely the manner that Heard supposes. This book is a sequel to *Is God Evident?*, a question which Heard answered in the affirmative. He now endeavors to show how God has entered into history, and brought redemption to the earth on the occasions of three different falls.

The first fall, into "wrong perception," was a physiological fall "of all the animals and indeed of all life," more than eighty million years ago in the middle of the Mesozoic period. Then the unicellular organisms, after having effected stabilization toward a limited environment, refused to make further advances, and in consequence remained in a blind alley. This situation was remedied by a divine intervention, effecting parthenogenesis. The multicellular organisms also fell through inadequate specialization, and suffered disasters—*e.g.*, the crabs became victims of parasites which in their turn degenerated. God this time effected redemption through sexual reproduction.

The second fall, the first specifically human fall, was into "wrong attention." This had two phases. The first was attended by "loss of intuitive knowledge of the entire nutritional and reproductive cycles." Taste and appetite became gradually perverted into gluttony, sexual abnormalities, misuse of fermented drinks, etc. Divine redemption from this phase was effected through reëxplications of tradition: in the Mongolian world by Tan, Duke of Chou; in India by the laws of Manu; in the Fertile Crescent (Toynbee's term for the West) by "no allover priest president social pattern synthesis" (whatever that may mean! p. xi). The second phase of this fall, into "intenser addiction, violence and avarice," was remedied by the prophetic appeal: in China by Confucius, Mencius, and Lao-tze; in India by Sankya, primitive Buddhism, and Jainism; and in the Fertile Crescent by the ancient Hebrew prophets, the Pythagoreans, and Zoroaster.

The third fall, into "wrong suggestion or false faith," due to decadence among those who had forgotten the teachings of the prophets, led to more frequent and severe wars, economic decay, excessive consumption of distilled spirits, degenerate mystery cults, black magic, and vile beliefs and practices of many kinds. A salvation adequate to correct such depravity had to come from further outside existing society than had been requisite for the former two redemptions. This third salvation was afforded in India by the Vedanta, and in China by Mahayana Buddhism with its bodhisattvas. It was best of all achieved in the Fertile Crescent, by the mystery religions and saviour gods, preëminently by Christianity whose Saviour God could be clearly and precisely identified with Jesus of Nazareth, an historic person who had been born in Bethlehem in the reign of Augustus Cæsar at a date now rightly reckoned in our calendar as the beginning of a new era.

Yet Christianity, instead of being accepted the world over, has been checked by ever-increasing secessions and corruptions, beginning, Heard thinks, with the third century A.D. What, then, shall we do? Heard is not too clear, but he seems to mean that we should return to the spirit of second-century Christianity, as expressed for instance in the Fourth Gospel, and reconciled with our present knowledge. The words with which the essay proper ends are worth pondering upon: "As long as we are in Time we shall be striving. God reveals Himself in history that through the process-effort to attain Him we may become worthy, capable of seeing Him as He is—no longer mediated through Time but in His eternal immediacy" (p. 234).

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

The I Ching, or *Book of Changes,* rendered into English by Cary F. Baynes from the Richard Wilhelm translation, New York, Pantheon, ©1950, 2 vols., pp. xliii, 395, 376, $7.50.

This work is No. 19 in the Bollingen Series, and is beautifully bound and printed. The first volume, after a foreword by C. G. Jung, a translator's note, a preface and an introduction by Wilhelm, is concerned chiefly with the text of the *Book of Changes,* while the second volume contains commentaries. There are two appendices, but no index or illustrations, and there are a number of footnotes.

The *Book of Changes* is one of the five Chinese classics. The list has varied from time to time, reaching its present form in the Sung Period (the tenth to the twelfth centuries A.D.), but the *Book of Changes* has always been included. Its popularity and the study it has received are due largely to a remark Confucius is alleged to have made, that if he had many more years, he would devote them all to the study of the *Book of Changes.* Modern scholars doubt that Confucius ever said this, but it has unquestionably had a great effect.

From very ancient times, the Chinese were devoted, like other early peoples, to the study of methods of divination. One of these was by means of casting stalks of a certain plant on the ground. The diviner then judged the future by the arrangement of the fallen stalks. The stalks were arranged in trigrams of broken and unbroken lines, and combined into double combinations called hexagrams. There were eight trigrams and sixty-four hexagrams, and a great variety of combinations was possible. The trigrams are very ancient, but the explanations and text of the book cannot date earlier than the beginning of the first millennium B.C., while the commentaries are still later. The present volume of the *Book of Changes* may be viewed in two ways: a) as an ancient work on divination, and b) as a book of wisdom, attempting a description of the universe by the meanings ascribed to the figures. While the Chinese generally have reverenced the book, it is more Taoist than Confucian in attitude.

The *Book of Changes* was translated into English by Legge (*Sacred Books of the East,* vol. XVI, in 1899; and in 1934 an English version by Z. D. Sung appeared. The late Richard Wilhelm, who died in 1930, published in 1924 his German translation, on which he had worked for ten years. Wilhelm was a well-known sinologist, and the author of a number of works on China. The present volume is a translation into English by Cary F. Baynes of Wilhelm's German translation from the Chinese. Baynes' translation does not differ markedly from Legge's in a number of instances selected at random by the reviewer, but the arrangement and point of view of Wilhelm and Legge differ.

The work is inevitably cryptic, and it is possible to find all sorts of interpretations if one wants to do so. Z. D. Sung writes, "The perfect agreement of these symbols (of the *I Ching*) with those of the algebraic terms of the expanded expression of a binomial sixth power . . . ." In much the same way, Jung, in his foreword, tells how he himself divined by means of the *Book of Changes,* and secured remarkable results. It is not fair to blame this sort of thing on Wilhelm, for there are always minds which are fascinated by literature of this kind. But the general impression given by these volumes is that they were published because the book was considered to have a practical value today, either in divination or as a book of wisdom. This view the reviewer does not share. Wilhelm, however, was a reputable sinologist, and his translation is probably as good as we will ever get.

In order that the reader may get a general impression of what the contents are like, he may consider hexagram No. 18, called Ku, whose character is composed of three insects above a dish. The hexagram means "work on what has been spoiled" (decay).

The upper trigram means "keeping still, mountain," while the lower means "sun, the gentle, wind." The text continues, "Work on what has been spoiled has supreme success. It furthers one to cross the great water. Before the starting point, three days. After the starting point, three days . . ." and so on. If anyone is interested in seeing how this particular hexagram was actually applied in divination in early times, he is referred to H. Y. Feng and J. K. Shryock, "The Black Magic in China Known as Ku," (*Jour. Amer. Orient. Soc.*, vol. LV, pp. 1-7). While the *Book of Changes* is interesting and valuable historically, it does not repay the great amount of study that has been given to it, and any wisdom it contains can be found with less effort elsewhere.

JOHN K. SHRYOCK

Women in the Old Testament: Twenty Psychological Portraits, by Norah Lofts, New York, Macmillan, 1949, pp. xi, 178, $2.50.

The task to which Mrs. Lofts has set herself is a legitimate one. She has undertaken to write psychological portraits of some famous and infamous women, taking as her starting point the fragments of information about each which have been preserved in the literature of the Bible. In these essays she has probed deeply into the motives of these characters. This is an area in which the textual and the historical critics can never give any conclusive answers. Nor are the answers of Mrs. Lofts convincing to the student of history; but they are suggestive, interesting, and frequently highly plausible.

What is the contribution of Mrs. Lofts in these delightful essays? Certainly it is not that of a schoolmistress who writes to inspire her students. Nor is the volume the result of a lifetime's study of the textual or historical problems involved in the narratives. Perhaps the merit lies in the writer's native endowment of those qualities of mind and feeling which so distinctively belong to women. These have been brought to that highly suggestive epic literature of Israel happily and creatively. She has handled the ancient material with imagination not unlike that with which the Israelite storyteller was endowed as he handed it down from generation to generation before it was caught up and fixed in a sacred book.

Some of Mrs. Lofts' insights and observations will indicate the character of the essays. The story of Sarah and Hagar illustrates for her "the inability of two women to share one roof and one man." The uniqueness of Rebekah lies in the fact that she was the first woman to challenge the nonsense of the man-instituted rule of primogeniture. Leah is characterized as one who bargained for one night of love. Potiphar's wife is analyzed frankly—as is the mind of those who find delight in the story. Rahab's rôle in the betrayal of Jericho is condemned and then explained by the remark, "Owning loyalty to no man, how could she be loyal to a city?" Jephthah's daughter is the virgin whose blood purchased for the religion of Yahweh its fine emancipation from the ugly rite of human sacrifice. Deborah and Jael are compared and contrasted in an interestingly written chapter. There is the delightful suggestion that Jael's unpopularity may derive from the fact that she refutes the age-old belief that no woman can drive a straight nail. The brilliant chapter on Delilah concludes that "there was nothing romantic or sentimental or patriotic about Delilah until the poets got hold of her." Ruth's place rests upon one perfectly phrased, perfectly balanced sentence. Bathsheba emerges as one who comes the nearest to being a nonenity of all the women of the Old Testament. All she did is due to her being "beautiful and pliant and obedient." Jezebel is put down as "the most-feared, most-hated, most powerful queen that Israel ever knew." The little maid in the household of Naaman is said to be the "very first medical missionary."

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

BOOK NOTICES

How Came Our Faith: A Study of the Religion of Israel and its Significance for the Modern World, by W. A. L. Elmslie, New York, Scribner, 1949, pp. xii, 417, $3.25.

As one reads this book he has the feeling that he is actually sitting in Principal Elmslie's lecture room listening to one who has not only mastered his material from the past but also seasoned it well with happy allusions to events and people of the present. There is hardly a page without some delighful—and sometimes humorous—aside. In the section on the history of interpretation, he labels the section on allegory "The Ice-Age," and the discussion of the infallible Bible "A Depression from Iceland." At another point in his discussion of the allegorical method, he speaks of treating the Bible like a huge refrigerator. Throughout he is not unaware of the culture which belongs to his twentieth-century readers. The vividness of the author's imagination is stamped on every page of the book. This makes it a book which must be read to the end. When Principal Elmslie needs a contemporary who will serve to illustrate what Isaiah meant to his country in 740 B.C., he finds Mr. Churchill and an apt quotation about him: "Humanly speaking, we might have gone under [in 1940] had one man, who was there, not been there. One man made all the difference. And the man was Mr. Churchill." The reader may debate some of the modern parallels which the author draws, but even though he may disagree at many points he cannot help but be thankful for the freshness which the references give to the pages. The book, as the title suggests, is neither a history nor a commentary. It is an appreciation of the positive contribution of Israel to our heritage and a plea for giving this contribution a hearing today. There is an acceptance of the major points of the critical interpretation of the Bible, but there is no disposition to parade his use of criticism. In the chapter on Amos, one of the high points in the book, he accepts most of the text, excluding of course 9:11-15. The accent is generally on the positive. Frequently he embraces one opinion without giving others. But this omission is quite necessary in a book which must deal with such a vast literature within the compass of four hundred pages. Certainly, pastors and laymen who are interested in the values to be found in the Old Testament will find this an absorbing and rewarding book.

JAMES B. PRITCHARD

Christian Unity in the Making, by Charles S. Macfarland, New York, Federal Council of Churches, ©1948, pp. 376, $2.75.

This review would seem to be so tardy that little good could come of it, were it not that the book itself is a real contribution to the understanding and undertaking of togetherness and that its subject, The Federal Council, is to lose its identity forthwith in the new and comprehensive National Council of Churches. It does not pass into history because of having outlived its usefulness. Rather, it is one of the most dynamic and determinative factors in the new instrument of Christian coöperation. We may well cherish Dr. Macfarland's story of the beginnings with the varied and rich experiences of vision, fortitute, and fidelity to long-term effectiveness. He writes with notable restraint and yet with a moving enthusiasm for the adventures of associated endeavor and service. And there is plenty of candor and realism in the interpretation of recurring crises with their pardonable errors, their honored judgments, and their vindicated hopes. It is heartening for those who are greatly earnest about the Christian cause in these troublous times to note how the days gone by were

weighted with wisdom and patience and a sublime trust in the grand eventuality. *Christian Unity in the Making* is an authoritative accounting of good stewardship in spiritual opportunity as well as of ecclesiastical advance. And withal, it grants to those of us who have been somewhat intimately associated with the Council through the years of this fateful half century, a choice privilege of remembrance of many a valiant of the days gone by whose names are written in our hearts quite as indelibly as in the Book of the Kingdom. Incidentally, this good book demands a sequel. It has brought us from 1905 to 1930. We shall turn to Dr. Cavert, Dr. Macfarland's esteemed successor, for his interpretation of the substantial achievements of the concluding momentous decades.

IVAN MURRAY ROSE

Rural Prospect, by Mark Rich, New York, Friendship Press, ©1950, pp. viii, 183, $1.50.

"No church can cultivate the seeds of the kingdom of God in the garden of the world unless it learns how to plant, cultivate, and harvest in the near-at-hand field—the community" is a statement in the introduction which could aptly serve as the thesis of the book. Clearly and effectively the author sets forth the place of the church in rural life and correlates two significant ideas: through the church is a wholeness of life, and the community as a whole is the strongest educational force. The opening chapter deals with dramatic rural changes which, although commonly accepted as social progress, have created serious problems for the rural church which cannot be easily solved. Population shifts, disappearing neighborhoods, and an array of agricultural innovations have upset the status quo of rural churches and have left them bewilderingly maladjusted. The tragedy of rural churches is that most of them are desperately trying to remain unchanged in the face of irresistible social and economic forces. Outmoded methods cause churches to reduce their effectiveness to a minimum. "Some churches most evangelistic in word and least evangelistic in fact have not gotten down to brass tacks as to who and where the unreached are. The church with a parish concept is on the road to a larger plan of evangelism, because of its concern for all the people." The book portrays changes in rural life in a stimulating manner and also includes splendid examples of rural churches which are adjusting themselves to the new rural conditions with challenging and compelling programs. A great hope for the rural church lies in the fact that the author, as director of rural work for a great denomination, is a spearhead of rural policies and programs emanating from his sagacious insight as revealed in the pages of his book. One who seeks an up-to-date, concise treatise on rural life will find in *Rural Prospect* a well-balanced presentation. Teachers of rural courses in church-training institutes will find the book an excellent text. Those interested in the welfare of the rural church will commend the author for his final chapter in which he pays tribute to the work of Mark Dawber, giving him honor in company with Oberlin and Neff. Rural workers will agree with the author: "The prospect is so dim that it presents a puzzling problem. Again the prospect is so bright that it makes the blood tingle with anticipation."

HAROLD BANCROFT WHITE

Kierkegaard the Cripple, by Theodor Haecker, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. xi, 53, $2.75.

This little book is a translation of *Der Buckel Kierkegaards,* a manuscript which Haecker, who died in 1945, must have written subsequent to the publication by Rikard Magnussen in 1942 of two volumes which establish beyond all reasonable doubt the

fact that Kierkegaard was a hunchback. The "thorn in the flesh" to which he often refers in his writings was an actual physical deformity, visible to all who saw him. Haecker believes that Kierkegaard became morbidly sensitive about his personal appearance. This does much to explain who he broke off his engagement to marry Regine Olsen, as well as the ground for the cruel personal attacks upon him in the *Corsair* and much else that has been obscure in what he said and did. However, one must not exaggerate. This affliction does not account for everything that is puzzling about Kierkegaard. Haecker's general conclusion is summarized in these words: "Kierkegaard himself was very nearly the personification of dissonance and paradox. He was an extraordinary man—*extraordinarius—extra ordinem* in both senses of the word. In the negative sense he was *extra ordinem, infra ordinem,* because he was physically abnormal, deformed, crooked, hunchbacked and sickly, outwardly a grotesque sight for any one who can only see the outward or physical aspect. In the positive sense, he was *extra ordinem, supra ordinem,* in mind and intellect, as thinker and poet, who overtopped all his contemporaries—the greatest man of all time in Denmark, and one of the greatest in the history of the world" (p. 24). This edition is illustrated by "a representative selection of drawings and caricatures of Kierkegaard most of which are unknown outside Denmark, or else known from very indifferent plates and wood-cuts" (p. v). Those produced by his friends of course avoid or minimize the deformity, while those by his enemies exaggerate it. It seems certain that Kierkegaard's physical appearance must have been far from pleasing, and that any man thus afflicted would be likely to become morbidly sensitive. These considerations will have to be taken into account in the future study of his life and thought.

WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

The Story of Religion in America, by William Warren Sweet, New York, Harper, rev. ed., 1950, pp. ix, 492, $3.75.

The reviewer, with enforced leisure on his hands, has read practically every word of this second revision of a standard and familiar work. Doubtless few will read it straight through, for it is essentially a reference book. A reading through, however, may be strongly counseled to every thoughtful person who seeks a consecutive knowledge of our American past in religion, as well as to the believer who is grasping for perspective to live faithfully in the difficult present. Dr. Sweet even fans courage for the future as on his last page he departs from his cool objectivity and bids us be of good cheer. The revision makes excellent use of a host of recent books and monographs. Indeed this volume is worth its price for its bibliographical value alone. The chief addition, however, brings the study nearly down to date in an extra chapter, which even details the Spellman-Roosevelt controversy of the summer of 1949. Doubtless the reviser of 1970 will reduce this chapter of twenty-three pages to an eight or ten page section, but the reviewer does not intend by this prophecy to disparage Dr. Sweet's wisdom in adding this timely and somewhat warmer chapter to the book. Sweet is not a brilliant writer, and seems never able to coin the magic phrase or cast the charmer's spell. How feeble, for example, is this: "Frances E. Willard, a red-headed teacher and Dean of Women of Northwestern University" (pp. 410-411). Yet the straightforward and workmanlike historical writer has his compensations, and we are disposed to trust him. Dr. Sweet's work is always ably organized and characterized by fair-mindedness. Colorful and well-chosen quotations from the sources brighten the narrative considerably. Every student of American church history will welcome this revision and cordially salute the dean of this field of study.

JOHN W. BRUSH

Communism's Challenge to Christianity, by Arthur Vööbus, Maywood (Ill.), Chicago Lutheran Theological Seminary, ©1950, pp. 98, $1.20.

This trenchant pamphlet is by an Estonian, who was formerly a professor in the University of Tartu and in the Baltic University (in exile) at Hamburg-Penneberg, Germany. He had experience with both the nazis and the Russian communists in Estonia before becoming a refugee in 1944. The time spent in refugee camps has given him acquaintance with many driven from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary, and other countries behind the Iron Curtain. An evident desire to be realistic is felt through the entire writing. The first two chapters recite a quantity of well-documented outrages poured on these people by the emissaries of the Soviet Union. His ire against communism does not rest on theoretical grounds but is the result of factual information. These chapters furnish a necessary supplement to all the theoretic evaluations of communism that have appeared heretofore. Chapter Three shows the real essence of communism to be in its action—the use of terror and force to compel its acceptance. There are three chapters dealing with what the author considers to be the naïve and dreamy way with which many Protestant writers view the claims of communism. The last of these is a scathing outbreak against the Amsterdam Conference of the World Council of Churches for bracketing capitalism and communism in the same statement that neither of them is satisfactory. The climax of the effort is a call to the churches to fight communism by every means in their power. And I think he is right in this contention. It will have to be a real fight, but is worth while.

HOWARD WAYNE SMITH

The Philosophy of Mathematics, by Edward A. Maziarz, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. viii, 286, $4.

The author hopes that this book will be of interest to professional mathematicians and philosophers (p. vi), but it deserves a wider audience. He opposes those reductionists who regard mathematics as the one ultimate science in which all others will ultimately be resolved, an outcome which would leave little place to the higher interests and aspirations of man. Such a question concerns us all. It cannot be solved by rhetoric and oratory, but only by careful investigation of the evidence. The book goes into the subject competently, but in a surprisingly untechnical manner. It is written in ordinarry English, without a single formula, equation, graph, Greek or Hebrew letter, or other esoteric symbol. Any seriously minded reader who has had the usual courses in mathematics required in secondary schools and freshman year in college, and a one-year college course in ancient, mediæval, and modern European philosophy, will find most of the book within his grasp. Naturally those who have had more mathematics and philosophy will be at an advantage. The book is very well documented. It ends with a bibliography of twenty pages which appears to be a comprehensive summary of the literature brought down to date. Approximately the first half of the volume consists of an historical account of the philosophy of mathematics, beginning with the ancient Pythagoreans and Plato, and giving special attention to Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, and more recent philosophers and mathematicians. The remainder of the book sets forth the contemporary positions more in detail, expounding fairly and clearly those which he rejects as well as his own standpoint, a contemporary version of Thomism. It is refreshing to find a writer of our own time who regards philosophy as queen of the sciences, and who assigns to metaphysics the authority to delimit the domains of the different sciences and to decide ultimate questions. Protestants may wonder whether

Thomas Aquinas actually anticipated the problems of the twentieth century on this subject to the extent which the author believes, although probably few Protestant philosophers and mathematicians have ever read the treatises of the angelic doctor upon this particular topic. Almost all Christians and Jews will sympathize with the general conclusions of this book, and hope that they will be convincing to the specialists in this field. The following sentence is worth quoting: "Though it has been said that God made the natural numbers and man made the rest, it is more correct, metaphysically and mathematically, to say that God made the mathematician and the universe, and the mathematician has abstractively and inventively construed the mathematics of the divinely fashioned universe" (p. 248). WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

The Art of the Rhythmic Choir, by Margaret Palmer Fisk, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. xi, 205, $2.50.

As an art form for the expression of religious experience the dance is practically an unexplored medium today. The reasons for this neglect are many but not impressive. The history of Christianity reveals the use of the dance from almost the earliest days; certainly symbolic movement as an expression of worship is as old as religion itself. Why, then, should we not train ourselves both to perform and to appreciate the art of rhythmic movement? Mrs. Fisk has been working with rhythmic choirs for several years and has achieved notable success in dramatizing religious ideas through this art. Her book is a sensible and convincing plea for the development and use of such choirs in our churches. She gives valuable suggestions on how and where to begin, what to expect of the choir, and how the church may use it in its worship. What she proposes, like all art, cannot be judged merely from the description of it; absentee art criticism is not valid. When Ruth St. Denis interprets Psalms 142 and 150, when the Sadler's Wells Ballet performs "The Wise and Foolish Virgins," and when Ted Shawn interprets an entire worship service from the call to worship to the benediction, it is certainly time we of the church recognized the tremendous importance and value of the dance and concluded that it is an art that must not be relegated to those outside the church. Its introduction into the worship service of the Christian church, however, will call for equal parts of appreciation, skill, sincerity—and tact. ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Big Burlesque, by Charles Tekeyan, New York, Pastoral-Universe, 1950, pp. 192.

As a first novel by a young man who has written a collection of excellent short stories (*The Passionate Tennis Player, and other Stories,* Pastoral-Universe, 1949), this book is not easy to review. One is confronted with the author's flair for the short story form, and the success of the former volume, as contrasted with the relative failure of this one. Mr. Tekeyan is thoroughly honest—not to say in earnest—and at times he is very convincing. Unfortunately, he becomes bogged down so often in his excessive use of symbolism that his virtues show in rather a poor light. Mr. Tekeyan is able to use a precise type of language which is arresting and interesting, so long as it steers away from a brand of pseudo innocence which attempts to evoke the magic of pastoral poetry. Mr. Tekeyan clearly believes that he has mastered this style, but he rarely sustains it without losing his thread somewhere. Another criticism could be levelled against his conscious attempt to use English as a foreign language. Again, without sufficient control of this necessarily simplified technique, the style becomes bizarre and rather flat, instead of conveying the otherworldliness which the author wishes to suggest. His story is a simple one, and rather touching: A young man and his father go for a day's excursion into a never-never land, somewhere in

New Jersey. It is a hot day, and the young man wishes to discover a new world—something outside of New York. In his search, he becomes preacher-protagonist of a "genuine world," while his father attempts to sway him with the considered judgments of old age. The subsequent adventures of father and son with various other people who reach the "real world" are brought to a final and inevitable conclusion by a severe attack of what Mr. Tekeyan chooses to call, "The Miracle of Poison Ivy." One strength of Mr. Tekeyan's rather loose narrative saves him here. Instead of a complete disillusionment, an incurable optimism, liberally besprinkled throughout the rest of the book, convinces the several enthusiasts that they should have their picnic celebration, drink toasts to the "real world," and return to the city. The "miracle" simply proves to them that civilized men are incapable of returning to prehistoric bliss for longer than a short holiday. However, there are many pages of windy philosophizing in a quasi-Rousseau style before we reach this conclusion; and there are other passages which are reminiscent of William Saroyan at his smart-aleck worst. There are several chapters which would make good, separate short stories. The one entitled *The Wonderful Turnstile Revolution* comes to mind, as does *Meet Chief Left-Wing.* Actually, it is easier to appreciate the undeniable merits of this book, if one considers it as a group of short stories, rather than as a novel.

THEODORE V. ENSLIN II

A Dictionary of Church Music, by G. W. Stubbing, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. 128, $3.75.

This excellent little volume is an English compilation intended primarily for organists, choirmasters, and clergymen in the Church of England. It contains, however, much information useful to church musicians and ministers in other denominations, especially those in which liturgical forms of worship are followed. Since the information goes beyond a dictionary definition of musical terms, in some cases running to a page or two of explanatory comment, the book is really a miniature encyclopædia of church music, with citations reporting Roman Catholic usage on the one hand, and Congregational and Methodist hymn singing on the other. It will prove a useful handbook for persons interested in the improvement of church musical standards.

HENRY WILDER FOOTE

The Secret of Life, by Roy A. Burkhart, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. 118, $1.25.

This little book like the dozen or more others by the same author is a kind of projection of his effective and unusual ministry into his reading constituency. It is a book on devotional guidance and spiritual tranquillity of which there are many. The days in which we are living encourage them. It is abundantly illustrated with incidents from his own experience. It has one brief chapter, "Pressing toward the Goal," which condenses into a little less than four pages a good part of its entire material. What he writes is largely the substance of many other books along similar lines. He quotes from several and lists a much larger number in an excellent bibliography. What commends the book mainly is the reputation of the author. He provides something of an insight into the method of his ministry. If one should venture a criticism, it would be of the title as applied to the content more than to the content itself. There is no secret in seeking to live the Christ life. "I have called you friends," Jesus said to his disciple, "for all things I have heard of my Father I have made known unto you." The book is a moving modern exhortation to apply in our own lives what Jesus teaches. It reveals no secret. It does emphasize and apply the truth that Jesus taught.

E. C. HERRICK

Introducing Islam, by J. Christy Wilson, New York, Friendship Press, ©1950, pp. 64, 60 cents.

This small brochure, published in paper covers and well illustrated with modern photographs, provides an interesting introduction to the field of Islam for nontechnical students of religion. It seems to be designed primarily for young people. Consisting of only sixty-four pages, it gives a brief but very readable account of Mohammed's life and of the spread of the religion; then follows a brief description of the main beliefs and practices of Moslems, followed by a brief look at Islam across the world, including an estimate of Moslem followers in various lands. The final chapter has a description of Islam from the standpoint of Christianity, stressing the unique values which appear in Christianity but seem to be lacking, according to the author, in Islam. It is certainly not an objective, scholarly study; yet on the whole it attempts to be fair in presenting the essential nature of Islamic faith. Its purpose is quite obvious, to awaken in people a missionary concern for Moslem peoples. As such it seems to the reviewer to be rather well done.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

Today Is Mine: a Manual of Devotion, compiled and edited by Thomas Curtis Clark, New York, Harper, ©1950, pp. viii, 374, $1.50.

Today Is Mine is a well-compiled and edited book of devotions. The author will be identified as the compiler of one thousand quotable poems. He is a well-known author in the field of religious poetry. Perhaps his knowledge of this field has much to do with the timely poems from modern and classical sources appearing with each day's meditation. The scripture selections are exceptionally good. This volume places more emphasis upon the prayers than the average devotional book. These prayers are drawn from men in our modern pulpits as well as from the great Christian spirits such as St. Francis of Assisi and Thomas à Kempis. The thought for the day is stated in a few trenchant sentences. The contributors of these meditations are men like Luccock, Fosdick, Coffin, Gilkey, Sockman, and Oxnam. Such should identify the book as among the best, if one is looking for devotional materials either for personal or family use.

JAMES HOUSTON IVEY

Windows Toward God, by Charles H. Schmitz, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1950, pp. 192, $1.25.

The author is the minister of a church, the chairman of the Radio and Television Committee of the American Baptist Convention, and a member of the University of Chicago Radio Workship. Since 1946 he has conducted daily devotional broadcasts. He has learned how to say what is worth saying in a manner that is engaging and impressive. These eighty-six brief meditations are as rewarding to read as they must have been to hear on the radio. Basically sound content is given a freshness of presentation that might well become a source of study for all those charged with the often seemingly impossible task of being both worth while and interesting. It is an art to write as Schmitz does. Read his book for your own personal devotion, as well as for the good it will do others who then listen to you.

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The San Francisco Stage, by Edmond M. Gagey, New York, Columbia University Press, 1950, pp. xv, 264, $3.50.

Both San Francisco and the stage are fascinating subjects for study. Together the combination is more than doubly interesting. The theatrical history of San

Francisco covers a little more than a century. During that time the city has seen practically everything from early military performances to the productions of a modern Hollywood suburbia. The story, full of the glamorous personalities of yesterday, is well told in this volume based upon the annals compiled by the Research Department of the San Francisco Federal Theatre. It is, to be sure, a history and a condensed history at that. Yet the smell of printer's ink never quite overcomes the subtle aroma of grease paint. Indeed, how could it?

ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

The Imitation of Christ, by Gerard Zerbolt of Zutphen, translated by Albert Hyma, Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1950, pp. 116, $1.

The reviewer turns in this brief notice (of a tiny book) before seeing the scholarly justification of its identity and authorship. Professor Hyma, the editor of this new *Imitation of Christ,* is also publishing this year a new study of "The Brethren of the Common Life." The familiar and beloved *Imitation of Christ* is, of course, a subject of long debate. In 1937 we had from the press *The Following of Christ,* edited by the Jesuit Malaise, consisting of the first three books of the standard work, and purporting to be the spiritual diary of Gerard Groote, the founder of the Brethren. Hyma in a review (*Church History,* IX, 1) refuted the claim of Groote's authorship of these three books. Now Hyma publishes a manuscript from Eutin, Germany, which he claims as the true and original heart of the *Imitation,* and names the author as Gerard Zerbolt of Zutphen, who was himself an eminent member of the Brethren. It consists of a shorter version of Book I of the à Kempis work, and the editor rejoices to find it a more consistent and satisfying whole, chiefly because of its freedom from the anti-intellectualism which mars the complete à Kempis version.

JOHN W. BRUSH

The Dignity of Man, by Lynn Harold Hough, London, Independent Press, ©1950, pp. 143, 6/.

Dr. Hough's little book is a very readable discussion of human nature in the light of the teachings of the Bible. It is a wholesome tonic and a much needed corrective for the gloomy description of man to be found in many quarters in these days. The reader will find here an optimism that is bracing in that it stems from an honest appraisal of our common humanity and a profound understanding of classic Christianity and its finest literature. *The Dignity of Man* deserves a wide and appreciative reading by all who are interested in the basic Christian conception of man.

SANKEY L. BLANTON

A Treasury of Sermon Illustrations, edited by Charles L. Wallis, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1950, pp. 319, $3.50.

Although this book will be widely used it will, unfortunately, aid and abet the speaker who (a) has not learned what sermon illustration really is, and/or (b) has not learned how to get better illustrations himself. It may be carping criticism to point out that this volume has several more or less serious misquotations and several inaccurate titles; these things may be mere carelessness. It is not carping, however, to express genuine distaste for and complete disapproval of the "a-little-boy-once-asked" type of illustration. It is not asking too much that accurate identification and attribution be the *sine qua non* of this sort of anthology. It is not unfair to warn the searcher through the indices for appropriate illustrations that he will often be disappointed and frequently misled. All these are serious defects that occur in the usual

volume of sermon illustrations, and the present one is only slightly less free than most. Of course there is some wheat. ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Through Christ Our Lord, by Georgia Harkness, Nashville, Abingdon-Cokesbury, ©1950, pp. xii, 147, $1.25.

The publishers ought not to use the word "unique" about this or any book; it prejudices those who know what the word means. As "a guide to personal daily devotions for approximately a five-month cycle," it is based upon "the principal recorded sayings of Jesus from the first three Gospels" (p. vi), quoted, explained, and made significant to the reader by several first-person questions. A brief prayer rounds out the one small page given to each day's devotion. ROBERT E. KEIGHTON

Origin of History as Metaphysic, by Marjorie L. Burke, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. 61, $2.75.

The author maintains that history, by which she evidently means historiography, the writing of history, has been on the wrong track ever since the Council of Nicæa, at least. This has been caused by a bias of thought resulting from cultural conditions. It is difficult to make out precisely what she believes this bias to be. Amazing sentences like this are typical of her attempts to state it: "History become conterminous with time, is believed to comprise in itself cause and ultimate effect and has thus become a physical concept of absolute purposiveness" (p. 2). Our misconception of history has led us moderns into erroneous interpretations of time, events, ourselves, and almost everything else. The processes by which we misinterpret history are further described in chapters on "the image and the thing-in-itself," "the communication of the image," "ascetic recreation," and "synthetic morality" in a manner that vaguely reminds one of Schelling and other idealists of the German romantic period. How historians are to overcome their alleged errors and learn to interpret history in the classical Greek manner, the author does not say. She can hardly expect them to return to the methods and manner of Thucydides. This book is erudite, but more provocative than convincing. WILLIAM K. WRIGHT

East and West, by Mary Burt Messer, New York, Philosophical Library, ©1950, pp. 66, $3.

It may be that there is something profound in this little book. If so, it eludes me. It speaks a language that is vague, and it is exceedingly difficult to get any precise meaning out of it. Beyond the statement of the fact that Marxism represents a materialistic view of history and that Christian Science represents a spiritual view, I do not see that it makes much of a contribution to the problem of East *vs.* West. She seems to regard the former as a masculine view, the latter a feminine view, discovered by Mrs. Eddy, but Christianity had long before Mrs. Eddy insisted upon the spiritual values as over against material. It shows little, if any, comprehension of the social problems which lie at the basis of the *Communist Manifesto,* and has no practical suggestion as to how they might be met. Publication of a book of this size at $3 is utterly inexcusable. CHARLES S. BRADEN